Islamophobia in the Asia-Pacific
The Othering & Belonging Institute at UC Berkeley, formerly the Haas Institute for a Fair and Inclusive Society, is a vibrant hub of researchers, community leaders, policy-makers, artists, and communicators that advances research, policy, and work related to marginalized communities. It engages in innovative narrative, communications, and cultural strategies that attempt to reframe the public discourse around marginality and inclusion and respond to issues that require immediate and long-term action.

This Reading Resource Pack was developed by researchers from the Global Justice Program at the Othering and Belonging Institute at UC Berkeley, as part of its larger project documenting and countering Islamophobia.

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**Introduction**

**THIS READING RESOURCE PACK** provides a thematic overview of current academic research published over the last few decades on Islamophobia in the Asia-Pacific region in the form of peer-reviewed academic journal articles, books, and relevant publicly available dissertations submitted to universities around the world. This edition expands the previous publication on *Islamophobia in the United States: A Reading Resource Pack* (September 2018), to the Asia-Pacific region. In doing so, the resource seeks to highlight trends in knowledge production around this topic and draw attention to any areas in need of further development and contributions. In particular, there remain a few countries within the Asia-Pacific region with minimal academic research on Islamophobia, highlighting the need for academic analyses and case-studies to understand the phenomenon in these relevant contexts. This is critical within a context of rising anti-Muslim discourse, sentiment, and violence towards Muslims in the region.

While definitions of Islamophobia have been offered by a range of researchers, scholars, and community organizers grappling with the evolving nature of anti-Muslim sentiment around the world, the Othering and Belonging Institute defines Islamophobia as “a belief that Islam is a monolithic religion whose followers, Muslims, do not share common values with other major faiths; is inferior to Judaism and Christianity; is archaic, barbaric, and irrational; is a religion of violence that supports terrorism; and is a violent political ideology.” As defined, Islamophobia forms the basis of an ideology that views Muslims as a threat to “many” civilizations. Furthermore, Islamophobia is contingent upon the construction and reification of a homogenized Muslim “other” who should be viewed suspiciously, scrutinized, dehumanized, and excluded from “Western” or “Judeo-Christian” societies.

Islamophobia is expressed in discriminatory laws, administrative policy, judicial activities, and public actions of state officials that single out Muslim persons or the observance of Muslim faith or customs for unequal or differential treatment, or laws that are neutral on their face but have a disparate harmful impact or are or tend to be applied unequally to people of Muslim faith or the observance of Muslim faith or customs. Additionally, Islamophobia is expressed in prejudicial views, discriminatory language, and acts of verbal and physical violence inflicted upon Muslims and those perceived to be Muslim. Islamophobia has manifested in a policing regime that engages in the profiling, surveillance, torture, and detention of people along racial/ethnic and religious lines and has justified the militarization of foreign policy and an unprecedented expansion of security apparatuses that impact all peoples.
As emphasized by the many readings cited in this reading resource pack, Islamophobia is wide-reaching across the region, varying in its origins, manifestations and impacts on Muslims residing in the ten nations profiled. The purpose of this publication is to enhance the utility of existing academic research on Islamophobia in the Asia-Pacific region for a wide range of stakeholders interested in challenging this global phenomenon. These stakeholders may include activists, civil rights organizations, community workers, counselors, students, researchers, and policymakers, among others. In providing the community with a shorthand summary of publications about Islamophobia, we aim to categorize existing work, encourage a robust expansion of these debates, and establish a framework for the synthesis and summary of anti-Islamophobia research across the globe.

The Othering and Belonging Institute has long believed that the frame of “othering and belonging” provides a critical perspective to build a more inclusive and equitable society. In response to the experiences of Muslim Americans and the Muslim community at large, we seek to counteract all forms of discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance to expose the power structures that generate them, in order to ultimately foster a more inclusive world. The Othering and Belonging Institute suggests this reading resource pack be used as a companion resource for training and education on the study of Islamophobia, and to challenge discourses and actions that discriminate against Muslims in the Asia-Pacific region.

To expand the geographical focus and document global anti-Islamophobia research, we are releasing two reading resource packs simultaneously: the one in your hand covers the Asia-Pacific region, and the other covers the European region. This reading resource pack catalogs more than 1,520 citations on the study of Islamophobia in the Asia-Pacific region, organized under these ten main themes, under each respective country name:

- Theorizing the Field
- National Security and Foreign Policy
- Xenophobia, anti-immigrant and anti-refugee sentiment
- Citizenship and National Identity
- Mainstream and Digital Media
- Othering and Discrimination
- Gender and Sexuality
- Social Mobility
- Geography and the Public Space
- Counter-Narratives and Strategies

This publication provides an overall summary of the main issues, themes and emerging trends relating to Islamophobia in each of the listed countries. Following this summary, the citations published about Islamophobia in each respective nation are
listed under the ten thematic headings. This format is utilized in order to bring to light, the expansive research published in particular thematic areas, while also highlighting the nations and emerging areas in the Asia-Pacific region in need of further research with regard to Islamophobia. The countries included in this reading pack were selected by the researchers based on the list of the region’s nations provided by the United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner. The researchers identified, examined, and studied the top ten countries for one of two reasons: either the country is home to a sizable Muslim population in a non-majority Muslim country, or the country has significant economic and political power. These countries are Australia, China, India, Myanmar, New Zealand, Japan, Philippines, South Korea, Sri Lanka, and Thailand.
THERE IS A GROWING BODY OF LITERATURE that recognizes the importance of examining the rise of Islamophobia in the Asia-Pacific region. As outlined in this reading pack, there has been considerable critical attention from scholars interested in the phenomenon of Islamophobia across the Asia-Pacific region. The reading pack presents an overview of the peer-reviewed scholarly works in these nations under the ten key thematic areas explored within this document. In bridging these country overviews, this section presents a summary of the key themes, issues and trends related to Islamophobia in the region as outlined in existing scholarly work.

Theorizing Islamophobia: Historical perspectives

Studies over the past two decades have provided important information on the rise of Islamophobia in the ten nations reviewed in this reading pack. The study of Islamophobia in the Asia-Pacific region draws on foundational works on Islamophobia in the West, applying key concepts to examine the phenomena in the region, see box below.

Edward Said
Establishing the study of Islamophobia

Prof Edward Said, one of the founders of the academic field of postcolonial studies is one of the earliest scholars to document and examine the phenomena of Islamophobia in Western Contexts. Beginning with Orientalism (1978), Said established the term “Orientalism,” which is now a widely adopted critical concept that referred to the characterization of “the East,” i.e., the Orient in Western scholarship and media. Said established that Western studies of the Middle East have offered representations and images reflecting the political power structure characterized by the colonial dominance of Europe over the Middle East.

Said’s analysis was later extended in Covering Islam (1997), which provided a groundbreaking early overview of how images and representations mediate the perception of Islam across a range of contexts in the West. Said begins with an overview of the prevailing Western and American hostility towards the Middle East, and the reciprocal hostility of the Middle East towards the West. This work traces how historical events...
Across all nations, Muslims represent a small proportion of the countries reviewed, residing in these countries as minority ethnic and religious groups representing as little as 0.17% of the local population in Japan, and over 15% of the local population in India. Definitions of Islamophobia vary across the region according to the unique local histories and contexts of each nation-state. Theorizations of Islamophobia in this region thus highlight the need to situate contemporary understandings of Islamophobia within the broader national histories of colonialism, interreligious conflict alongside the global influences on rising anti-Muslim trajectories in the region.

In the first instance, scholars across the ten nations argue that an examination of Islamophobia must account for the unique local histories of Islam in each context. For example, the history of Islamophobia in the Philippines can be traced as early as 1886, highlighting the need to account for Muslim struggles against colonial domination within contemporary analyses of ongoing liberation efforts of the Moro struggle in Southern Philippines. Historical contestations mutually shape the recent struggles among Muslims in Thailand, particular those in the Southern provinces. The majority of perspectives theorizing Islamophobia also highlight that anti-Muslim sentiment is not a new and emerging phenomenon in this context, with some scholars tracing conflict between Muslim and Buddhist communities to the beginning of Sinhala Buddhist revivalism in the 1880s–90s (Stewart, 2014). Three key periods of Islamophobia that predate the recent increase of Islamophobia in Sri Lanka in 2012 have been identified: first “during the British colonial regime, which culminated in the 1915 race riots, the second during the so-called socialist era of Prime Minister Srimavo Bandaranaike, climaxing in the 1976 Puttalam riots, and the third after the 1983 anti-Tamil pogrom” (Ali, 2015). Indeed, the end of the civil war in Sri Lanka (1983-2009) marked an unfortunate period of increased discrimination against the Muslim minority (Ameer Ali, 2015; Razick et al., 2016).

In the case of China, emerging perspectives that theorize Islamophobia also trace the historical roots, arguing that Islamophobia is not a modern-day sentiment in China exclusive to recent decades (Gladney, 2003; Yi, 2010; Qian, 2019). Rather, Islamophobia is positioned as a historical construct that can be traced to ethnic conflicts between Han Chinese and Muslim minorities in the early modern era (Qian, 2019; Luiqui and Yang 2018). In particular, the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) reportedly produced oppression against ethno-religious minorities in China, resulting in the closure of any Muslim buildings as well as the prohibition of Arabic texts (Jones-Leaning and Pratt, 2012). This history is significant in shaping contemporary understandings of current day interethnic riots and interreligious conflict affecting Muslims in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (Erie and Carlson 2014).

The significance of historical perspectives is mutually apparent in contributions to Islamophobia in Myanmar. Emerging research situates Islamophobia in the broader context of political and social liberalizations in Myanmar since colonialism. Scholars emphasize that the othering of Muslim minorities such as the Rohingya in present day Myanmar is foregrounded in nationalist resentment towards British colonial migration labor policies that encouraged Rohingya migration to Myanmar in the seventeenth century. Since the 1948 independence of Myanmar from the British, several animosities towards the Rohingya have surfaced, based on the belief that Rohingya have benefited from colonial rule. This has led towards a nationalist movement, as well as religious revival that further contributed to the growing anti-Muslim hatred (Kyaw, 2015).

On the other hand, in contexts like Korea Islamophobia is situated as a contemporary issue traced back to the 1950s, which has reportedly been exacerbated by global influences of the War on Terror (Dong-Jin and Jae, 2012; Fathil and Fathil, 2011).

In addition to calls for localized understandings of Islamophobia, there is also a growing body of literature that recognizes that Islamophobia is relationally produced and implicated in the Asia-Pacific region. Within these works, the numerous global influences and connections in how Islamophobia is manifest within each nation-state are examined. First, scholars publishing on Islamophobia in Western nations - namely Australia and New Zealand, have demonstrated the significance of the September 11 attacks on rising levels of anti-immigrant sentiment, and anti-Muslim attitudes. This emerged in line with a global fear around Islamic terrorism, however, the particular reasons why Islamophobia increased in prevalence within these two national contexts has not been explored significantly within these emerging works.

The global influence of the War on Terror is mutually noted in scholarly works on East Asian nations including Korea, China and Japan. For example, within the frame of security, the rise of Islamophobia within Korean society has been attributed to key geopolitical events and external influences, particularly the fear of Islamic terrorism. These include the 9/11 attacks, the shock killing of the South Korean interpreter and Christian missionary Kim Sonil by an Iraqi militia group in 2004 and the Korean Hostage Crisis in 2007.

Similarly, anti-Muslim sentiment in China is found to be inspired by the global Islamophobia emerged from the ongoing conflict between the West and the Islamic world. Scholars who support this theory argue that the anti-Muslim rhetoric observed in Chinese society bears strong.
The influence of the 9/11 attacks on Islamophobia in Thailand is also reflected in Prime Minister Thaksin's support for the "war on terror" in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 through involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq was opposed by Thai Muslims, including ethnically Malay Muslims in the south who demonstrated against what they perceived as a war against Islam (Storey, 2008).

**National Security and Foreign Policy**

In accordance with the above theorizations of Islamophobia as a relationally produced global phenomenon, a range of perspectives in this reading pack further examine the impacts of the Global War on Terror on the national security and foreign policy trajectories of each nation-state. The scholarship within the broader theme of national security and foreign policy has focused on connections to the global war on terror across all countries in the Asia-Pacific region, as well as emerging pro-Muslim foreign policy in a few contexts.

In the first instance, according to the scholarship covered in this reading pack, there has been a fortification of policies, practices and measures implemented in the name of national security that are found to discriminate against Muslim communities across the Asia-Pacific region. Islamophobia is thus legislated in both domestic and foreign policies following the 9/11 attacks as evident in political discourse, governance and practices, to the detriment of human rights. For example, in Australia, Islamophobia is legislated in deradicalization programs, counter terrorism surveillance and other measures that discriminate against Muslim communities. In Japan, Muslim communities are also surveilled in the name of national security (Yamagata, 2017; Takahashi, 2018). Security factors have mutually contributed to Islamophobia in South Korean politics include right wing politicians, intelligence authority, and conservative anti-Muslim civil and religious groups, and the legalization of the Anti-Terrorism Act in 2016 which cumulatively discriminate against Muslims (Han, 2018). Despite ongoing tensions and histories of interreligious conflicts in other parts of Asia, Muslims were accorded more attention following the US War on Terror in nations such as Myanmar, the Philippines and China. For example, the government in the Philippines proposed a Muslim-only ID scheme to identify alleged terror personalities in a bid to avoid spillover of the Marawi crisis (Imbong, 2018; Qian, 2019) highlights that after the 9/11 attacks, China explicitly classified domestic separatism in Xinjiang as a form of terrorism and drew comparison between the authorities’ crackdown in Xinjiang with the “War on Terror" in the West (Qian 2019). A rise of Islamophobia in China is thus connected to the state framing of ongoing ethnic unrest as a religion-motivated terrorist movement that poses a threat to national security (Qian 2019).

The contributions to National Security and Foreign Policy in this reading pack thus emphasize the role of political transition in producing greater anti-Muslim rhetoric and violence. However, although the respective War’s on Terror may import the legitimizing discourse and cover of the global War on Terror, the respective national security policies and practices of Islamophobia are best to be seen and understood within the relevant histories and contexts of each nation-state (e.g., see Gladney 2009). Scholarship on the role of foreign policy in Islamophobia in the Asia-Pacific region also draws attention to economic interests of
bridging friendly relations with Muslim nations and the Muslim world. Japan, for example, continues to encourage and welcome Muslim tourism through dedicated Halal Tourism, maintained through relatively cordial, economic ties and foreign policy with the Middle East (Marayuma, 2005) and other Islamic countries. There is also a tension between the Peoples Republic of China’s strategic national interest in building friendly relations with the Muslim world, and its determination to limit religious radicalism among Muslim groups (Wang 2016; Qian 2019; Erie and Carlson 2014).

This area of research requires ongoing attention, as the role of China’s Muslims in achieving the PRCs goal of channel transnational Muslim financial networks for its own benefit may become critical in linking China and Muslim countries (Wai-Yip Ho, 2019). What has been labelled as the “revival of the Silk Road network” may impact internal conditions of Muslims living in China, highlighting the need for critical studies on Chinese Islam and Muslims within PRC geo-politics (Ho, 2019). This is particularly important as China’s Muslim population is poised to play a significant role in the evolving relationship between China and the rest of the developing world, as well as in the resurgence of global Islam in state politics (Erie and Carlson 2014).

Xenophobia

In Western contexts, rising Islamophobia has stereotypes and stigmatized Muslim identities, undermining the official policies of multiculturalism in Australia and New Zealand (Poynting and Mason, 2008). Xenophobia (anti-immigrant and anti-refugee sentiment) and Islamophobia are connected in these two contexts, with scholarly works noting the role of political leaders in fueling this fear of refugees and immigrants from entering Australia. Anti-refugee sentiment has affected refugee policies in New Zealand, Australia and Korea. For example, the politicized and mediated othering of mostly Muslim immigrant groups such as Turkish, Syrian, Somali or Sudanese refugees has ultimately led to the progressively reduced support and intake of refugees in Australia. Further, the National Human Rights Commission of Korea (NHRC) report on hate speech uncovered hatred against immigrants was mostly directed towards immigrant workers, including Muslims, migrant women involved in international marriage, children of interracial families, and African Americans (Koo, 2018). Islamophobia is thus framed as a barrier to the true inclusion and belonging of Muslim communities in Australia and New Zealand, and results in negative impacts on identity formation in an integrationist, rather than multicultural framework (Kolig, 2019). Further research on the connections between xenophobia and Islamophobia, as well as the impacts on the lives of immigrants in the Asia-Pacific region is a critical area of work.

Citizenship and National Identity

Issues related to citizenship and national identity are at the forefront of Muslim experiences of Islamophobia in the Asia-Pacific region. Within this reading pack, these issues are organized around three trends: a rise in ethnonationalism, increased ethnoreligious conflict and
communalism, and finally, the exclusion of Muslims from citizenship. These trends undermine the position of Muslim groups within nation states and undermine policies of multiculturalism in relevant contexts.

A prominent area of work critiques the rise in ultra-right-wing nationalism, ethnonationalism and religious nationalism that excludes Muslim minorities from experiences of belonging and citizenship all ten nations reviewed in this reading pack. In Australia, emerging work documents and critiques the rise in ultra-right-wing nationalism, and the concurrent exclusion of Muslim identities from the exclusionary politics of white nationalism in the collective Australian national identity. A prejudice or discrimination against ethnic minorities as a whole is also ingrained in a number of Asian constructions of nationhood.

In China’s ancient culturalism, which maintains the Han majority’s control of legitimacy (Yi, 2010). Central to this culturalism is the belief that Han-Chinese was the only true civilization, resulting in alien invaders, migrants or nationalities such as Islamic communities being perceived as “backward” (Yi, 2010). Islam, like all cultures other than Chinese is regarded as a lower civilization as they have not acquired Chinese characteristics, leading to prejudice and discrimination (Yi, 2010). Similarly, “un-Japanese” temporary migrants, or values are seen as threats to the maintenance of Japan’s national identity as a homogenous island nation Yamagata (2017). As a secular and a religious society, Islam’s monotheistic point of view is therefore also viewed as something incompatible with Japanese culture (Pratama, 2018). Islamophobia is also as an extension of anti-multicultural sentiments and nationalist ideologies within South Korea (Joo, 2015). “A single-nation sentiment based on ethnic homogeneity is deeply embedded in the Korean self-identity, resulting in foreign immigrants in South Korean being treated as outsiders (Dong Jin and Jae, 2012). Islam is seen as a religion of foreigners, not of Koreans (Dong-Jin and Jae, 2012), resulting in Islamophobic sentiments being tied with hatred towards foreigners, immigrants, multicultural families and sexual minorities (Koo, 2018).

Across the rest of the region, a rise in radical religious ideologies has led to social conflicts and asymmetric policies from ruling regimes that weaken other groups, such as Muslims in the (Kusuma, 2017). In Korea, recent scholarship examines the ways in which Islamophobia is inscribed in the Protestant Right’s discourse on Islam and Muslims, discursively excluding Islam and Muslims a from an ethnonationalist view of Korean belonging. Indeed, the increase in Islamophobic discourses and attitudes is most pronounced in protestant communities and churches, who have been active agents in producing Islamophobic discourses in South Korea (Koo, 2018; Jeong, 2017).

The exclusion of Filipino Muslims can also be traced to the early years following political independence in 1946 where binaries were in place between Christians and Muslims, breeding minority nationalism that excludes Muslims. This religious nationalism also remains an important motivation for Muslim minorities who have been in conflict with the political objective of either an independent territorial state or a restitution of local political identity in response to their othering (Liow, 2006).

A rise in religious Hindu and Buddhist nationalism across the remainder of the region is also
attributed to rising levels of Islamophobia. Emerging perspectives have problematized the steady rise of Hindu nationalism following the partition of India and Pakistan (Butalia, 2017), portraying Indian Muslims as anti-India and anti-national, ultimately damaging Hindu-Muslim relations” (Thompson et al., 2019). Utilizing the ideology of Hindutva (Sumit, 1996; Waikar, 2018), right-wing nationalists proliferate the notion of Hindu superiority over other religions, and thus the political and social rationale for violence against other religious minorities such as Muslims (Dibyesh, 2010).

Most significantly, emerging scholarship has examined the negative impacts of rising Buddhist nationalism in Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Thailand on relations with Muslim minorities in these countries (Keyes, 2016). Keyes highlights the relational impacts of Theravada Buddhism, indicating that it was not until the period from the thirteenth to sixteenth centuries that it became the fundamental basis for political orders in both Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia (Keyes, 2016). Beginning with Sri Lanka, Muslims have faced long-standing external threats of ethno-linguistic Tamil nationalism as well as Sinhala Buddhist nationalism (Fazil, 2005; McGilvray, 2010). A recent rise of radical and violent Buddhist nationalism in Sri Lanka has been attributed to Sinhalese Buddhist majoritarianism which has exacerbated religious intolerance towards Sri Lanka’s ethno-religious minorities including Muslims and Christian Evangelicals (Gravers, 2015). Buddhist nationalists, such as Bodhu Bala Sena (BSS) are noted by Holt (2016) to construct Muslim communities in Sri Lanka “foreign invaders” who through alleged demographic/sexual, economic and cultural invasion, threaten the Sinhala race and the Buddhist religion. Scholars situate this anti-Muslim sentiment, is connected to historical anti-Tamil Buddhist nationalism highlighting that a xenophobic discourse of terrorism has been imposed and transferred from Tamil to Muslim minorities in Sri Lanka (e.g., Ali, 2015; Sivaloganathan, 2017; Stewart, 2014) in order to prevent a multi-ethnic and multi-religious nationality in Sri Lanka (Sivaloganathan, 2017).

A few scholars in recent years have brought attention to global connections between anti-Muslim Buddhist nationalism in Sri Lanka and other parts of Asia such as Thailand and Myanmar. Mikael Gravers (2015) and Peter Lehr (2018) both emphasize the connections between rising militant Buddhism across Thailand, Sri Lanka and Myanmar. There has been a particular rise of Buddhist nationalism with many Buddhists outside of southern Thailand noted to embrace a “Buddhist chauvinism” (McCargo 2009b: 32), also termed “militant Buddhism” – in response to the conflicts in the South of Thailand (Keyes, 2009) since as early as the 1970s. Buddhist nationalism has played a significant role in perpetuating anti-Muslim narratives (Mikael Gravers, 2015), policies and violence in Myanmar. Constructed as “foreigners,” xenophobic rhetoric has targeted Rohingya Muslims, fueling anti-Rohingya, and by extension, anti-Muslim sentiment (Eng, 2013). The role of Buddhist religious nationalism in producing these anti-Muslim narratives in Myanmar have been well-documented in emerging research, highlighting that Muslims are presented in key texts and discourses among Buddhist monks as a threat to both the nation and the Buddhist religion, justifying violence towards “threatening” Muslims (Johannessen, 2018). The radicalization of Buddhists and the rise of xenophobic sentiments in Myanmar are therefore connected with Myanmar’s national identity, which is largely based on ethnicity and tends to exclude the rest, particularly
Muslims. Islamophobia therefore has roots in Buddhist nationalism and its opposition to Islam (Roman Husarki, 2017) across various countries in the Asia-Pacific region, particularly Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Thailand. Gravers (2015) and Peter Lehr (2018) both emphasize that nationalistic monks and their messages disadvantage Muslims in their respective nations, producing Buddhist nationalist agitation (see also Rāghavan, 2013). These comparisons are also drawn with India’s Hindutva adherents, and the Muslim 969 Movement in Burma (Neil DeVotta, 2016).

A rise in ethnoreligious nationalism across the region has resulted in ethnoreligious conflicts with Muslim minorities in the protection of national territories and interests. In India, Hindu nationalism as the primary policy of national security has resulted in internal conflict and social upheaval (Chatterji et al., 2016), religious and ethnic violence (Dhattiwala and Biggs, 2012) and the displacement of Indian Muslims from the national space (Chatterjee, 2009). In Myanmar, the rise and evolution of anti-Muslim campaigns by Buddhist nationalist groups have resulted in “communal conflicts” across the nation (Walton and Hayward, 2014). Ethnoreligious conflicts involving religion and ethnicity have therefore responded to policies of organized violence and campaigns of cultural assimilation which targeted and discriminates against Muslims in their religious and cultural lives (Kusuma, 2017). Similarly, scholars have increasingly brought attention to how the liberation of Xinjiang in 1949 by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army and its subsequent establishment of Xinjiang as the Uyghur Autonomous Region on 1 October 1955 perpetuated the nationalist policy of “people’s war against the three evils: separatism, terrorism, and extremism” that negated the autonomy of Uyghur as a minority nationality under the PR of China. Many scholars believe that this nationalistic approach led to calls for the assimilation of, discrimination against, and exclusion of the Uyghurs from the national social fabric and is a cause for ongoing cruel policy against the Uyghurs in Xinjiang (Ho, 2019; Roberts, 2022).

Rising ethnonationalism and ethnoreligious conflicts noted in the existing literature also explore the negative impacts on experiences of citizenship and belonging among Muslims in the Asia-Pacific region. In China, Muslim Uyghurs and other Muslim ethnic minorities – such as Kyrgyz and Kazakh people in Xinjiang – are reported to face harsh actions by the Chinese government that considered by many as genocidal acts, including arbitrary detentions, incarceration in internment camps, cultural and religious restrictions (Jones-Leaning and Pratt, 2012; Luiqui, 2018). The struggle for Muslim integration and identity in an increasingly Hindu-nationalist political climate of India (Froerer, 2006) has also restricted the space available for alternate religious identities such as Muslims to navigate freely (Meenai, 2014). National identities of belonging and citizenship are reserved to Hindu Indians, whilst excluding those who do not satisfy the characteristics of the Hindu nationalist identities. Further, measures such as love jihad (Gupta, 2018; 2014; 2009) anti-conversion laws and the expansion of the ghar vāpasī (returning home) program restrict the ability for Hindus to convert to other religions, while simultaneously advancing and encouraging the conversion, and more than often forced conversions of other religious groups such as Muslims, to Hinduism (Thompson et al., 2019).

The contested history around the national identity of Muslims in parts of Asia, such as Thailand, Myanmar and Sri Lanka are a fundamental aspect of ongoing conflicts and their ongoing
experience of citizenship in the nation. Exclusion is felt by Malay Muslims in Thailand, who note that in addition to perceived threats against their ethnic identity and being treated as “other,” Malay Muslims view themselves as second-class citizens, politically marginalized and denied access to educational and employment opportunities (Storey, 2008). In the case of Myanmar, the Myanmar government excludes Rohingya as one of the countries’ “national races,” resulting in fearful uncertainty about the status of Muslims living in the Rakhine State in the western region of Myanmar (Parashar and Alam, 2019). National laws have thus resulted in the statelessness of the Rohingya, bringing to light, the role of legislation in further disempowering the Rohingya who are regarded as neither minority not citizen by the law (Parashar and Alam, 2018). This denial of citizenship to the Rohingya minority has resulted in systemic discrimination and large-scale displacement, stripping them of basic and “fundamental rights and freedoms afforded to afforded to Myanmar’s Buddhist majority, such as the freedom to move, the freedom to equal education and employment opportuni-
ties, and the freedom to marry” (Eng, 2013). As highlighted by Eng (2013), the xenophobia directed towards the Rohingya, in the denial of their citizenship is critical to the continuation of current policies that perpetuate widespread, sectarian violence that endangers Muslims and other religious minorities in Myanmar.

Mainstream and Digital Media

The existing body of research on Islamophobia in the Asia-Pacific region suggests that media has played a significant role in shaping anti-Muslim discourses, representations and attitudes across the region. Within these published works, there are a few key trends that are discussed in the reading pack. First, a number of studies have highlighted the role of news media in representing Muslims and Islam negatively, and at times, connect these representations constructions and depictions in Western media. Further, emerging works have captured the role of digital media, particularly online and social media platforms in further proliferating Islamophobic representations and attitudes across the region.

The negative media representation of Muslims. In the first instance, across the Asia-Pacific region, news media sources are identified as primary sites of (re)producing racialized stereotypes of Muslims, and often produce polarizing, and negative representations of Islam that exacerbates an Islamophobic political climate in these respective nations. Across the region, representations of Islam and Muslims in news media are overwhelmingly associated with national security, acts of terrorism, war, and conflict. The consistently negative tenor of media that exacerbates Islamophobic discourses was thus traced across the region, particularly in producing misunderstandings of Islam and undermining understandings of local conflicts. For example, in Thailand, media reporting around the insurgencies of the early 2000s further muted any Islamic or Malay claims to self-determination and thus failed to capture the narratives and grievances of Malay Muslims in the South of Thailand (Jerryson, 2014). Further, the media characterizes relations between Buddhists and Muslims as that of deep hatred and fails to report on regions of Thailand such as the Songkla Lake basin where peaceful relations between Buddhist and Muslim communities prevail (Horstmann, 2011). In
India discursive representations of Muslims and Islam in Indian Prime-Time News found that these television channels propagate negative associations between Islam and backwardness, ignorance, and violence. Beyond news media Hindi and Bollywood cinema are also found to produce Islamophobic narratives, representing Muslims as terrorists, religious extremists, Pakistan loyalists, anti-Hindu and “traitors” (Kumar, 2016).

**The influence of Western media.** Negative constructions of Islam and Muslims across the region are also found to be relationally influenced by those produced by Western media. For example, the news media in a number of Asia-Pacific nations are found to reproduce the anti-Muslim bias, such as Japan, China, Korea. In some nations such as Korea, European and American media are streamed locally, which depict Islam as a violent religion, and Muslims as terrorists and religious fundamentalists (Koo, 2018). Negative depictions of Muslims are related to increased coverage of global anti-terror initiatives, international affairs such as the Syrian war and refugee crisis, which dominate international news coverage. Further, Western media outlets are also found to reinforce Islamophobia in how they depict local crises in the Asia-Pacific region. For example, Jasper Roe (2017) finds that online media sources generally depict the Rohingya people as a homogenous, passive group of victims, while minimizing agency of the Myanmar Security Forces and Government of Myanmar persecuting minority groups. In focusing heavily on the Islamic identity of the Rohingya people, these representations further intensify a sharp dichotomy between Muslims and Buddhists and fail to capture historical struggles for self-determination, as well as transnational economic and political forces contributing to sectarian violence in Myanmar (Brooten 2015; Rooten, Syed and Akrino, 2015). Overall, scholarly works present evidence that the rise in negative news media reporting of Islam results in increased anti-Muslim sentiment and violent attacks against Muslims across the region.

**The role of online and social media spaces.** There is increasing concern in published works that digital media platforms, including the online space have reproduced negative discourses of Islamophobia such as cyber hate speech, online hate groups and communities. Such trends are particularly reflected in the social media activities of online conservative groups in South Korea, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, China, Australia and India who use social media to not only expand anti-Muslim discourse, but also spread hate speech and images regarding Muslims and Islam. (Han, 2018). In India, wide-spread othering of Muslims under a Hindu nationalist logic has resulted in exclusion, segregation, compromised safety and disadvantage of Indian Muslims (Gayer and Jaffrelot, 2012). More concerning, technologies, including mainstream and digital media are being used to disseminate the views of Buddhist nationalist groups, appealing to young computer-savvy residents through the liberal use of new social media technologies such as Facebook, Twitter and SMS (Stewart, 2014). In Myanmar, hate speech produced using digital media has resulted in outbreaks of mass violence, stemming from propaganda such as pamphlets, leaflets, DVDs, VCDs, CDs, posters and others that were distributed before the mass violence. Indeed, “increased freedoms to express political opinions, combined with a growing, less censored media landscape and ready access to the Internet and mobile phones, have provided opportunities for divisive voices to enflame religious and ethnic tensions and promote discriminatory policies, often to the detriment of Myanmar’s
Othering and Discrimination

Anti-Muslim discourses, attitudes, policies and practices have produced increased experiences of othering and discrimination across the Asia-Pacific region. Across all ten nations cited, Muslims faced intensified state surveillance in the last two decades, as well as institutional discrimination, Islamophobia in everyday life, and increased violence that threatened their safety.

In the first instance, the othering of Muslim minorities has justified the surveillance of Muslim ethnic groups under anti-terrorism and national security legislation by authorities across China, Australia, Japan and Myanmar. Islamophobic discourses have also resulted in everyday forms of discrimination such as racial attacks, hate speech, opposition to mosques and anti-Halal campaigns across the region. Most concerning is the increased risk of violence and threats to safety imposed by Islamophobia. In Australia, Islamophobia following the 9/11 attacks produced mass-racist violence, evident in the Cronulla riots in 2005, which was anti-Arab, and mainly anti-Muslim in its intentions and impacts. In neighboring New Zealand, the Christchurch mosque attacks on March 15, 2019 killed 51 people, perpetrated by Australian gunman Brenton Tarrant.

Rising ethnoreligious violence against Muslim communities in Sri Lanka, Thailand, India, China and Myanmar form significant areas of concern within the literatures cited in this reading pack. In Sri Lanka, Buddhist nationalist groups have incited violence against Muslim bodies and in the last two decades. Further, Muslim communities in Southern Thailand are under a constant threat of intercommunal and terrorist violence, which has led to militarization, harassment, human rights violations, ethnic cleansing and rising numbers of refugees. Under the Hindu nationalist ideology of Hindutva, India’s Muslims also face increased beef-related violence against Muslim (Siyech, 2018), justified by beef bans and cow legislation that divide India’s Muslims and Hindus in the name of “protecting” Mother Cow. Many Muslims thus “live in fear due to the increasing, volatile and unpredictable nature of beef lynching across various regions in India” (Siyech, 2018, p. 14). In the works cited in this reading pack also report on communal violence and what appears to be, the ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya, and other Muslim minorities in Myanmar (Nick Cheesman, 2017), which are attributed to anti-Muslim hate speech before outbreaks of mass violence. Collectively, publications on sectarian violence against Muslim minorities shed light on the broader effects of othering and discrimination on overall safety of Muslim minorities in the Asia-Pacific region. As emphasized by Imtiyaz Yusuf (2018), there is a critical need to interrogate anti-Muslim violence in each nation-state within the broader context of global Islamophobia and the tenuous state of Muslim-Buddhist relations in contemporary Southeast Asia more broadly in connection to the region.
**Gender and Sexuality**

An emerging body of work in the broader theme of Islamophobia increasingly focuses on the gendered representations and subsequent experiences of Islamophobia among men and women. In the first instance, scholars explore the heightened vulnerability and susceptibility of Muslim women, as visible “symbols of Islam” to facing Islamophobia across the region. The construction of Muslim women as oppressed beings, in need of saving, has ultimately led to the discrimination of Muslim women in everyday spaces such as the workplace, and their ultimate economic exclusion from opportunity and upward mobility in nations across the Asia-Pacific region. Muslim women participants attribute their experiences of Islamophobia to wearing the hijab, which increases their Muslim visibility. For example, Muslim women in Korea who choose to adopt a visible Muslim identity have reported instances of workplace discrimination, including being fired for converting to Islam and wearing hijab in the workplace (Koo, 2018). Others who remain employed report difficulties wearing the hijab to work (Koo, 2018) or maintaining their Islamic practice of praying five times a day whilst at work (Han, 2018). Disproportionate gendered and sexualized violence against Muslim women in India is also reported (Chatterji, 2016; Chatterji et al., 2016) in the wake of communal riots and violence, and a wide range of perspectives listed in this reading pack bring to surface, the silenced narratives of sexualized violence faced by women in increasingly Islamophobic political environments.

Islamophobic discourses are indeed gendered, creating a fear of Muslim men alongside a paternalistic concern for native women supposedly mistreated by Muslims (Kim 2016; Koo, 2018), such as Korean women, Hindu women in India and Buddhist women in Sri Lanka and Myanmar. In Korea, constructions that otherize, and demonize Muslim men are often in contrast with the depiction of Korean men who are, in contrast “responsible,” “reliable,” “capable,” “faithful,” and, thus, the “masculine” ideal in Korea. This sentiment is also reflected in Indian discourse. Drawing on the issue of “Love Jihad,” Thompson et al. (2019) draw attention to the way in which “Hindu patriarchal notions appear deeply entrenched in discourse campaigns against ‘love jihad’, which reinforce images of passive victimized Hindu women at the hands of inscrutable Muslims abound. This is accompanied by stereotypes of the hyper-sexualized, evil, licentious, and sexually violent Muslim male that must be punished by the hyper-masculine Hindu male” (see also Gupta, 2009; Gupta, 2014; Gupta, 2018 and Hossain et al., 2016). The scapegoating of Muslim men is also evident in Myanmar, whereby Muslim men are particularly demonized by rumors of the rape and their alleged forced religious conversion of Buddhist women. Such gendered constructs are found to justify state protection from Muslim men, and the use of aggression in the name of this protection (McCarthy and Menager, 2017). There is a need for greater theoretical and empirical engagement on the connection between gender, nationalism and Islamophobia in the Asia-Pacific region, with a close examination of how gendered forms of anti-Muslim sentiment are experienced and implicated differentially by Muslim men and women.
Social Mobility

Recent work has sought to examine the impacts of Islamophobia on the social mobility of Muslims in the Asia-Pacific region. In examining the spaces of health, education and the workplace, scholars have emphasized the overall socioeconomically disadvantaged position of Muslims in these nations. Anti-Muslim policies and practices limit the access of Muslims to education and thus reduce the labor outcomes of Muslims and refugees in various contexts, including Western nations such as Australia and New Zealand.

As a result of Islamophobia, Muslims are found to occupy a socioeconomically disadvantaged position and consistently under-perform the national average on key indicators of unemployment rate, income, type of occupation and home ownership (Peucker et al., 2014). Muslims in China, Sri Lanka and Thailand are also found to face social, cultural and educational constraints, limiting their social mobility and opportunities. Muslims in India experience limited labor agency caused by work discrimination (Shaban, 2018) and restricted access to the urban rental housing market (Banerjee et al., 2015). For example, Banerjee et al. (2015) found house owner prejudices deny housing for both Dalits and Muslims in India.

Such examples of economic marginalization are experienced by Muslims across the region are resituated as important driving forces for Muslim resistance in the south of Thailand and the Southern provinces of the Philippines. For example, the autonomous region of Mindanao Muslims in the Philippines (ARMM) is the poorest in the country and its five constituent provinces are also the poorest both in Mindanao and in the whole country (Rivera, 2006). Malay Muslims in Thailand also view themselves as second-class citizens, politically marginalized and denied access to educational and employment opportunities (Storey, 2008). Sugunnasil (2005) indicates that problems of poverty and high unemployment, drug addiction, crime, and other social problems have created conditions for violence and the reemergence of separatist movements in Southern Thailand. Storey supports this position by highlighting that the Thai insurgency was produced by feelings of ethnic identity being under siege, combined with feelings of alienation, injustice, and discrimination caused by poor governance and lack of access to educational and employment opportunities (Storey, 2008).

Geography and Public Space

An emerging body of literature has explored the impacts of Islamophobia on the Muslim right to place, and the place of Islam in the national sphere across contexts in the Asia-Pacific region. These contributions have mainly centered on the Muslim Australian, Sri Lankan and Indian experience, highlighting the need for further examination of the geographical dimensions of Islamophobia elsewhere in the region. The politics of mosque development, and community opposition to the “presence” of Muslim sites, has illustrated how exclusionary discourses of nationalism have propelled movements against the inclusion of Muslim institutions and spaces in Australia and Sri Lanka. The 2005 Cronulla riots in Australia demonstrated the way in which white spatialities actively and violently excluded Muslim bodies from the symbolic national space of the Australian beach in Cronulla (Noble and Poynting 2010).
Examinations of geographical patterns and impacts of violence against Muslims in India have highlighted the way in which exclusionary discourses of Islamophobia are spatialized through “communal violence,” and attacks against Muslim sites of worship, Muslim neighborhoods or Muslim bodies navigating everyday spaces (Susewind, 2017; Gayer and Jaffrelot, 2012). Existing perspectives on the geography of Hindu right-wing violence in India highlight that “there is a pronounced geographic pattern where politically-stoked violence occurs, which can be traced in ten states: Uttar Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, Rajasthan, West Bengal, Jharkhand, Telangana and Assam” (Thompson et al., 2019, p. 12).

Islamophobia has geographical impacts, including the spatial exclusion of Muslims, and producing patterns of segregation and ghettoization. Scholars therefore highlight the need for spaces of security for Muslims in order to mitigate the impacts of anti-Muslim violence on the ability for Muslims to engage in the public sphere. Islamophobia limits the social and spatial mobility of Muslims (Thompson et al., 2019; Itaoui and Dunn, 2017), and their overall ability to access the socio-economic opportunities required to participate in national economic growth. Therefore, the need for geographers to examine and address the geographical impacts of Islamophobia is a critical area of further enquiry, particularly in nations across the Asia-Pacific region where such engagements remain underrepresented, such as Japan, New Zealand, China, Korea, Thailand and Myanmar.

Counter-Narratives and Strategies

The body of work on counter-narratives and strategies to Islamophobia in the Asia-Pacific region is in its early stages and requires further contribution and development – in both its documentation, and also evidence-based suggestions on how to advance such counter-narratives. So far, the current contributions to this theme have focused on the Australian context and has discussed the way that Muslim women have challenged such discourses through activism and strategies that enhance the agency of Muslim women. The digital and online space is also identified as an important site for the voice of Muslims to craft their own narrative, and also construct their own identities, rather than what is imposed on Muslims. Anderson (2015) also highlights the potential role of peace journalism in countering Islamophobic representations, which can be advanced with the use of digital media spaces. In Australia, multi-faith networks, political participation and education are identified as critical spaces were Muslims challenge Islamophobia, represented in alliance-building efforts in Australia post-9/11.

Conclusion

Collectively, scholarship theorizing the field of Islamophobia in the Asia-Pacific region emphasizes the need to examine the long-term impact of contextualized historical memories, political regimes and ideologies alongside global trends of Islamophobia in shaping contemporary anti-Muslim attitudes and policies within each nation-state in the region. Further, the need to examine relational connections and linkages in Islamophobic discourses, policies and
practices across the region are emphasized in by emerging scholarship that stresses the need for such analyses. For example, Elaine Coates (2013) draws attention to how inter-religious violence in Myanmar is a security threat to Southeast Asia and poses a threat to security and stability in the South East Asian region. Mutually, Syeda Naushin Parnini (2013), discusses the negative implications of the Rohingya crisis on bilateral relations with Bangladesh, disrupting such relations since the 1970s. Owen Frazer (2015) highlights that international actors have indeed been cautious in their engagement with the issue of anti-Muslim hate, violence and race and religion bill in the context of Buddhist-Muslim relations. Frazer (2015) emphasizes the need for international actors to work towards resolving the question of Buddhist-Muslim relations – the “Rohingya question” and foster a discussion on a refined, peaceful conception of national identity. Further, he emphasizes that international actors must take a collaborative, problem-solving approach that opens the way for dialog with the authorities on these issues in Myanmar. As demonstrated in this overview radical ideology has been a serious problem for countries in Southeast Asia such as the Philippines and Thailand, resulting in social conflicts and regimes of power that weaken minority groups such as Muslims (Kusuma, 2017). Ethnonationalism and violence is indeed a critical and rising area of concern in the region, yet there remain limited discussions of such conflicts, particularly in their connection. Moreover, there remain limited suggestions for strategies and solutions moving forward, particularly in challenging Islamophobia.
Overview

Researchers have attempted to theorize and conceptualize the rise of Islamophobia in Australia over the last two decades. General overviews of Islamophobia draw on the history of Islamophobia, note key events and time periods that have resulted in a rise of anti-Muslim sentiment, and most importantly, situate this rising hostility towards Muslims within a globalized Islamophobia. For example, Linda Briskman (2015) provides an overview of the rise of Islamophobia across the nation, and Gary Bouma (2011) brings to light, the global connections of Islamophobia across the Western world that manifest in the Australian context. Several studies have attempted to conceptualize the term itself and debate the validity of the term “Islamophobia,” such as Carmen Aguilera-Carnerero and Abdul Halik Azeez (2016) who propose the use of the term “Islamoneausia.” On the other hand, other scholars have focused on situating Islamophobia within broader issues of racism in Australia, such as Ghassan Hage in his early contribution on the importance of analyzing Islamophobia within the “white Australia” context – and thus, brings attention to the dialectical relationship between white supremacy and the discrimination and exclusion of minorities in Australia from the privileges associated with whiteness. Oishee Alam (2012) similarly provides an interesting insight on the difficulty that white converts experience, navigating stereotypes that associate Islam with being a “black fella’s religion.” A more pronounced body of literature explores the racialization of Muslim identities and describes Islamophobia as a form of contemporary racism in Australia. Contributions to this body of literature have explored various manifestations of this racialization, such as the racialization of domestic violence and “forced marriage” (e.g., see Chloe Patton, 2018), and the common stereotypes and anti-Muslim imagery evident in the contexts of Australia and Britain, Australia and the US, as well as Australia and Europe broadly. Such racialization and discrimination against Muslim communities is posed as a challenge to tolerance, justice and equity in these respective countries.

In the area of national security and foreign policy, the negative impacts of the War on Terror, on Muslim communities are explored. These perspectives draw on theorizations around the global scope and impact of the War on Terror, to emphasize that Islamophobia is indeed a global foreign policy issue that has affected the Australian national space. The contributions listed in this section focus on the local manifestations and impacts of the War on Terror on Australian politics, governance and everyday political rhetoric around Muslim communities. In the first instance, the political discourse and language in the war on terror is defined by themes of suspicion and distrust, which, Scott Poynting (2013) highlights, ultimately
undermines the human rights of Muslims. The role of the state in demonizing, criminalizing and othering Muslims is emphasized in these contributions, and is materialized in discriminatory policies that target Muslim communities, or ineffective “de-radicalization” programs, such as counter-terrorism community policing programs are critiqued by leaders in the field such as Kevin Dunn (2016). Most interestingly, a few scholars draw on how Islamophobic foreign policy and issues of national security relating to Muslims has shaped the political consciousness of Muslim communities in the War on Terror and created a politics of accountability that deems everyday Muslim Australians as responsible for “condemning” and “fighting violent extremism within their communities” (e.g., see Abdel-Fattah, 2017).

Key contributions to this area of study highlight the connections between xenophobia, anti-immigrant, and anti-refugee sentiment, and Islamophobia. Natasha Klocker (2004) provided early commentaries on community antagonism towards asylum seekers and highlighted the role of political leaders in fueling this fear of refugees and immigrants from entering Australia. A number of scholars have since explored the rising constructions of illegality towards immigrants and refugees, and their ultimate criminalization by political leaders and perpetuated by mainstream media, referred to as “moral panic.” This is connected to the hostility towards a range of immigrant groups, such as anti-Turkish, anti-Somali or anti-Sudanese sentiment. This politicized and mediated othering of immigrant groups has ultimately led to the progressively reduced support and intake of refugees in Australia.

Issues around citizenship and national identity are among the most comprehensively researched and relevant to Muslim experiences and manifestations of Islamophobia in Australia. In particular, Islamophobia is framed as the beginning of Australia’s retreat from multiculturalism by Scott Poynting and Victoria Mason, who, among a range of scholars listed in this resource pack, highlight that Muslim integration is posed as the primary challenge for multiculturalism (2008) among politicians and media outlets. This research notes that there has been an unofficial policy swing back to promoting mono-culturalism. Attacks against “political correctness” have ultimately undermined multiculturalism in Australia, with such exclusionary rhetoric targeting the Muslim community whose citizenship is constantly in question and debate. This large body of work documents and critiques the rise in ultra-right-wing nationalism, and the concurrent exclusion of Muslim identities from this collective Australian national identity. Such perspectives note exclusionary perceptions among Australians towards Muslims and how Muslims are now at the Australian periphery of inclusion, as a result of media, state and everyday discrimination. Further, these key readings draw attention to how discourses of nationalism are at the forefront of exclusionary Muslim issues including opposition to mosque development, the racialization and othering of Muslim communities, the gendered stereotypes of Muslim women who are “in need of being saved,” and the broader exclusionary politics of white nationalism. Islamophobia is thus framed as a barrier to the true inclusion and belonging of Muslim communities in Australia, and results in negative impacts on identity formation in an integrationist, rather than multicultural framework.

The role of the mainstream media in othering and demonizing Muslims in Australia is comprehensively explored by several articles and book chapters that focus on mainstream and
recently, digital media in this issue. The media is identified as a primary site of (re)producing racialized stereotypes of Muslims, and often produces polarizing, and negative perceptions of Islam and Muslims that exacerbates the Islamophobic political climate in which Muslims must navigate. For example, media footage of terrorism and the overall criminalization continues to demonize Muslims in Australia, with disproportionate reporting of issues relating to Muslim communities, and the irresponsible identification of Islam as a causative factor in crime and acts of terrorism. Most interestingly, a few sources have explored the everyday impacts of these mainstream media representations on the experiences of Muslims in Australia, including the impacts on women, particularly visibly Muslim women in Australia, the impacts on Lebanese and Turkish communities, and the access to everyday spaces, such as the public space. Recent perspectives focus on the role of the online space in reproducing these negative experiences, such as cyber hate speech, and on the other hand, the use of social media among Muslims in Australia to challenge Islamophobia and redefine the Islamophobic narratives imposed on them.

A range of perspectives shed light on the othering and discrimination of Muslim communities in Australia, bringing attention to the increased experiences of such discrimination following the 9/11 attacks in the US. This section documents a few case studies that note the impact of Islamophobia on producing mass-racist violence, evident in the Christchurch mosque attacks, perpetrated by an Australian citizen in 2019, as well as the Cronulla riots in 2005, which was anti-Arab, and mainly anti-Muslim in its intentions and impacts. The impacts of stigma on identity formation are explored, as well as the everyday experiences of Muslims in Australian suburbs, workplaces and intercultural interactions. These experiences need further documentation in academic publications, particularly with sharing qualitative narratives around the subject area.

The body of work focusing on gender and sexuality in the broader theme of Islamophobia is mainly concerned with the negative experiences of Muslim women, as visible “symbols of Islam” in the Australian imaginary. Susan Carland (2011) brings attention to the Islamophobia against Muslim women in the West undermines and restricts their freedom navigating the national space. This is situated within the broader framework of Australian nationalism, which Christina Ho (2007) emphasizes, has been increasingly framed against a dangerous Muslim “other,” which is a gendered white nationalism that is shaped by a discourse that emphasizes protecting women’s rights against “misogynistic Islam.” The construction of Muslim women as oppressed beings, in need of saving, has ultimately led to the discrimination of Muslim women in everyday spaces such as the workplace, and their ultimate economic exclusion from opportunity and upward mobility. On the other hand, recent perspectives have discussed the way that Muslim women have challenged such discourses through activism and strategies that enhance the agency of Muslim women in Australia.

The impacts of Islamophobia are captured by a range of perspectives on the everyday experiences of Muslims in Australia with accessing opportunities and institutions that are fundamental to their experiences of social mobility. In particular, these perspectives focus on the impacts of Islamophobia on negative experiences in the workplace, particularly among visibly Muslim women, and overall reduced labor market outcomes among Muslims. Aparana
Hebbani (2014) brings particular attention to the negative experiences of Muslim refugees with unemployment and underemployment, tied to xenophobia and Islamophobia. In general, Mohammed Alasani and Jack Collins (2017) highlight that Muslim immigrants experience much higher unemployment rates compared to other immigrants at twice the national average. Mario Peucker et al. (2014) similarly shed light on the socioeconomically disadvantaged position that Australian Muslims continue to occupy, whereby Muslims consistently under-perform the national average on key indicators of unemployment rate, income, type of occupation and home ownership. This socio-economic disadvantage is attributed to not only limited access to resources, but also a sense of marginalization that undermines the ability for Muslims to enjoy the full engagement with society and the natural growth of emotional affiliation with Australia. Such perspectives highlight the way in which Muslim active citizenship both affects and is shaped by such socioeconomic barriers. Such discrimination is also evident in spaces of education, such as experiences of Islamophobia noted by Adam Possamai et al. (2016) in university campuses across the state of New South Wales.

An emerging body of literature has explored the post-9/11 impacts of Islamophobia on the Muslim right to place, and the place of Islam in the national sphere in Australia. Instigated by works on the politics of mosque development, and community opposition to the “presence” of Muslim sites, a range of perspectives have critiqued the way in which exclusionary discourses of nationalism have propelled movements against the inclusion of Muslim institutions. Such perspectives expose the way in which negative political and media representations of Islam are internalized and reproduced by communities who echo similar messages of exclusion against Muslim presence, and ownership of shared public spaces across the nation. In particular, key perspectives draw on the Cronulla riots of 2005 to highlight the way in which white spatialities actively and violently excluded Muslim bodies from the symbolic national space of the Australian beach in Cronulla. Since these events, publications have focused on understanding the way Muslims in Sydney have internalized this message of exclusion, and the way in which this has negatively impacted the way in which Muslims perceive, and engage with geographical spaces around Sydney. Perspectives on the geography of Islamophobia in Australia highlight the tension between the Muslims “right to the city,” and the place of Muslim sites, bodies and organization in the Australian national sphere. These challenges also extend to the civic-political space. A growing body of research examines Muslims’ resilience and active-engagements with their communities and the wider society as a form of resistance and a provision of countering-narratives to Islamophobia. On the one hand, Sohrabi (2016 and 2015) and Harris and Karimshah’s (2019) studies situate the normality of Muslims’ existence and activities as a strategy to counter the stigmatization discourses. On the contrary, the work of Peucker (2014, 2016 and 2019), Roose (2015 and 2016) argues that second generation Muslims are contesting their marginalization and exclusion through advancing their active citizenship as well as their religiosity to redefine their spaces through “resistance and developing project identities.”

The body of work on counter-narratives and strategies to Islamophobia is in its early stages and requires further contribution and development – in both its documentation, and evidence-based suggestions on how to advance such counter-narratives to Islamophobia in
Australia. Existing contributions focus on three spaces where counter-narratives and discourses to Islamophobia have materialized. In the first instance, the digital and online space has been situated as an important site for the voice of Muslims to craft their own narrative, and also construct their identity narratives, rather than what is imposed on Muslims in Australia. For example, Nasya Bahfen’s (2018) article sheds light on the way in which social media has helped Muslim minority communities in Australia and the United States find their place in a global community of Muslims, and Liza Hopkins (2008) describes how young Turks have used new media to forge their own sense of identity and place. Leticia Anderson (2015) also highlights the potential role of peace journalism in countering Islamophobic representations, which can be advanced with the use of digital media spaces. Spaces of multi-faith networks, political participation and education are also presented as examples where Muslims in Australia are challenging Islamophobia. For example, Anna Halafoff (2011) documents how Muslims are countering Islamophobia in multi-faith networks, and Shakira Hussein et al, draws on alliance-building post-9/11 with Muslim and broader communities as an example of such strategies. Spaces of education are also identified of sites where Islamophobia can be challenged, particularly through advancing multicultural education, and even sex education, as suggested by Fida Sanjakdar (2010).

List of Citations

Theorizing the Field


National Security and Foreign Policy


Xenophobia (anti-immigrant and anti-refugee sentiment)


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**Citizenship and National Identity**


Mainstream and Digital Media


Othering and Discrimination


Gender and Sexuality


**Social Mobility**


**Geography and the Public Space**


**Counter-Narratives and Strategies**


34. Peucker, Mario. “‘You are essentially forced into being an activist’: the interplay between Islamophobia and Muslims’ civic engagement in Australia.” *Religion, State & Society* 49, no. 1 (2021): 23-40


Overview

IN CHINA, Islam is categorized as both a religion and ethnicity/race (Luqiu and Yang, 2018). According to the official China Islam Association, in 2012 there were over 20 million Muslims in China, belonging to 10 distinct ethnicities and making up 1.6% of the entire national population. Muslims are reported to live in 27 provinces and 4 municipalities in China (Luqiu and Yang, 2018). According to the sixth Chinese census, the Hui are the largest Muslim population in China, followed by the Uyghurs who form the second largest Muslim group (Luqiu and Yang, 2018). Over the last decade, studies on Islamophobia have emerged, building on rich scholarship that had previously explored the history of Islam in China (see Wai-Yip Ho 2019; Lipman, 2011). Historical perspectives on Islam and Muslim identity in China found that Islam has been practiced for the past thirteen to fourteen centuries, arriving to China via the Silk Road - the great trading route beginning in the ancient Chinese capital of Xian (Jones-Leaning and Pratt, 2012; Lipman, 2011). Gladney (2003) brings to light that long-term Muslim communities have often been the “familiar strangers” found in small enclaves throughout the country, accompanied by a wide spectrum of Islamic belief among Chinese Muslims. Muslim identity was reportedly strengthened in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, where mosque-based education emerged (Jones-Leaning and Pratt, 2012). The historical relationship between China and Islam is positioned by Erie and Carlson (2014) as not one of opposition, but rather one of cultural, linguistic, and economic imbrication. According to Erie and Carlson, the Muslim experience in China “encompasses a complex mosaic of accommodation, adjustment, preservation, and, at times, resistance. Thus, generalizations about this incredibly diverse population are unhelpful, and careful attention must be paid to history, politics, and place” (Erie and Carlson, 2014). Further, there is increased scholarship, understanding and representation of the Chinese Islamic tradition and China’s Muslims as a part of multicultural China in history (Ho, 2019).

Together, there are a range of recent developments on the challenges faced by Muslims in China (Wai-Yip Ho, 2019). Emerging perspectives that theorize Islamophobia trace the historical roots, arguing that Islamophobia is not a modern-day sentiment in China exclusive to recent decades (Gladney, 2003; Yi, 2010; Qian, 2019). Rather, Islamophobia is positioned as a historical construct that can be traced to ethnic conflicts between Han Chinese and Muslim minorities in the early modern era (Qian, 2019; Luiqui and Yang 2018). According to Qian (2019), the ethnic relationship between the Hui and the Han has been marked by frequent skirmishes and hostile conflicts, which particularly escalated in the late nineteenth century...
Over the past decade, research has emphasized the way in which national identity affects the position of Muslims in China as ethnoreligious communities (Gladney, 2009). Prejudice or discrimination against ethnic minorities as a whole is ingrained in China’s ancient culturalism, which maintains the Han majority’s control of legitimacy (Yi, 2010). According to Yi, central to this culturalism is the belief that China was the only true civilization, resulting in alien invaders, migrants or nationalities such as Islamic communities being perceived as “backward” (Yi, 2010). However, Yi notes that “there is a specific ‘phobia’ at work, which emerges from Chinese culturalism against Islam or Muslims that is to some extent distinct from that general xenophobia in regard of ethnic minorities in China” (Yi, 2010). China’s Muslims are the “most threatened in terms of self-preservation and Islamic identity according to Gladney” (2003). Islam, like all cultures other than Chinese, is regarded as a lower civilization as they have not
acquired Chinese characteristics, leading to prejudice and discrimination (Yi, 2010). However, using culturalist ideas, the Chinese authority points to the civilizing effects of education, which also has the power to legitimize non-Chinese, dependent on whether they behaved in Chinese ways as set out in the Confucian classics that advocate the rule of rites and traditional morals (Yi, 2010). Ethnic minority communities who are seen to be making an effort in this direction, for example, by sending their children to mainstream schools or removing their ethno-religious markers such as Muslim headscarves in public life, are praised (see Yi, 2006; Yi, 2010). The thrust of China’s policy for Islam is therefore described by Shan and Ho (2018) to promote its fusion with Chinese culture and to prevent influence of Arab customs.

In exploring citizenship and national identity, scholars have examined two Muslim groups in China most extensively: The Hui and Uyghurs. The Hui people – a group commonly referred to as Chinese Muslims – have lived alongside the Han Chinese in society for over 1,000 years (Qian, 2019) yet maintained their separate identity as Muslims (Lipman, 2011). It is important to note that the Hui’s status as an ethnic group or “nationality” has always been subject to scholarly debate – because, in contrast with other ethnic groups, they do not have their own languages, do not share a common ancestral origin, and do not occupy a traditional territory within China’s borders (Lipman, 1987; Qian, 2019). Historically, the Hui people were considered as a foreign-originated people whose culture was inherently incompatible with the dominant Han civilization (Qian, 2019). However, unlike the Uyghurs, the Hui are ethnically closer to the Han, and live in small communities found in almost every city and province of China. They generally dress like the majority Han and speak Mandarin or a local dialect, so they are capable of blending in reasonably well with ethnic Han Chinese (Luiqiu and Yang, 2018). However, the Hui are often segregated from the Han (McCarthy, 2007), and so form their own communities, often identified by their Islamic dress, and their avoidance of pork, alcohol, and other substances forbidden under Islam which sometimes results in experiences of discrimination (Luiqiu and Yang, 2018).

Compared with Hui Muslims in China, Muslim Uyghurs and other Muslim ethnic minorities – such as Kyrgyz and Kazakh people in Xinjiang – are reported to face more cultural and religious restrictions from the government (Jones-Leaning and Pratt, 2012; Luiqiu, 2018). Scholars have increasingly brought attention to issues around Xinjiang and Uyghur separatism (Ho, 2019). First, Gladney (2003) highlights that the liberation of Xinjiang in 1949 by the Chinese Communists, and its subsequent establishment as the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region on 1 October 1955, perpetuated the Nationalist policy of recognizing the Uyghur as a minority nationality under Chinese rule. Reportedly, this nationality designation not only masks regional and linguistic diversity, but also includes groups such as the Loplyk and Dolans who are distinct from the oasis-based Turkic Muslims who became known as the Uyghur (Gladney, 2003). Jones-Leaning and Pratt (2012) state that state vigilance against religious extremism was warranted by reports that Uyghur Islamists were being trained by their co-religionists in camps run by leading organizations across Central Asia, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Hizb-ut-Tahrir, as well as concerns that Uyghur groups were mounting incursions into Xinjiang from bases in Kyrgyzstan. While Amnesty International began monitoring the situation in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
in the early 1990s, reports of the harsh measures adopted by the authorities to suppress unrest in Xinjiang, including “arbitrary detention, unfair trials, torture and executions were obtained, in many instances, from Uyghur nationals living abroad” (Jones-Leaning and Pratt, 2012). More recently, Luqiu and Yang (2018) highlight that starting in early 2017, thousands of Uyghurs and other Muslim ethnic minorities had been sent to re-education camps which are formally called “Professional Education Schools” under policies introduced to counter extremism. Further, in response to concerns around terrorist threats in northwest China in 2017, authorities implemented new rules in Xinjiang requiring car owners to install GPS devices so that vehicle movement could be tracked. Xinjiang also implemented a ban on burqas, veils, and “abnormal beards”; officials say that the purpose of the ban is to combat “extremism” among the Uyghur ethnic minority, which is a Muslim group concentrated in the region (Luqiu and Yang, 2018; Ho, 2019). Recent perspectives have drawn attention in particular to alleged genocide and various human rights abuses, including medical involvement, against Uyghur Muslims (Abbas 2021; Finnegan, 2020; Ramdat, 2020).

Many recent studies have thus drawn on these issues to highlight that Islamophobia is closely related to national security and foreign policy in China. In the first instance, scholars draw on the Peoples Republic of China’s (PRC) War on Terror that targets ethno-religious minorities, such as Muslims as potential separatists and radical insurgents that endanger Chinas territorial integrity (Qian, 2019). Such constructions are claimed to legitimize hostility and resentment against Muslims from Chinese nationalists (Qian, 2019). Qian highlights that after the 9/11 attacks, China explicitly classified domestic separatism in Xinjiang as a form of terrorism and drew comparison between the authorities’ crackdown in Xinjiang with the “War on Terror” in the West (Qian, 2019). Further, the in the wake of ethnic unrests in Xinjiang and Tibet, the Chinese government further imposed the label of “terrorism” on all ethnic protests (Qian, 2019). Thus, the rise of Islamophobia in China is connected to the state framing ongoing ethnic unrest as a religion-motivated terrorist movement that poses a threat to national security (Qian, 2019). Jones-Leaning and Pratt (2012) however claim that China’s War on Terror against what is known as East Turkestan or Uyghuristan after 9/11, the crackdown on the Uyghur riots in Xinjiang from July 2009 onward included, is “seen as part of the stock response to challenges to the ruling power of the state from upheavals connected to any of its cultural or social minority communities” (Jones-Leaning and Pratt, 2012). This has extended to racial profiling and digital surveillance of Muslims in Northwest China. Therefore, according to Lin Yi (2010), although China’s War on Terror may import the legitimizing discourse and cover of the global War on Terror but is not best seen or understood from the same perspective or in the same context (see also Gladney, 2009).

The second emerging body of literature regarding Islamophobia, national security and foreign policy focuses on the tension between the PRC’s strategic national interest in building friendly relations with the Muslim world, and its determination to limit religious radicalism (Wang, 2016; Qian, 2019; Erie and Carlson, 2014). In seeking to channel transnational Muslim financial networks for its own benefit, Chinas Muslims are now becoming national assets as “cultural ambassadors” linking China and Muslim countries (Wai-Yip Ho, 2019). What has been labelled as the “revival of the Silk Road network” may impact internal conditions
of Muslims living in China, highlighting the need for critical studies on Chinese Islam and Muslims within PRC geo-politics (Ho, 2019). This is particularly important as China’s Muslim population is poised to play a significant role in the evolving relationship between China and the rest of the developing world, as well as in the resurgence of global Islam in state politics (Erie and Carlson, 2014).

A range of studies have documented increased othering and discrimination against Muslims in multiple dimensions of Chinese social life. This ranges from a more explicit form of hate speech toward Muslims and prejudice against Islamic culture and practices (Shih, 2017; Huang, 2018; Ian Johnson et al., 2019; Lin, 2019), to more implicit expressions such as the opposition to new mosque construction or the criticism of alleged “preferential treatment” of Muslim minorities (Palmer, 2019; Ma, 2019; Luqiu and Yang, 2017; Qian, 2019). Luqiu and Yang (2018) found that a majority of Muslim respondents in China have experienced a negative portrayal of their religion through media and have encountered some form of discrimination in their daily lives. Further, public debates around the Halal controversy - the “spread of Halal” highlighted social perceptions and fears around Islam in the public sphere, with claims that sharia was intruding on the state law in China (Erie, 2018). Discrimination is particularly cited by Uyghurs who complain of facing discrimination in hotels, restaurants, schools, and even mosques throughout China (Erie and Carlson, 2014). The othering of Muslim minorities has justified the surveillance and suppression of Muslim ethnic groups under the guise of anti-terrorism and national security by the authorities (Tazmal, 2019; Qian, 2019). A range of researchers have noted that negative stereotypes of Muslim minorities in China have resulted in their discrimination in both education and employment (Qian, 2019). These barriers have reportedly limited the social mobility of Muslims, associated with social, cultural and educational constraints faced by Muslim Hui students despite the government’s preferential policies and efforts to implement programs catering to their educational needs (Zhao, 2014). The yearning of Muslim Hui Chinese students to achieve social mobility is limited by social, cultural, and educational factors that regard them as the “other,” delaying their higher educational success (Zhao, 2014).

To date, several studies explore the role of mainstream and digital media in shaping Islamophobia in China. First are emerging perspectives on how media in China depicts Islam and Muslims. Qian (2019) finds that media outlets in China regularly portray Islam as a backward and uncivilized religion and often links Muslims with violence, crime and terrorist attacks, which can result in hostile attitudes toward Muslims in Chinese society. Scholars connect these discourses to international news reporting which allegedly reproduce the anti-Muslim bias in Western media framing of Muslim-related stories in Chinese outlets (Cheng, Golan, and Kiousis, 2016; Luqiu and Yang, 2018, cited in Qian, 2019). These findings are similarly noted by Luqiu and Yang (2018) in their analysis of 10 years of news reports about Muslims and Islam in Chinese state news media. Overall, this study revealed that (1) there is an overall negative framing of news coverage of Muslims and Islam; (2) non-Muslim Chinese hold a negative stereotype of Muslims and Islam; (3) Chinese Muslims are cognizant of a negative media portrayal of Islam and of themselves; and (4) some Muslim Chinese experience discrimination in their daily lives (Luqiu and Yang, 2018). Such
negative depictions of Muslims are related to increased coverage of global anti-terror initiatives in China, as well as active involvement in international affairs, such as the Syrian war and the refugee crisis in Europe, which dominate the state media’s international news coverage (Luqiu and Yang, 2018). Based on these stories, Chinese media devote most of their coverage to religious extremists and the war on terror (Luqiu and Yang, 2018). Further, when stories about Muslim cultural life do appear in the Chinese news media, they reinforce stereotypes of Islam as foreign and strange, such as stories about dress codes for women in Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Indonesia with no background information (Luqiu and Yang, 2018).

Emerging perspectives note a similar proliferation of Islamophobic discourses within online spaces such as social media. Qian (2019) notes that Chinese Islamophobia also stems from anti-Muslim narratives spread via China’s online community, which appropriate many popular conspiracy theories and negative portrayals of Muslims within Western far-right commentaries (Zhou, 2017; Evans, 2017; Huang, 2018; Zhang, 2019; Qian, 2019). Similarly, Ying Miao (2019) using a content analysis of social media headline articles argues that key Islamophobic actors in the Chinese cyberspace have constructed a “victims and villains” narrative to effectively “other” Muslim populations in China (Miao, 2019). Online narratives imply that non-Sinicized Muslims are under Arab fundamentalist influences, resulting in religious autonomy being framed as political betrayal thus legitimizing Islamophobia (Miao, 2019). Bhai’s (2018) study similarly finds that comments on the social media site Weibo in 2017 regarding international refugees and certain religious and ethnic groups such as Muslims, were loaded with negative emotions, biased stereotypes and resistant sentiments (Bhai, 2018). Online spaces are important sites of analysis for studies of Islamophobia in China, worthy of further scholarly attention and critique.

The collected works offer a complex and nuanced perspective on Islamophobia in China, from state policies and historical roots to digital surveillance and human rights violations. It uncovers the multidimensional aspects that contribute to the current situation and provides insights into personal experiences, international law, and citizenship. The literature paints a vivid picture of a deeply intricate and concerning landscape surrounding the treatment and perceptions of Muslims in China over the last few decades – a situation under which human rights violations and systemic violence is intensifying.

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Theorizing the Field


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National Security and Foreign Policy


**Xenophobia (anti-immigrant and anti-refugee sentiment)**


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Citizenship and National Identity


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12. Qian, Jingyuan. “Ethnic Conflict and the rise of Anti-Muslim Sentiment in Modern China.” *Available at SSRN 3450176* (2019).


ISLAMOPHOBIA IN CHINA


Othering and Discrimination


16. Qian, Jingyuan. “Ethnic Conflict and the rise of Anti-Muslim Sentiment in Modern China.” Available at SSRN 3450176 (2019).


Gender and Sexuality


Social Mobility


Geography and the Public Space


Counter-Narratives and Strategies


Islamophobia in India

Overview

A GROWING BODY OF LITERATURE has theorized the rise of Islamophobia in India, tracing its historical roots and recent proliferations over the last few decades. Thompson et al (2019) provide a thorough review of this history and these literatures in their report that extensively examined the issue of Islamophobia in India, which have since been developed by key contributions on the issue (Sikander, 2021; Ushama, 2020). Prior contributions on the issue first draw attention to the rise of Hindu nationalism and concurrent rise in Islamophobia following the partition of India and Pakistan (Butalia, 2017). Such Hindu nationalism has been accompanied by the portrayal of Indian Muslims as anti-India and anti-National, ultimately damaging Hindu-Muslim relations” (Thompson et al., 2019). Damaged religious relations have resulted in drastic increases in religious violence against Muslims (Basu, 2015; Hansen, 2001). Utilizing the ideology of Hindutva (Sumit, 1996; Waikar, 2018), right-wing nationalists proliferate the notion of Hindu superiority over other religions, and thus the political and social rationale for violence against other religious minorities such as Muslims (Dibyesh, 2010). An example of violence founded in the ideology of Hindutva is the increase of beef-related violence against Muslim (Siyech, 2018) and Dalits, justified by beef bans and cow legislation that divide India’s Muslims and Hindus in the name of “protecting” Mother Cow. Thompson et al (2019) note that these bans and legislation are exclusionary and unjustly target Muslims and Dalits who tend to consume beef as either a religiously lawful meat and/or an inexpensive form of protein. Further, “many Muslims live in fear due to the increasing, volatile and unpredictable nature of beef lynching across various regions in India” (Thompson et al., 2019).

In accordance with these fears, a range of scholars have attributed increased anti-Muslim religious communal riots, to Hindu nationalist right-wing electoral politics (Rider, 2016), highlighting the connection between “saffronization” and communalism (Rao, 2011). Cases of communal riots such as Islamophobia in the tragic anti-Muslim pogrom in Gujarat in 2002 (Dhattiwala and Biggs, 2012) or Surat (Breman, 1993) are situated as important examples of the dialectical relationship between religious riots and electoral politics in India (Iyer and Shrivastava, 2018). In addition to the rise in Hindu nationalism and anti-Muslim violence, a number of contributions theorizing Islamophobia emphasize the significance of love jihad (Gupta, 2018; 2014; 2009) anti-conversion laws and the expansion of the ghar vāpasī (returning home) program to intensifying anti-Muslim discrimination in India (Thompson et al., 2019). This is contextualized in the history of myths about Muslim fertility (Jeffrey and Jeffrey, 2002), which can be traced to as early as 1909, with a revived emergence of the “love
All measures restrict the ability for Hindus to convert to other religions, while simultaneously advancing and encouraging the conversion, and more than often forced conversions of other religious groups such as Muslims, to Hinduism (Thompson et al., 2019).

Research into national security and foreign policy issues in India focus on how Hindu nationalism is deployed by political leaders to (re)produce a politics of “fear of the religious other” (Dibyesh, 2016). According to Angana Chatterji (2009) in “Violent Gods: Hindu nationalism in India’s present,” Hindu nationalism has been used to propel religious violence and conflict, resulting in communal riots, killings and sexual violence against religious minorities such as Muslims (see also Van Der Dee, 1994). Hindu nationalism, as the primary policy of national security, or what Anand (2005) refers to as “the violence of security,” has been rationalized by the othering and portrayal of Indian Muslims as a threat to national security. This national security logic driven by the ideology of Hindutva has resulted in internal conflict and social upheaval (Chatterji et al., 2016), religious and ethnic violence (Dhattiwala and Biggs, 2012) and the displacement of Indian Muslims from the national space (Chatterjee, 2009).

Notably, scholars have drawn connections between Hindu nationalism in India, and other forms of right-wing nationalism in global contexts such as the United States (Gottschalk and Greenberg, 2013; Therwath, 2007). Drawing attention to these connections elucidate the global network of right-wing nationalist groups, and they in which they collectively contribute to rising anti-Muslim sentiment across ultra-right-wing groups in the name of national security.

Finally, the relationship between Islamophobia and national politics is highlighted by Ieyer and Shrivastava (2018) who find that communal riots increase the vote share of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party by at least 5 percentage points. This connection between electoral votes and communal riots is reinforced by Thompson et al. (2019) who documented several Islamophobic statements from leading BJP members from across the political spectrum beginning with Prime Minister Narendra Modi himself. Their report found that polarizing politics are lucrative at the ballot box in India, where “individuals affiliated with stoking ‘communal’ hate and violence [such as anti-Muslim violence] are four times more likely to win than others.” This politics of fear was further employed in political rhetoric during the COVID-19 pandemic, sowing further public fear towards Muslims in India through blame and misinformation resulting in hate speech and discrimination (e.g., see Ahuja and Debanjan, 2020; Al-Zaman, 2020; Zajączkowska, 2021).

The relationship between Hindu nationalism, xenophobia, anti-immigrant, and anti-refugee sentiment within national electoral politics and rising ultra-right-wing nationalism are discussed as primary components of the current exclusionary environment of Islamophobia in India. This sentiment has been reflected in legislative changes that have targeted and discriminated against Muslims, such as the unprecedented move towards listing 1.9 million people in its northeast state of Assam as illegal migrants from Bangladesh in a new National Register of Citizens before passing the Citizenship (Amendment) Act. By creating legal distinctions that align with religious and ethnic divides, this change overtly discriminates against the country’s
Muslim minority, and has resulted in precarious citizenship under India’s increasingly anti-migrant regime, particularly for Bengali-speaking Muslims (Puntahil, 2022).

Much of the current literature on how Islamophobia and citizenship in India pays particular attention to the way in which the national identity of Indian Muslims is undermined by Hindu nationalism and a politics of fear around other religious groups, particularly Muslims (Anand, 2016). The struggle for Muslim integration and identity in an increasingly Hindu-nationalist political climate (Froerer, 2006) has restricted the space available for alternate religious identities such as Muslims to navigate freely (Meenai, 2014). Tasneem Meenai (2014) brings attention to the way in which Hindu nationalism minimizes space for Islamic identities in the public sphere, particularly in relation to the State and in Education. Therefore, those belonging to a caste and religion outside of Hinduism are subjected to limited access of basic rights such as the urban rental housing market (Banerjee et al., 2015), to being able to navigate everyday spheres in fear of facing anti-Muslim violence in the name of Hindu nationalism. National identities of belonging and citizenship are reserved to Hindu Indians, whilst excluding those who do not satisfy the characteristics of the Hindu nationalist identities.

There is a relatively small body of literature that is concerned with the way media portrayals of Muslims and Islam reinforce or reproduce Islamophobia in India. Looking at mainstream news outlets, Ahmed Saifuddin (2012) revealed a significant association between media as the primary source of information and a negative attitude towards Muslims and Islam among non-Muslim Indian adolescents. Saifuddin’s (2012) sentiment analysis of media content concerning Muslims revealed a dominant presence of negative sentiments as compared to positive sentiments towards Muslims in Indian media, however it noted that Western media showed greater negative sentiments of Muslims than the Indian media. Conversely, a recent contribution by Onaiza Drabu (2018) of discursive representations of Muslims and Islam in Indian Prime-Time News found that these television channels propagate negative associations between Islam and backwardness, ignorance, and violence through consistent employment of the following tropes: “Muslim women need to be saved from Muslim men”; “Hindu women need to be saved from Muslim men”; and, “Muslims are not fully Indian—they are anti-national.” Similar analyses were drawn from studies on Islamophobia in Hindi and Bollywood cinema. In the first instance, Kumar (2016) highlights the way Hindi cinema produces Islamophobic narratives, represented in its reductionist employment of Muslims as a synecdoche to signify a terrorist, religious extremist, Pakistan loyalist, anti-Hindu and “a traitor.” The study notes the context of a majoritarian Hindu setting in which the stories of Hindi cinema are situated and reinforces how the Muslim is constructed as a metaphorical figure of violence, barbarism and treason. Maidul Islam’s (2007) study of Muslims in Bollywood cinema similarly notes that Hindi films portrayed Muslims either as nonmodern feudal characters or as anti-national, terrorist, villain, or anti-social characters. Moreover, Islam (2007) problematizes the absence of Muslim protagonists in these films, which therefore fail to illustrate the everyday livelihood issues and problems faced by Indian Muslims. Combined, these perspectives highlight the overall negative tenor of various forms of media towards Muslims in India, and the way in which they negatively exacerbate Islamophobic discourses.

The various forms of othering and discrimination caused by Hindu Nationalism has profound
impacts on overall safety of Muslims in a violent political environment compromised by communal riots (Rupal, 2013) or beef-violence (Siyech and Narain, 2018), limited labor agency caused by work discrimination (Shaban, 2018) and limited access to the urban rental housing market (Banerjee et al. 2015). For example, Banerjee et al. (2015) found house owner prejudices deny housing for both Dalits and Muslims, with Muslims experiencing greater discrimination. The study also found that Dalits and Muslims who manage to rent homes have to do so by agreeing to unfair terms and conditions. The wide-spread othering of Muslims under a Hindu nationalist logic has resulted in the exclusion, segregation, compromised safety and disadvantage of Indian Muslims (Gayer and Jaffrelot, 2012). Reports of anti-Muslim violence have continued to increase and intensify, particularly Hindutva incited violence on religious lines (Ramachandran 2020; Ushama, 2021). This trend is also reflected in digital and online spaces amidst the COVID-19 pandemic in response to political labeling that attributed Muslims to original causes of infection (Rajan and Shreya, 2021). The role of social media and digital platforms in spreading and reinforcing Islamophobia in India has been a critical area of research in recent years, highlighting the role of these spaces in enabling quicker spread of misinformation and hate towards Muslims, which is resulting in physical forms of violence, including extreme forms such as lynchings, against Muslims in the Indian context (Binny, 2022; Nagar and Simran, 2022; Mirchandani, 2018; Vasudeva and Barkdull, 2020).

The academic literature on Islamophobia in India has revealed the gendered nature of anti-Muslim violence and discrimination in India. Drawing on the issue of Love Jihad, Thompson et al (2019) draw attention to the way in which “Hindu patriarchal notions appear deeply entrenched in discourse campaigns against ‘love jihad’, which reinforce images of passive victimized Hindu women at the hands of inscrutable Muslims abound. This is accompanied by stereotypes of the hyper-sexualized, evil, licentious, and sexually violent Muslim male that must be punished by the hyper-masculine Hindu male” (see also Gupta, 2009; Gupta, 2014; Gupta, 2018 and Hossain et al, 2016). On the other hand, Angana Chatterji draws on the disproportionate gendered and sexualized violence against women, including Muslim women in India (Chatterji, 2016; Chatterji et al., 2016) in the wake of communal riots and violence. A range of perspectives listed in this reading pack bring to surface, the silenced narratives of sexualized violence faced by Muslim women in an increasingly Islamophobic political environment (Jagani, 2022).

Finally, a growing body of literature on the geographical patterns and impacts of violence against Muslims has emerged over the last decade. These perspectives highlight the way in which exclusionary discourses of Islamophobia are spatialized through “communal violence,” and attacks against Muslim sites of worship, Muslim neighborhoods or Muslim bodies navigating everyday spaces (Susewind, 2017; Gayer and Jaffrelot, 2012). Scholar such as Rupal Ozal (2013) draw on the geography of Hindu right-wing violence in India, which Thompson et al (2019) elaborate on. They highlight that “there is a pronounced geographic pattern where politically-stoked violence occurs, which can be traced in ten states. These states with the highest incidence of communal violence included Uttar Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, Rajasthan, West Bengal, Jharkhand, Telangana and Assam” (Thompson et al., 2019). Raphael Susewind (2017) highlights the geographical impacts of
such anti-Muslim violence, in the spatial exclusion of Muslims, and producing patterns of segregation and ghettoization. Kaylani Menon (2015) thus highlights the need for spaces of security for Indian Muslims, such as Old Delhi, which is a primary site of Muslim belonging. In the absence of such sites of safety, the threat of anti-Muslim violence further excludes Muslims from the public sphere and according to Thompson et al., limits the social and spatial mobility of Muslims, and their overall ability to access the socio-economic opportunities required to participate in national economic growth (Thompson et al., 2019).

As examined, the rise of Islamophobia in India has deep historical roots, becoming more pronounced with the ascent of Hindu nationalism, a trend examined in a plethora of scholarly works listed. Widespread othering has led to the exclusion, segregation, and compromised safety of Indian Muslims, with gendered violence, geographical impacts, and digital platforms playing significant roles in perpetuating escalating discrimination and violence on. In sum, the complex and multifaceted nature of Islamophobia in India is deeply ingrained, reflecting a broader trend of rising ultra-right-wing nationalism and a politics of fear that undermines the national identity and safety of Indian Muslims, is in need of further examination.

List of Citations

Theorizing the Field


National Security and Foreign Policy


**Xenophobia (anti-immigrant and anti-refugee sentiment)**


Islamophobia in the Asia-Pacific

Citizenship and National Identity


34. Sahoo, Niranjan. “Mounting Majoritarianism and Political Polarization in India”. In Carothers, Thomas and Andrew O’Donohue *Political Polarization in South and Southeast Asia: Old Divisions, New Dangers* (2020), pp. 9-24.


**Mainstream and Digital Media**


**Othering and Discrimination**


Gender and Sexuality


**Social Mobility**


Geography and the Public Space


5. Hong Tschalaer, Mengia. “Muslim Women’s Rights Activists’ Visibility: Stretching the Gendered Boundaries of the Public Space in the City of Lucknow.” South Asia


Counter-Narratives and Strategies


Overview

IN RECENT YEARS, there has been an increasing amount of literature covering increased anti-Muslim rhetoric, discrimination and violence in Myanmar (formerly known as Burma).

Theorizations of Islamophobia in Myanmar focus on key areas including the role of (i) the legacy of colonialism, (ii) Buddhist religious nationalism and religious intolerance in producing (iii) anti-Muslim violence, ethnic cleansing and displacement of Muslim minorities. In the first instance, Nyi Nyi Kyaw (2015) as well as Giorgio Shani and Sana Saeed (n.d.), situate Islamophobia in the broader context of political and social liberalizations in Myanmar since colonialism. They emphasize that the othering of Muslim minorities such as the Rohingya in present day Myanmar is foregrounded in nationalist resentment towards British colonial migration labor policies that encouraged Rohingya migration to Myanmar in the seventeenth century. Since the 1948 independence of Myanmar from the British, a number of animosities towards the Rohingya have surfaced, based on the belief that Rohingya have benefited from colonial rule. This has led towards a nationalist movement, as well as religious revival that further contributed to the growing anti-Muslim hatred (Kyaw, 205). Shani and Saeed (n.d.) highlight that despite ongoing resistance from the Rohingya for their own autonomous state as promised by the British, they were rejected, and finally in 1977, the Rohingya were considered illegal during the army national drive to register citizens in Myanmar (Crouch, 2016). Second, theorizations of Islamophobia emphasize the crucial role of Buddhist nationalism in perpetuating anti-Muslim narratives (Mikael Gravers, 2015). Ingrid Johannessen (2018) devotes her Master’s thesis to problematizing the role of Buddhist monks in constructing the Muslim other in Myanmar, whilst Nyi Nyi Kyaw (2015) and Walton and Hayward (2014) further highlight the role of Islamophobic mobilizations by Buddhist nationalist groups such as 969 and Ma-Ba-Tha in driving religious intolerance (also see Elaine Coates, 2013). Mikael Gravers (2015) for example, sheds light on how monks in Burma promoted marriage laws that restricted interfaith marriages, fueled by hateful anti-Muslim rhetoric and claims that Buddhism, language, culture and the national identity is endangered by interfaith marriages.

Nyi Nyi Kyaw therefore brings attention to the effects of othering and discrimination on Muslims, with the rise of anti-Muslim sentiments and violent sectarian conflicts in 2012 and 2013 that resulted from this othering of Muslim minorities, particularly the Rohingya who have suffered most. He also highlights however that there is a need to consider the effects of Islamophobia on other Muslim minorities in Myanmar such as ethnic Kamans and Mandalayans.
He refers to a series of unprecedented sectarian violence against Muslim minorities to shed light on the broader effects of Islamophobia on Muslim minorities. For example, he refers to the sectarian violence between Rakhine Buddhists on one hand and Rohingya/non-Rohingya Muslims on the other hand in Rakhine State in 2012 and in other places in 2013 and 2014 (Meiktila (March 2013), Okkan (April 2013), Lashio (May 2013), Kanbalu (August 2013), and Mandalay (July 2014). Nyi Nyi Kyaw reinforces that there has been international recognition of the anti-Muslim tone and focus of this violence. Islamophobia in Myanmar is therefore highlighted as a form of racism in Myanmar (Penny Green, 2013), leading to the alienation, discrimination and securitization of Muslim legal and cultural personhood in Myanmar (Nyi Nyi Kyaw, 2015).

The othering of Muslims in Myanmar has been found by Gerard McCarthy and Jacqueline Menager (2017) to be highly gendered, which show how colonial era social and legal processes have inspired the scapegoating of Muslim men. Muslim men are particularly demonized by rumors of the rape and their alleged forced religious conversion of Buddhist women. Such gendered constructs are used to justify state protection from Muslim men, and the use of aggression in the name of this protection (McCarthy and Menager, 2017). The authors further highlight that in Myanmar, the figure of the wealthy Muslim perpetrator has been popularized both as a scapegoat for decades of brutal authoritarianism and as a threat to the contemporary social reproduction of the national Buddhist polity. There is a need for greater theoretical and empirical engagement on the connection between gender, nationalism and Islamophobia in Myanmar, as well as the gendered forms of anti-Muslim sentiment that may be faced differentially by Muslim men and women.

Islamophobia, as a form of racism (Mohamed Nawab Bin Mohamed Osman, 2017) has sparked communal violence and what appears to be, the ethnic cleansing of Muslim minorities in Myanmar (Nick Cheesman, 2017). Ye Mynit Win (2015) exposes the critical connections between mass violence and anti-Muslim hate speech before outbreaks of mass violence against Muslims in Myanmar. Such hate speech is evident in propaganda such as pamphlets, leaflets, DVDs, VCDs, CDs, posters and others that were distributed in some parts of Myanmar right before outbreaks of mass violence. Min Zin (2015) in conceptualizing the emergence of anti-Muslim violence in Myanmar, highlights that there has been an increased intensity, frequency and anti-Muslim violence since 2011 compared to religious riots that occurred previously in Myanmar, attributed to the complicities of new regimes in ongoing communal violence. Matteo Fumugalli (2018) refers to anti-Muslim violence, particularly towards the Rohingya as “ethnic cleansing,” and by Macmanus et al., (2015) from the International State Crime Initiative as a “countdown to annihilation” of Muslim minorities. Jason Mikilian connects this ethnic cleansing to economic development and local business in across the nation. Imtiyaz Yusuf (2018), however, highlights the need to interrogate anti-Muslim violence in Myanmar in the broader context of Islamophobia and the tenuous state of Muslim-Buddhist relations in contemporary Southeast Asia more broadly in connection to the region.

Several studies have begun to examine the role of national security and foreign policy in understanding Islamophobia in Myanmar. One of the earliest contributions to this area was by Andrew Selth (2004) who connected the way in which Muslims in Myanmar were accorded
more attention following the U.S. War on Terror. However, he notes that the most notable increase in anti-Muslim discrimination took place following the 1962 military coup. The majority of recent perspectives on National Security and Foreign Policy emphasize the role of political transition in producing greater anti-Muslim rhetoric and violence. Liere (2014) for example, devotes a thesis to research on the anti-Muslim discourse in Yangon, Myanmar, within a time of political transition where the Muslim population was securitized and stigmatized. Ronan Lee (2014) in particular highlights that the new political and media freedoms in the wake of transition have resulted in an agenda that further limit the civil and political rights of Myanmar’s Muslim population. Lee highlights that “increased freedoms to express political opinions, combined with a growing, less censored media landscape and ready access to the internet and mobile phones, have provided opportunities for divisive voices to enflame religious and ethnic tensions and promote discriminatory policies, often to the detriment of Myanmar’s Muslim population” (Lee (2014). This view is supported by Jones Matthew Walton and Susan Hayward (2014) who also argue that Myanmar’s transition to democracy is undermined by violence between Buddhists and Muslims. They assert that although the violence originally broke out between Rakhine Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims, it subsequently emerged throughout the country, impacting Buddhists and Muslims of many ethnic backgrounds. Walton and Hayward (2014) in their article, conceptualize the monastic political mobilization against religious minorities, which they emphasize can be understood as an extension of past monastic activism, rooted in traditional understandings of the monastic community’s responsibility to defend the religion, respond to community needs, and guide political decision-makers. They affirm that a major political component of Islamophobia in Myanmar can be attributed to the rise and evolution of Buddhist nationalist groups led by monks that have spearheaded anti-Muslim campaigns that result in “communal conflicts” across the nation. Aleksandra Wieliczko (2017) highlights the negative effects of anti-Muslim policies, particularly against the Rohingya for the process of democratic transition in the country. Wieliczko emphasizes that “the recurring inter-ethnic clashes undermine the stability of the state and will not allow for a legitimate and profound fulfilment of its democratic transition” (Wieliczko, 2017).

Existing perspectives highlight the negative effects of Islamophobia on the legal system and foreign policy. In the first instance, Archana Parashar and Jobair Alam (2018) highlight the way national laws have resulted in the statelessness of the Rohingya, bringing to light, the role of legislation in further disempowering the Rohingya who are regarded as neither minority not citizen by the law. In the same vein, Chit Win and Thomas Kean (2017) critically examine how the credibility of Myanmar’s nascent legislature is undermined by its reluctance to tackle sectarian violence. Indeed, the legal system is both affected by, and reinforces Islamophobia in Myanmar (Win and Kean, 2017). Finally, a range of perspectives have focused on the role and impact of Islamophobia on Myanmar’s foreign policy. Elaine Coates (2013) draws attention to how inter-religious violence in Myanmar is a security threat to Southeast Asia and poses a threat to security and stability in the South East Asian region. Mutually, Syeda Naushin Parnini (2013), stresses the negative implications of the Rohingya crisis on bilateral relations with Bangladesh, disrupting such relations since the 1970s. In light of this, she urges the need to “engage reluctant actors, such as China and Russia, and to unify the international
community of states behind policies to engage, and put pressure on, the government to fulfill its responsibility to protect the people of Myanmar” (Parnini, 2013). Owen Frazer (2015) however highlights that international actors have been cautious in their engagement with the issue of anti-Muslim hate, violence and race and religion bill in the context of Buddhist-Muslim relations. Frazer (2015) emphasizes the need for international actors to work towards resolving the question of Buddhist-Muslim relations – the “Rohingya question” and foster a discussion on a refined, peaceful conception of national identity. Further, he emphasizes that international actors must take a collaborative, problem-solving approach that opens the way for dialog with the authorities on these issues in Myanmar. Clearly, as expressed by Parnini, the government of Myanmar has failed to live up to its democratic responsibilities by taking all the necessary measures to stop violence in the Rakhine state to fully accord the rights of citizenship to Muslim Rohingyas (Parnini, 2013).

Existing academic literature on xenophobia in Myanmar, focus primarily on the othering and persecution of the Rohingya Muslims, who are classified as stateless and non-citizens (Crouch, 2016). Constructed as “foreigners,” xenophobic rhetoric has targeted Rohingya Muslims, fueling anti-Rohingya, and by extension, anti-Muslim sentiment (Eng, 2013). As the Myanmar government excludes Rohingya as one of the countries’ “national races,” a majority of the Muslims living in the Rakhine State in the western region of Myanmar live with a fearful uncertainty about their status (Parashar and Alam, 2019). Citizenship and national identity is therefore a key issue explored in existing literature on Islamophobia in Myanmar. Myanmar’s denial of citizenship to the Rohingya minority has resulted in systemic discrimination and large-scale displacement, stripping them of basic and “fundamental rights and freedoms afforded to Myanmar’s Buddhist majority, such as the freedom to move, the freedom to equal education and employment opportunities, and the freedom to marry” (Eng, 2013). As highlighted by Eng (2013), the xenophobia directed towards the Rohingya, in the denial of their citizenship is critical to the continuation of current policies that perpetuate widespread, sectarian violence that endangers Muslims and other religious minorities in Myanmar. The role of Buddhist religious nationalism in producing these anti-Muslim narratives includes Buddhist monks construct Muslims as one coherent group of violent and threatening invaders who do not belong in Myanmar. Muslims are presented in key texts among Buddhist monks as a threat to both the nation and the Buddhist religion, justifying violence towards these “threatening” Muslims (Johannessen, 2018). The radicalization of Buddhists and the rise of xenophobic sentiments in Myanmar are therefore connected with Myanmar’s national identity, which is largely based on ethnicity and tends to exclude the rest, particularly Muslims. Islamophobia therefore has roots in this Buddhist nationalism and its opposition to Islam (Roman Husarki, 2017).

In recent years, there has been a growing body of literature on the role of mainstream and digital media in understanding Islamophobia in Myanmar. Lee Ronan (2015) provides a valuable critique on how relaxed government rules around social media have provided platforms to spread anti-Muslim hate and rhetoric online. Ronan (2015) draws attention to the way in which social media is being used to enflame religious tensions, and has been exploited by extremist groups such as the Ma Ba Tha to express divisive political views that enflame
religious and ethnic tensions whilst promoting discriminatory policies, often to the detriment of Myanmar’s Muslim population (Ronan, 2015).

Further, there has been a critique of how Islamophobia is depicted by Western media outlets, particularly in their coverage of the Rohingya crisis. For example, Jasper Roe (2017) finds that online media sources generally depict the Rohingya people as a homogenous, passive group of victims, while minimizing agency of the Myanmar Security Forces and Government of Myanmar - their persecutors. In addition, the data reveals that the representation of the Rohingya people focuses heavily on depicting them as Muslims and further intensifying a sharp dichotomy between Muslims and Buddhists. Lisa Brooten (2015) similarly critiques human rights coverage and its framing of violence against the Rohingya in Myanmar, problematizing the way mainstream media outlets silence much needed representations of atrocities occurring in rural areas. In her analysis of Reuters reports, she finds that not much attention is paid to the work of advocacy organizations or organized resistance to the violence by local people or Rohingya themselves, who remain constructed either victims or largely invisible, reinforcing the need for “an external savior.” Further, she highlights that the lack of media attention to transnational economic and political forces contributing to sectarian violence in Myanmar leaves the global market and trade policies unexamined for their complicity in the situation facing the Rohingya. Rooten, Syed and Akirnro (2015) similarly note in their study that the New York Times in reporting on Rohingya, constructs the primary problem as the threats to democracy and investment, conflated in their discourse, promoting neoliberal economic policies which favor US interests. These constructions, according to the authors, reinforce the US’s paternalistic, hegemonic role, especially as Obama turned US foreign policy attention towards the East. In contrast Rooten et al. (2015) found that Inter Press Service (IPS) constructs the problem as lying both with the Burmese government and international investment strategies, by linking economic and political macro-level changes to the situation facing people on the ground. Thus, Burmese people and people’s organizations are constructed as the primary saviors, locating strategies for solutions in very different quarters and providing local people with agency that is not reflected in the NYT constructions of Rohingyas as victims.

Overall, the scholarship on Islamophobia in Myanmar makes a timely contribution to a critical crisis of violent, fatal anti-Muslim violence. Despite the developments annotated and listed in this reading pack, there is a critical need to expand this scholarship, and examine the geographical, gendered and socio-economic dimensions of Islamophobia in Myanmar, as well as its implication on the social mobility of Muslims in Myanmar. Further, there is a need to understand how to best develop counter-narratives and strategies of resistance on behalf of Muslims in Myanmar in response to the troubling rise of xenophobia and Islamophobia in this context.
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**Xenophobia (anti-immigrant and anti-refugee sentiment)**


Citizenship and National Identity


**Mainstream and Digital Media**


**Othering and Discrimination**


**Gender and Sexuality**


Social Mobility


Geography and the Public Space


Counter-Narratives and Strategies


4. Gonzalez, Nathaniel J. “How communal violence is prevented: Community mobilization in cases of potential Buddhist-Muslim violence in Myanmar.”


Overview

THEORIZATIONS OF ISLAMOPHOBIA in New Zealand have consistently emerged since the early 2000s to document the rise in anti-Muslim attitudes across the nation. Beginning with a demographic overview, many of these contributions have emphasized that the Muslim community in New Zealand is a small group, making up only 1.2% of the national population. But the Muslim population is growing, having increased by 28% between the 2006 and 2013 census (Colleen et al 2019). Approximately three-quarters of New Zealand Muslims are overseas-born and are highly diverse in terms of ethnicity and national background. The largest group is of Asian origin (26.9%), with around a quarter having African and Middle Eastern backgrounds (23.3%), as well as smaller numbers of both Māori and Europeans comprising the community (Drury 2016). New Zealand is a settler state and former British colony and as such has accepted Muslims since the mid nineteenth century with the first Islamic organization (New Zealand Muslim Association) established in 1950 (Drury 2016; Kolig 2019). Yet, Islam is widely considered a recent religious import, and therefore Muslims are understood by the general public as an immigrant group (Kolig, 2019; Drury, 2016).

Overall, existing research highlights that despite the socio-political nature of New Zealand and the country’s official pluralist and multicultural policies (Kolig, 2019), there has been a rise in Islamophobic attitudes and discrimination which are usually non-violent, however the recent extreme occurrence of the Christchurch mosque attacks in March 2019 has shifted this reality and highlighted the importance of examining Islamophobia in this context.

In tracing early theorizations of Islamophobia, the majority of these works cited in this resource pack note a marked shift from clear openness towards Islamic “otherness” to a “stance of concern, caution and growing negative prejudice in New Zealand (Shepard 2006; Clarke, 2006; Pratt 2010; Tuffin, 2008), particularly following the September 11 attacks in 2001. However, other perspectives have emphasized the need to connect Islamophobia with the broader deep-seated history of racism and discrimination in New Zealand, which can be traced to the discrimination against the Māori, New Zealand’s indigenous people who lived in New Zealand before the Europeans (predominantly British) discovered and colonized the country (Salahshour and Boama, 2020). The controversial Treaty of Waitangi, signed in 1840 between New Zealand’s indigenous Māori and the British Crown, which pledged to protect and ensure Māori as participating partners, was subsequently ignored by the British Crown, leading to a century of systematic racism against the Māori (ibid). As a result of the Treaty,
New Zealand is recognized as a bicultural society (Salahshour and Boama, 2020), meaning Anglo-Celtic culture and indigenous Maori culture (Tikanga Maori) and Maori language (te Reo Maori) officially are of equal status (Kolig, 2019).

With acknowledgement of this historical record of violence against minorities, New Zealand now appears to perform well on indicators of multiculturalism (Sibley & Ward, 2013) with a longstanding reputation for ethnic and religious tolerance (Crother and O’Brien, 2020). New Zealand’s “race relations” have been portrayed as harmonious (Kolig, 2019) and there has been considerable support for ongoing immigration and accommodation of refugees (Crother and O’Brien 2020). However, the issue of Islamophobia is presented as a key challenge to the success of the multiculturalism policy in New Zealand (see Kolig, 2003; 2006, 2012, 2015; Kolig and Voyce, 2016). In the book “New Zealand’s Muslims and Multiculturalism,” Erich Kolig provides a robust overview of various issues affecting Muslims in New Zealand including community, identity, diversity, Muslims in the public sphere, integration and conflict discoursers, gender issues. For example, the treatment of burqa-wearing women within the multicultural court setting is situated as an example of how islamophobia challenges New Zealand’s policy of multiculturalism (Kolig, 2006).

These theorizations of Islamophobia draw on themes of Muslim citizenship and national identity in New Zealand within the broader framework of multiculturalism. First, Erich Kolig and Nahid Kabir (2008), in comparing the images of citizenship available through multicultural policy provisions to the Muslim minority in Australia and New Zealand, highlight that the acceptance of cultural difference is more firmly entrenched in New Zealand. However, both authors acknowledge the impact of 9/11 on stereotyping and stigmatizing Muslim identities in New Zealand, bringing into question, how the Muslim minority fits into the socio-political framework of multiculturalism. Issues with negotiating Muslim identities (Kolig, 2012) were also identified by Colleen Ward et al. (2010) who found that Muslim youth see their religion as a more frequent source of discrimination than their ethnicity. They were also more likely to acknowledge discrimination against other Muslims. However, other research has also identified a correlation between stronger Muslim identities and resilience to religious discrimination (Marieke et al. 2012). Islamophobia is therefore problematized in how it limits feelings of citizenship and national identity, which questions the success of multiculturalism as a policy in New Zealand. Kolig and Kabir highlight the need to address this disconnect in order to facilitate the equal citizenry of Muslims in New Zealand.

Looking at causes and factors contributing to Islamophobia in this context, a number of emerging publications highlight the way in which Islamophobia is primarily formed by external global forces, leading to a rising diffuse anxiety towards the presence of Muslims across the nation (Kolig, 2012; Pratt, 2010). In reviewing early Muslim migration and communities, Douglas Pratt highlights the way in which fear of terrorism; a loathing of religious coercion; suspicion of the unfamiliar; and deep historical misunderstandings of Islam resulted in a growing anxiety within New Zealand society towards Muslims, as a result of the global phenomenon of prejudicial responses to Islam in the West. The rise in Islamophobia is mutually presented by these authors as a threat to multiculturalism in New Zealand, which is exacerbated by global issues, discourses and events such as terror attacks overseas.
such as 9/11 (Clark, 2006). Building on these themes, a small number of contributions have connected Islamophobia and the broader issue of national security and foreign policy in New Zealand. Like many western democracies around the world, the events of 11 September 2001 prompted a series of legislative reviews, updates, and new legislation introduced to counter international terrorist activity (Battersby and Ball, 2019). New Zealand enacted the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, the clear limitations of which from a security perspective have been discussed in other work (Battersby, 2017; Battersby and Ball, 2019). Following terrorist attacks in the early 2000s, Kolig (2006) drew attention to the way in which global events resulted in a fear of the Muslim minority’s radicalization in New Zealand. Such fears were reported to be exacerbated by media representations of radical features of Islam and ideological features of supposed “fundamentalism” spreading among Muslims. Kolig explains that such labels of fundamentalism are often conflated with terrorists and thus exacerbates broader concerns around terrorism that often originate in overseas situations. The appearance of Islamophobia in New Zealand has therefore been described as “a sign of ideological globalization” (Kolig, 2019) and can be connected to global actors and events around the world.

Islamophobia as an “ideological globalization” was evident in the Christchurch mosque massacre in March 2019, which was undertaken by an Australian perpetrator who had previously travelled around Europe (Kolig, 2019). Critically, there has been considerable interest in the issue of Islamophobia in New Zealand following these attacks, which underscored the threat that Islamophobia posed to this multicultural society (Ward et al., 2019). On 15 March 2019, a lone Australian national gunman who had recently been living in Dunedin stormed two Christchurch mosques, killed 51 people and injured up to 50 others, after emailing a 74-page manifesto to politicians and newsrooms just before the attack, and livestreaming part of his assault on Facebook. This violent tragedy became the catalyst for a fundamental shift in New Zealand’s views about guns, safety and gun control (Every-Palmer et al., 2020), as well as the reevaluation of self-reflective debate and reconsideration of race relations in the country (Kolig, 2019). Several journal special issues have been published since the shootings including the New Zealand Journal of Psychology 48 (1). April 2019 and Waikato Islamic Studies Review Vol 5, No 1. 2019.

Specifically, the New Zealand Journal of Psychology published a rapid-response issue to provide more research on this problem. The issue included many review-style articles written in response to the attack (Khawaja and Khawaja, 2019; Mirnajafi and Barlow, 2019; Waitoki, 2019; Wetherell, 2019), alongside several further analyses of survey data exploring the predictors of anti-Muslim prejudice (Hawi et al., 2019; Highland et al., 2019; Yogeeswaran et al., 2019), and data from a community sample exploring prejudice towards different religions (Wilson, 2019). The mosque shooting was a “focusing event” for New Zealand – which social scientists describe as extreme occurrences that can indelibly alter public opinion and change the political agenda (Birkland, 1998; Newman & Hartman, 2019; Every-Palmer et al., 2020). This tragic event which gained international headlines left a nation that was often presented as welcoming towards diversity, in utter shock. Importantly, it probed national reflection and public discussions around issues surrounding hate crimes, racism, discrimination, gun laws and Islamophobia (Every-Palmer, 2020).
The immediate reaction from political leaders and wider society was to stand in close solidarity with the targeted Muslim community, and a broad recovery process soon emerged which provided substantial ongoing support to anyone impacted by the incident (Anwar et al., 2020). Prime Minister Ardern’s description of the victims of the Christchurch attacks as “They are us” (Ellis and Muller, 2020) was echoed by New Zealand who shared this we-are-all-in-this-together sentiment (Ellis and Muller, 2020). Further, a vast majority of people immediately stood in close solidarity with their Muslim neighbors, and the government’s reaction was inclusive, supportive and defiant (Anwar et al., 2020). Floral tributes were brought by many in the public and support provided to the surviving victims and families, including raising money to supplement government grants for victims’ families. A gun control law which outlawed assault rifles was rapidly passed with support across the political spectrum, and further gun control legislation foreshadowed the possible establishment of a gun registry (Crothers and O’Brien, 2020).

Recent publications have sought to consider the Australian perpetrator Brendon Tarrant, in the context of New Zealand and global terrorism. While Tarrant’s attack on March 15, 2019 was unprecedented in terms of its scale, a major ideology causally involved in the massacre was white supremacy or white nationalism (described as nuances of the same trope) (Kolig, 2019). The attack therefore brought attention to the way in which Islamophobia is integrated in the right-wing political spectrum world-wide with fascism, neo-Nazism, white nationalism and white supremacy (Kolig, 2019). Practitioners involved in the security sector demonstrated that that extreme “right wing” demonstrative thinking was presenting itself in 2018 more regularly, and more overtly, within New Zealand society, than had been seen before (Battersby and Ball, 2019). In the perpetrator’s manifesto, entitled “The Great Replacement,” themes concerned “white genocide conspiracy theories,” neo-Nazi tropes and symbols and copious anti-immigrant sentiment from the Norwegian shooter Anders Behring Breivik were central, together with broader “racialized traditions and a nod to [US President] Donald Trump’s racist exhortations” (Crothers and O’Brien, 2020). However, while practitioners responsible for the detection and mitigation of terrorism risk in New Zealand seemed to suspect a rise in Right Wing Extremism (RWE) risk, security agencies were preoccupied with Islamist threats at the expense of focusing on RWE and the rise of Islamophobia (Battersby and Ball 2019; Kolig, 2019).

Thus, while the empathetic and inclusive approach demonstrated by the former prime minister Jacinda Ardern after these attacks was applauded and praised, following the attacks it became clear that warnings relating to the rising Islamophobia had come from experts, scholars, and members of the Muslim community who claim that this sort of attack was “inevitable” (Shaver et al., 2017). These series of events and discourses suggest that there are insidious, subtle and often unheard attempts to exclude migrant communities in various contexts including the education workplace of New Zealand (Salahshour and Boamah, 2020).

Prior to this event, a body of research had examined the othering and discrimination of Muslims in New Zealand including racial attitudes towards this group, as well as lived experiences of Islamophobia among Muslims. Prior to the Christchurch massacre, there
were a number of attempts to systematically quantify Muslim acceptance and prejudice in New Zealand, particularly against the backdrop of ethnic-specific prejudice. In line with this conjecture, previous research found a conflation of anti-Muslim prejudice and anti-Arab prejudice, and that both forms are predicted by media exposure (Shaver et al., 2017; Greaves et al., 2020). Two articles have demonstrated widespread prejudice against Muslims in NZ, what the authors described as a “Muslim Acceptance Gap” (Shaver et al., 2016, 2017). The “Muslim Acceptance Gap” refers to large shortfalls in the acceptance of Muslims relative to ethnic minorities, and a relatively higher correlation of anti-Muslim prejudice with anti-Arab prejudice when compared with prejudice to other ethnic minorities (Shaver et al., 2017).

Recent research has verified that New Zealand’s spirit of tolerance does not apply for all groups, whereby religious minorities such as Muslims, Sikhs and Hindus are more readily targeted by discrimination and prejudice (Crothers and O’Brien, 2020). For example, a national survey—the New Zealand edition of the International Social Survey Programme module on religion—found a substantially greater perceived threat and negativity towards Muslims compared with other groups. In particular, older people, New Zealand Europeans, men, and those with more right-wing attitudes reported greater threat and negativity towards Muslims. However, in line with previous studies, higher religious identification and higher education predicted greater acceptance of Muslims (Greaves et al., 2020). Collectively, these studies reinforced a substantial “Muslim Acceptance Gap” in New Zealand. Specifically, greater challenges for acceptance are evident among lower-educated, right-wing, older, secular, and male populations. The magnitude of this gap reveals a substantial challenge to the future of New Zealand where religious and secular people can live without evoking prejudice (Greaves et al., 2020; Sibley et al., 2019).

These attitudes translate into various forms of othering and discrimination among Muslims in New Zealand that have been noted in the existing literature before the Christchurch mosque attacks. Ward et al., 2019, reviewed the issues that New Zealand Muslims face, including coping with discrimination which included everyday racism, negative stereotypes based on lack of knowledge about Islam, and unfavorable media portrayals of Muslims, as well as discrimination in educational and employment contexts (Stuart 2014; Ward, Lescelius, Naidu, Jack, & Weinberg, 2016; Ward et al., 2019). Some examples of these incidents included verbal abuse, denying the use of public transportation to veiled women, as well as the vandalism or targeting of mosques with graffiti and pigs’ heads (Kolig, 2019). Salahshour and Boamah (2020) focused on the area of Islamophobia in employment, highlighting high levels of perceived discrimination among Muslim staff working at universities across the country. It is important to note that although such discrimination was cited across these studies, these incidents were on the less violent end of the spectrum (Ward, Liu et al., 2010) up until the recent Christchurch mosque attacks (Ward et al., 2019). Importantly, these experiences of othering and belonging affect different groups in society according to immigration status, gender and institution. Therefore, it is important to review the bodies of literature have examined the ways in which Islamophobia affects different groups in society, as well as the works that trace the role of the media in perpetuating Islamophobic discourses in New Zealand.

First, recent research emphasizes the way in which these experiences of Islamophobia are
gendered, with female participants attributing experiences of Islamophobia to wearing the hijab, which increases their Muslim visibility (see Hobson, 2012; Kolig, 2019; Jasperse et al., 2011). In exploring processes of identity creation in the lives of Muslim women in NZ, Stephanie Hobson, 2012, highlights the increased pressure on Muslim women to negotiate between popular essentialist stereotypes about Islam, and their own conditions of diaspora and minority contexts. She finds that their identities contradict stereotypical and mostly Islamophobic notions of Muslim women. Hobson, 2012b, further explores the varying levels of prejudice in New Zealand towards Muslim women, from explicit public abuse to more covert forms, such as discrimination in employment or being stared at. There is a need for further examination of these gendered dimensions of Islamophobia in New Zealand, particularly in relation to the various discrimination faced by Muslim men and women.

Islamophobia also affects the social mobility of Muslims in New Zealand. For example, Marieke Jasperse, 2009 and Jasperse et al., 2011, investigated the perceived religious discrimination and three facets of Muslim identity (psychological, behavioral, and visible) as predictors of psychological well-being among 153 Muslim women in New Zealand. The results indicated that although visibility (wearing hijab) was associated with greater perceived discrimination, it predicted positive psychological outcomes. Analysis further revealed that the psychological (pride, belongingness, and centrality) and behavioral (engaging in Islamic practices) facets of Muslim identity moderated the relationship between perceived religious discrimination and well-being. A strong psychological affiliation with Islam exacerbated the negative relationship between perceived religious discrimination and well-being. Conversely, engaging in Islamic practices buffered the negative impact of discrimination. In relation to education, Heather Smyth, 2013, drew on focus groups with young Somali students attending a primary school in the Greater Wellington region to explore their interactions with their peers and teachers. Despite the students’ identification of numerous positive aspects of their school lives, including strong friendships and autonomy in the classroom, the study revealed that bullying is an ongoing issue, for themselves and other students, in and out of school. This was more readily reported by female Muslim students. Overall, there is a need for further research into how Islamophobia manifests in a range of institutional spaces, and the way in which this affects the social mobility of Muslims in range areas such as education, healthcare and employment.

The impact of the rising Islamophobia on immigration, and specifically refugee experiences as well as policies is also a growing area of interest among researchers. First, one aspect of Rose Joudi Kadri’s PhD dissertation (2009) on resettling Arab Muslim refugees explored Islamophobia and rising anti-Muslim sentiment as one of the challenges that they face during resettlement. Further, Butler et al.’s study (2006) of immigrants and refugees in New Zealand found that Muslim participants felt that Islam was misunderstood, and therefore resulted in both overt and implicit forms of discrimination. All Muslim participants mentioned that they were concerned with the way that Islam was portrayed, not just in New Zealand, but on an international scale. Najib Lafræie (2006) specifically explored the negative impacts of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States on refugee policies in New Zealand. The article draws on the case of Ahmed Zaoui – an Algerian refugee who has been elected to the Algerian
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parliament in the early 1990s, and reached New Zealand in December 2002 after a decade of failed resettlement in other nations. Zaoui’s detention and imprisonment by New Zealand authorities upon his entry is framed as a result of new laws introduced after the 9/11 attacks. These toughened laws and regulations regarding detention are problematized by Lafraie (2006) in their potential implications on deterring future Muslims from seeking asylum. On the other hand, Cheryl Sulaiman-Hill et al. (2011) in their study of changing images of refugees in print media found that New Zealand newspapers consistently portrayed refugee issues in a largely sympathetic way, especially after the 9/11 attacks. However, a more common prejudicial image (of Muslims as immigrants) is instrumentalized by white supremacism (or white nationalism), as espoused by the perpetrator of the Christchurch attack for the claim that Muslims were “invading” New Zealand (Kolig, 2019). This image of Muslims as immigrants also overshadows the contributions and role of local Muslim converts, hindering the development of “New Zealand Islam” (Drury, 2016). This area of research on xenophobia, immigration and refugees could benefit from studies that document and examine the lived experience of Muslim immigrants with Islamophobia, particularly after the 9/11 attacks.

Mainstream and digital media have been found to reinforce orientalist views and construction of Islam as the “other” across major New Zealand media outlets. Shah Nister Kabir provides a number of contributions to this area, beginning in 2012 with an analysis of how New Zealand mainstream newspapers represent Islamic identity and Muslim communities. Kabir and Bourk (2012) found that hard news appears to reinforce Orientalist representation of Muslims, whereas editorials adopt a more liberal pluralist construction of Islamic identity and issues. Kabir (2013), in analyzing the construction of the Iran nuclear issue appearing in three New Zealand newspapers, also argued that these newspapers framed Iran and the Islamic nature of its political structure as a threat, espousing an Orientalist view that constructed Iran (a Muslim nation) as a threat to the world. Shah Nister Kabir and Obaidul Hamid (2015) similarly illustrated how three mainstream newspapers in New Zealand espoused an orientalist view of the “Islamic Other” in framing the issue of the 2006 “suspected aircraft terror plot” at Heathrow Airport in London. The paper found that “these newspapers provided extraordinary emphasis on Islamic terrorism that was extrapolated from the event, but they maintained their categorical silence when the initial sensationalizing representations were found to be questionable, as evidence did not fully support the scale of the Orientalist representation.” Ewart et al., 2016, also critically examined the constructions of Islam in mainstream media, finding firstly that interviewees commented on the problematic nature of reportage of Muslims and Islam and also provided anecdotal evidence of a connection between the rise in negative news media coverage of Muslims and increased reports of violent attacks against Muslims, and overall anti-Muslim sentiment, that also fueled xenophobia (see also Shepard, 2016). Similarly, Shaver et al. (2017) found that exposure to news among a national sample of over 16,000 New Zealand residents indicated that greater news exposure was associated with increased anger towards Muslims (Ward et al., 2019). Overall, most reporting is attributed to international newsfeeds that construct Muslims as the “dangerous other,” that lacks visibility of the local Muslim community identity and culture (Kabir and Bourk, 2012; Rahman and Emadi, 2018). Specifically, Rahman and Emadi found a growing number of narratives linking Islam to “terrorism” and “jihad” so much so that by 2016 New Zealand news outlets
reported on “Islamic terrorism” almost seven times more often than on Islam more generally (Ward et al., 2019). It is important to note, however, that since the Christchurch terror attack, there has been a shift in the tone and discourses of news stories on Islam and Muslims in the New Zealand media which has focused largely on empathetic coverage of victims and resisted the alleged gunman’s attempts to publicize his cause (Ellis and Muller 2020; Every-Palmer et al., 2020). Whereas past research has found that media coverage of Muslims in New Zealand is generally negative (Kabir and Bourk, 2012; Rahman and Emadi, 2018), positive press was more evident in the New Zealand media in the wake of the attack, which according to Greaves et al., 2020, might have moderated anti-Muslim prejudice. An ongoing examination of these shifts and impacts of media reporting on anti-Muslim attitude and discrimination in New Zealand is therefore a valuable area of further inquiry.

Finally, research has also examined the digital media space to draw attention to the role of social media for the incubation and promulgation of white supremacist and other extremist ideologies such as Islamophobia (Crothers and O’Brien, 2020). As evidenced in the Christchurch mosque attacks, the perpetrator scripted references to previous shooters (e.g. the perpetrator of the 2011 Norwegian shooting), YouTube stars, memes and far-right symbols as “hooks” for attracting attention and communicating with an international audience. And then he filmed and streamed the murders at Al Noor mosque in real time on Facebook (Every-Palmer et al., 2020).

Overall, the existing body of academic writing on Islamophobia in New Zealand highlights the way in which Islamophobia has posed a challenge to social cohesion and the policy of multiculturalism in this context. As demonstrated by the body of literature published in the last three decades, there is tension between the nation’s reputation of pluralism and acceptance in, compared with rising anti-Muslim attitudes and experiences of Islamophobia among Muslims, which was particularly highlighted in the extreme tragedy of the Christchurch massacre. While the perpetrator of the attacks was Australian, it remains critical to contextualize both the global and local influences that cultivate Islamophobia in the national context of New Zealand within the broader process of globalized Islamophobia. It is also particularly important to monitor hate crimes against Muslims in New Zealand (Greaves et al., 2020) as well as account for the impacts of anti-Muslim prejudice on Muslim mobility in areas such as health, well-being, education and employment outcomes compared with other groups. There is also a particular need for institutional training opportunities to elevate intercultural understanding to improve social cohesion among diverse members of communities (Salahshour and Boama, 2020). Future research should continue to provide empirical insights into the experiences of othering and discrimination among Muslims in New Zealand whilst also paying attention counter-narratives and strategies Muslims in New Zealand utilize in response.
List of Citations

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32. Waitoki, Waikaremoana. ““This is not us”: But actually, it is. Talking about when to raise the issue of colonisation.” (2019) New Zealand Journal of Psychology, 48(1):140.


**National Security and Foreign Policy**


Xenophobia (anti-immigrant and anti-refugee sentiment)


### Citizenship and National Identity


29. Waitoki, Waikaremoana. “‘This is not us’: But actually, it is. Talking about when to raise the issue of colonisation.” (2019) New Zealand Journal of Psychology. 48(1):140.


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Counter-Narratives and Strategies


Overview

A GROWING BODY OF LITERATURE in the English language has recently theorized the field of Islamophobia in Japan, highlighting the importance of addressing the potential for a rise of anti-Muslim sentiment in this context. Within this scholarship are demographic overviews of the Muslim population estimating the Muslim population to be around 170,000 (less than 0.2%), with an expected rise of Muslim visitors and residents in Japan in the future (Yamaganta, 2019; Fathil and Fathil, 2011). In addition to the growing number of non-Japanese Muslim residents in Japan, the number of Japanese Muslims is also growing due to intermarriage between non-Japanese Muslims and Japanese, and the children born to these families (Yamagata, 2019). This growth in Muslim population has been accompanied by an expansion of mosques, with a total of 102 mosques across Japan as of October 2017 (Tanada 2018a, cited in Yamagata, 2019). The history of Muslim relations in Japan is debated across these perspectives, with some scholars claiming that the presence of Islam in Japan is quite recent, with no historical traces before 1868 of Islam and Japan (Fathil and Fathil, 2011), while others claim that contacts between Japan and Muslims occurred through trade as early as the eighth century A.D. (e.g., Komura 1988, cited in Yamaganta, 2019). However, across these perspectives is consensus that the nineteenth century marked when communities of Muslims began to form in Japan (Yamaganta, 2019). From the 19th century, Muslim migration came from India, as well as Tatar Muslims fleeing the Russian revolution, which formed communities in cities such as Tokyo, Nagoya, Kobe and Kumamoto (Matsunaga 2009, 3–9, cited in Yamaganta, 2019). The Asian Congress (Ajia Gikai), founded in 1909 was established in Tokyo as an important hub of pan-Asian and Muslim activism. Members of the Asian Congress sought funds from the Ottoman Empire to construct a mosque in Tokyo, as well as ulema to serve Muslims living in Japan (Wen, 2014). In 1935 the Kobe Mosque was established, followed by Nagoya Mosque in 1936 and Tokyo Mosque in 1938 (Tanada 2015, 24, cited in Yamaganta, 2019). During this period, relations with Muslims were positive, with the Tokyo Mosque being established as part of the “Kaikyō Seisaku” Islamic policy of the Japanese government of the time (Tanada 2015, 24; Fukuda 2010, cited in Yamaganta, 2019), in hopes of securing cooperation with Muslims in its foreign policy to make use of Muslims in its advancement into North China and South East Asia. To promote interaction between Japan and Muslims, some Islamic research institutes were also founded by the government under its Islamic policy (Tanada, 2008, 216, cited in Yamaganta, 2019). However, after the end of World War II, the Islamic research institutes were dissolved or banned by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers during the Allied occupation.
of Japan, as those institutes were regarded as part of Japan’s military campaigns (Fathil and Fathil, 2011). The number of Muslims in Japan remained quite small in the decades after the war, but has grown since the late 1980s with a rapid increase in immigrant workers from Muslim-majority countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh and Iran working in Japan to earn income. As the number of undocumented foreign workers increased rapidly, the Japanese government suspended the Visa Waiver Agreements with Pakistan and Bangladesh in 1989 and with Iran in 1992. An influx of Muslims from Indonesia started to come to Japan from the 1990s as technical intern trainees or students as well as Indonesian nurses and caregivers also increasing from 2007, following Japan’s signing of an Economic Partnership Agreement with Indonesia. Furthermore, as the Japanese government has been promoting a policy of increasing its international student intake, the number of Muslim students coming to Japan has also grown (Tanada, 2015, 23).

As with other contexts, a common narration of a conflict between Japanese culture and Islamic values proposes challenges for citizenship and national identity for Muslims in Japan. Pratama, 2018, draws upon texts set in the twentieth century to highlight the portrayal of Japan as a country that is not accommodative, though not discriminative, towards Muslims. In terms of religiosity, from Islam’s monotheistic point of view, Japanese culture and religion is often portrayed as something confusing (Pratama, 2018). Such incompatibilities have been identified as a potential point for Islamophobia to grow in Japan, due to cultural differences that may not be accommodated (Maruyama 2005). For example, formal education policies in the early 2000s promoted assimilation into “Japanese” norms and rather than accommodation of Japanese Muslims in public schools (Maruyama, 2005). Such tensions around Islam and a Japanese national identity are covered by Fathil and Fathil, 2011, in their reflections on converts to Islam. Converts to Islam are perceived as selfish, and “un-Japanese” due to placing personal religious beliefs ahead of family or collective duties, in their betrayal of Japanese customs and traditions. Therefore, the exclusion of “un-Japanese” temporary migrants, or values are seen as threats to the maintenance of Japan’s national identity as a homogenous island nation (Yamagata, 2017). While such tensions are noted, other scholars such as Pratama, also bring to light that Japanese culture is also understood by Muslims as a culture that is able construct neutral and non-confrontative interactions with Islamic values. This increasingly positive image of Japan among Muslims, such as those in Indonesia has grown in the last decade (Pratama, 2018).

Recent studies on othering and discrimination have shown a range of perspectives on negative experiences of Islamophobia among Muslims. One group of scholars (Yamagata, 2017, 2019; Fathil and Fathil, 2011) have emphasized that Muslims residing in Japan encounter little to almost no hostility from the local population, which is “not held as intensely as in Europe or the United States” (Fathil and Fathil, 2011; Yamagata 2017). Satō Ken’ei, a journalist who has been researching the Muslim community in Japan, claims that most Muslims in Japan have not felt changes in Japanese people’s attitudes towards their communities, and have received increased visits and interest in their mosques after negative incidents about Muslims in the media. In some Mosques in Japan, the number of non-Muslim Japanese who want to visit the Mosques to learn about Islam has even increased after those incidents (Yamagata, 2017).
On the other hand, these scholars do draw attention to the historical stereotypes of Muslims and Islam in Japan as “violent, intolerant and strange” (Fathil and Fathil, 2011) in the 1950s and 60s, as well as the modern misunderstanding of Islam in Japan (Yohei, 2011), and a subsequent intensification of negative views about Islam and Muslims following the September 11 attacks and the war on terror policies of the West. This has raised suspicions that al-Qaeda and other radical Islamic groups have established a presence in Japan has further intensified fears and negative attitudes towards Islam and Muslims (Fathil and Fathil, 2011). There are indeed recent accounts of anti-Islamic sentiment by ultraconservative activists, and newspaper articles about Muslims in Japan (Yamagata, 2019). Anti-Muslim sentiment has affected the social mobility of Muslims in Japan. Marayuma, 2005, highlighted the need for Japan to develop a recognition of an inclusive approach in education to challenge Islamophobia. According to Marayuma, this can be accomplished with better accommodation of religious needs in education policies and a recognition of Islam in education ministry and local governments. It was indeed only recently that Muslim organizations were given recognition and permitted to open an official Islamic school to be established in Japan (Fathil and Fathil, 2011).

The role of the media in producing negative experiences of Islamophobia has been a recent, yet limited point of discussion in existing scholarship. Fathil and Fathil, has noted that misunderstandings of Islam are caused by distorted information conveyed and printed in electronic media, reinforced by no direct experience with Muslims among the Japanese (Fathil and Fathil, 2011). Yamagata, similarly draws attention to a survey in 2006 by Matsumoto (cited in Yamagata, 2019) carried out on perceptions of Islam among high school students in 2003 and among university students in 2005 (Miura, 2006, cited in Yamagata, 2019). Based on questions about the three religions: Islam, Christianity and Buddhism, high school and university students associated more negative words with Islam than the other faiths, using descriptors such as “backward,” “intolerant,” “strange,” “unfree,” and “aggressive” to reflect their images of the religion (Miura 2006, 179–83, cited in Yamagata, 2019). Both Matsumoto and Miura point out that the results were influenced by the Japanese mass media, which often covered Islam in the context of news about conflicts (Matsumoto 2006, 201–02; Miura 2006, 187–89) (Yamagata, 2019). Yamagata, through a media analysis, examined media representations of Muslims in Japan, and considered how Islam and Muslims living in and coming to Japan are perceived, while exploring the rationales behind these perceptions (Yamagata, 2019). Based on these findings, Japan is shown to have a rising interest in Muslims as visitors or tourists, and that there is little evidence to indicate increasing negative attitudes towards them. In Japan’s case, rather than inciting violence or hate speech, Yamagata contends that a recent rise of national pride in Japanese hospitality has encouraged Japanese people to be more welcoming of Muslims. Coverage of Muslims in the media focused mostly on the provision of halal food for Muslim tourists or students by Japanese businesses or universities was discussed in many articles (e.g., Asahi Shimbun, 2014b, 2016a; Yomiuri Shimbun, 2016c, cited in Yamagata, 2019).

However, two major events that resulted in negative reporting of Muslims when two Japanese citizens were taken hostage and later killed by the so-called Islamic State in the Middle East...
in January 2015 (Nordland, 2015), which was widely covered in the Japanese media and was received with deep sorrow in Japan (Miura 2015, cited in Yamagata, 2019). The second incident occurred in July 2016, when seven Japanese citizens were killed in Bangladesh, with responsibility claimed by Islamic State (BBC 2016). After this incident, one Yomiuri Shimbun article reported that a mosque in Shizuoka prefecture had received four threatening letters saying “both the Islamic State and you are Islam” and “I will hit you with a bat from behind” (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2016b). The influence of these incidents, however, seems to have been limited on producing Islamophobia (Yamagata, 2019). In short, in mainstream news coverage in Japan from 2014 to the first half of 2018, Muslims were predominantly represented as potential visitors or tourists in a hospitality context. Although there were tragic incidents perpetrated by Islamic extremists which affected Japanese nationals during this time, the two Japanese newspapers studied highlighted the voices of Muslims criticizing the atrocities, and there was little reporting of a rise in Islamophobia. When incidents were perpetrated against Japanese nationals by Islamic State, newspaper sections devoted to local news introduced voices from local mosques (e.g., Yomiuri Shimbun, 2015), which provide platforms for Muslims to lend their voices to Japanese media and society (Yamagata, 2019).

Scholars argue that Islamophobia must be understood within the broader issue of xenophobia and potential anti-refugee sentiment. Hate speech against non-Japanese in Japan has been identified as a serious social problem, whereby since around 2000, xenophobic discourses have emerged on the internet and, since the middle of the 2000s, ultra-conservative groups such as Kōdō-suru Hoshu Undō “Action Conservative Movement” started to hold rallies, verbally attacking foreign residents (Yamaguchi, 2013, cited in Yamagata, 2019). While these movements mainly target ethnic Koreans or Chinese, one group named Han Gurōbarizumu Kokusai Hoshu Rengō, or Anti-Globalism International Conservative Alliance (AICA), started to target Muslims from around 2014. This group is specifically against the admission of Muslims to Japan and regularly holds rallies in Tokyo verbally attacking Muslims (Yamagata, 2019). The AICA, frames modern Muslims in Japan as fundamentalist and therefore pose a risk of conflict or terrorism in Japan (Yamagata, 2019). Yamagata highlights that groups like the AICA often cite problems allegedly caused by Muslims in Europe, and thus argues that these groups see the influx of refugees to Europe and terrorist attacks in European cities as a threat to Japan (Yamagata, 2019). Further, Yamagata references a controversial event in 2015, whereby Japanese cartoonist Toshiko Hasumi posted an illustration of a girl to her official Facebook page. The illustration closely resembled a photograph of a Syrian girl at a refugee camp in Lebanon which was taken by Canadian photographer Jonathan Hyams (Osaki, 2015b). Asked about the illustration by The Japan Times, Hasumi said it was her “understanding” that most of the people fleeing Syria this time were “bogus” asylum seekers or “illegal migrants” (Osaki, 2015c). While not directly targeted at Muslims, can be seen as related to perceptions of Muslims through its link to the Syrian refugee crisis (Yamagata, 2019). This is also connected to Japanese responses to the Syrian refugee crisis since 2011, with a reluctance to accept refugees although it had pledged a large amount of financial assistance to international organizations (Yamagata, 2017, 2019). For example, Japan only accepted 28 refugees out of 10,901 applicants in 2016 (Yamagata, 2017). Although Islamophobic discourses are rarely expressed in Japanese media and in
proceedings of committees around accepting Syrian refugees, some studies have connected the outflow of Muslim refugees with a rise in xenophobic movements (Yamagata, 2017).

Publications focusing on national security and foreign policy have reported on three main areas: the increased surveillance of Muslim communities, positive relations with Muslim majority nations in the Middle East, and Japanese policies encouraging Muslim tourism. In the first instance, recent research has uncovered that although there have been no terrorist attacks by Muslim extremists in Japan, Muslims living in Japan have been under official surveillance in the name of national security (Yamagata, 2017). In 2010, leaked confidential documents from the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department revealed that police had profiled around 72,000 Muslims from countries of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) living in Japan, including children, and had carried out surveillance of places where Muslims gather, such as mosques, shops and businesses (Attorney Team for Victims of Illegal Investigation against Muslims 2014, in Yamagata, 2019).

While these counter-terrorism measures are in place within Japan, decreased hostility towards Muslims in Japan is attributed to cordial, economic ties and foreign policy with the Middle East (Marayuma, 2005) and other Islamic countries. Indeed, establishing harmonious political relationships with the Islamic world has become a relevant component of Muslim life in Japan. The decade of the 2010s has witnessed how Japan has been successful in capturing the attention of the Muslim market through the promotion of “halal tourism” and the provision of facilities aimed at facilitating Muslims to fulfill their religious obligations during their time in Japan (Pratama, 2019; Henderson, 2016). Total numbers of Muslim tourists in Japan more than doubled between 2010 and 2015 (Henderson, 2016). Efforts to attract Muslim tourists are not limited to the private sector. In May 2018, the “Action Plan for Muslim Tourists in Japan” was formulated at the 20th Tourism Strategy Promotion Task Force meeting held by relevant ministries and agencies to attract more Muslim tourists, such as the provision of halal food, the establishment of prayer rooms, and promotional activities in Muslim majority countries (Yamagata, 2019). The Japan Tourism Agency also publishes guidebooks teaching Japanese people how to extend culturally appropriate hospitality to Muslims (Yamagata, 2019). At the municipal level, Kyoto City launched a website for Muslims named “Muslim Friendly Kyoto” in 2014, which provides information about prayer rooms, restaurants serving halal food and Muslim-friendly accommodation in Kyoto (Kyoto Convention and Visitors Bureau n.d.). While the increase in Muslim visitors to Japan has had a positive influence on perceptions of Islam and Muslims in Japan, there is a need to investigate attitudes of non-Muslims, whether locals or visitors, towards Muslim tourists and what happens when Muslim and non-Muslims share spaces and services.
List of Citations

**Theorizing the Field**


**National Security and Foreign Policy**


Xenophobia (anti-immigrant and anti-refugee sentiment)


Citizenship and National Identity


Mainstream and Digital Media


Social Mobility


Gender and Sexuality

Islamophobia in the Philippines

Overview

A WIDE RANGE OF PUBLICATIONS have attempted to theorize the issue of Islamophobia in the Philippines, primarily over the last two decades. These publications have focused on armed conflict and the struggle for Muslim independence and autonomy in the southern Philippines.

First, scholars have provided demographic overviews of the Muslim population in the Philippines to contextualize the community within these broader issues (see Angeles, 2010; Rivera, 2006). According to recent publications, Muslims constitute an estimated 5% of the Philippines’ 100 million population. Previously concentrated in the southern part of the country, they are now visible in most regions as a result of internal migration and conversions that have taken place since the 1970s (Angeles, 2010). In discussing Islamophobia in this context, it is vital to note that “Southern Philippine Muslims are both an ethnic and religious minority who experienced discrimination and marginalization from colonial times and even under the independent Philippine government” (Angeles, 2010). Historical accounts of Islamophobia are traced to as early as 1886, with reports describing Muslims as “cunning, hypocrites, traitors, swindlers, suspicious, cowards, unaccommodating and persistent” (Montero Y Vidal, 1886, 383-384, cited in Angeles, 2010), followed by references to Islam as the false religion and calls for punishment of Muslims (Viana, 1903:230, cited in Angeles, 2010). Islam took root in Mindanao some two centuries before the coming of Christianity with the Spanish colonial conquest in the fifteenth century (Rivera, 2006). In the early 1900s, the Muslim population constituted about 76% of Mindanao's total population. In 2006, it was “down to only about twenty percent of the population as a result of policies of internal Christian migration, corporate expansion, land grabbing’s and seizures, and family displacements from the armed conflict” (Rivera, 2006). Thus, centuries predating colonization in the Philippines, Muslims emerged as a dominant ethno-religious group in Mindanao and Sulu, existing as a sovereign and independent states, and established their own system of government through the sultanates, which during those periods was the most advanced in the Philippines. They had also established diplomatic and trade relations with neighboring states. (Aquino, 2009). Colonization in the sixteenth century threatened Muslims’ domination and distinct identity. Scholars therefore argue that an examination of Islamophobia must account for their struggles of resistance against foreign domination, first Spain, for more than three centuries, and then the United States, for another four decades (Aquino, 2009).

Theorizations of Islamophobia in the Philippines in existing scholarship are framed around armed struggles against Spanish colonialism (sixteenth century), the United States
occupation (1898-1946), as well as ongoing liberation efforts in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries following the independence of the Philippines. In pre-Hispanic Philippines, Islamic culture and religion radiated from two centers of political power: The Sultanate in Sulu (1450 A.D.) and the Sultanate in Maguindanao, central Mindanao (1511 A.D) (Rivera, 2006). By the time Spain arrived to colonize the Philippines in the sixteenth century, Islam had become a key feature of cultural identity and, hence, education throughout the region. Spanish colonization, however, with its policy of aggressive Christianization, introduced a dichotomization of Philippine cultures along religious lines that would eventually lead to a series of armed conflicts over the next three centuries (Majul, 1999, cited in Milligan, 2004). Angeles highlights that early Muslim resistance to Spanish Christianizing efforts and intrusion into their commercial activities in the Sulu zone (Warren, 2007) generated negative descriptions of Muslims that were recorded in various documents of empire (Angeles, 2010). During American occupation, religion was not imposed, however Muslims and other indigenous peoples were placed under the administration of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes (Gowing, 1977), thereby reinforcing otherness on the basis of religious identity project (Rivera, 2006), and colonial superiority. Further, the Americans introduced a system of electoral democracy which produced a new generation of elected Muslim politicians from elite families which placed Muslim politicians in subordinate roles reflecting their far smaller political constituencies and bases of power (Rivera, 2006). Colonization and post-colonial influence significantly altered Muslims’ distinct identity as a dominant ethno-religious group of people. Notwithstanding strong Muslim resistance, colonial and post-colonial rule prevailed and eventually transformed Muslims into the minoritized group in Mindanao (Aquino, 2009).

When the Americans granted Philippine independence in 1946, Mindanao was made part of the new republic despite earlier objections from Muslims, which was accompanied by discriminatory American laws and policies towards the Moros. This further alienated and marginalized Muslims who were dispossessed of their lands while several government programs supported migrant settlements. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, continued Christian migrations resulted in brewing Muslim-Christian violence over land conflicts (Aquino, 2009). A significant component of theorizing Islamophobia in the Philippines is the secessionist conflicts in the southern Philippines that erupted in the 1970s to assert Muslim self-determination and establish a Bangsamoro state (Aquino, 2009). Despite the government’s peace efforts, the conflict persisted for more than four decades, causing instability and hindering progress in the region (Aquino, 2009). In particular, the tragic “Jabidah massacre” on March 18, 1968, of Muslim recruits while on a secret military training for the government’s plan to invade and retake the Malaysian state of Sabah, created further outrage against the government’s unjust treatment of Muslims (Aquino, 2009). Muslim secessionist conflict in the southern Philippines in the early 1970s is the culmination of a long series of struggles against foreign domination (colonial and post-colonial), which eventually succeeded in government control over the Muslims in Mindanao. Longstanding resistance to colonial and central government rule erupted in 1972 when a separatist rebellion led by the MNLF broke out in response to grievances of national integration policies that sought to incorporate the
southern Islands into the Catholic nation (whittled down indigenous Muslim population from 70-80% down to 30% (Liow, 2006).

The salience of Islam came through to Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILKF) that split from the MNLF, which became the largest and most powerful resistance group in southern Philippines (Liow, 2006). Rivers, 2006, provides a robust analysis of the various factors that led to the separatism movements after the second world war, the majority of which were related to loss of land, economic grievances and lack of access to government positions (see also Aquino, 2009).

For more than four decades, the conflict has persisted, while its solution has remained elusive. It has created instability that hampered necessary economic development in the Philippines’ southernmost region. (Aquino, 2009). Political negotiations between the government and Muslim movements, ranging from (1976-2001) were deemed unsuccessful, and exacerbated by American intervention in the aftermath of 9/11 in providing counter-terrorist training and intelligence and increased substantially its military financial assistance to the Philippine military (Rivera, 2006). Most problematic is the way in which the American intervention subsumed the local armed conflicts to the greater strategic interests of U.S. policy in its war against terrorism, silencing, in the process, the nuances and particularities of local movements long rooted in legitimate grievances (Rivera, 2006). The religious characterization of the Moro struggle as a Muslim, or “terrorist” struggle, cultivates a culture of Islamophobia has been cultivated, while simultaneously confuses the real political nature of the Moro struggle (Imbong, 2018).

**National security** has been a focal point of recent contributions to the body of knowledge on Islamophobia in the Philippines. This is particularly relevant to the recent siege of Marawi, a city with a population of around 200,000 people, over five months between May and October 2017. Although led by the Maute group, a powerful local clan, the fighters were allegedly an alliance of militant Islamists that transcended clan and ethnic boundaries, in an effort to demonstrate unity under the caliphate and receive recognition from ISIS central. In response, the government proposed a Muslim-only ID scheme to identify alleged terror personalities in a bid to avoid spillover of the Marawi crisis (CNN Philippines Staff 2017, cited in Imbong, 2018). “The proposed measure, reminiscent of the identification system the Nazis imposed upon the Jews, merely instigates religious bigotry and the misconception that Muslims are potentially terrorists” (Imbong, 2018). This both reinforced Islamophobia and the distorted depiction of the Moro struggle as religiously-instigated. The devastation of the attack, however, was followed by a major breakthrough in the peace process in the Southern Philippines with the formation in early 2019 of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM). In a historic step forward, a plebiscite held on 21 January 2019 saw voters overwhelmingly ratify a law to create the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM), providing for deeper and wider autonomy in the area than ever before (Temby, 2019). The law promises “genuine and meaningful self-governance” and financial autonomy through an automatic annual block grant from the national government equivalent to 5% of the national internal revenue tax collection. The success of BARMM, and the peace process as a whole, is central to uplifting Muslim Mindanao — one of the poorest areas of Southeast Asia (Temby, 2019).
A range of perspectives of **citizenship and national identity** draw on the othering exclusion of Muslims in the Philippines (Rivera, 2006; Liow, 2006). This is traced to the early years following the political independence of the Philippines in 1946, where multiple binaries were in place that reflected both institutional and individual Islamophobia describing Christians and Muslims in the country in terms of: us/them; good/bad; believers/heathens; civilized/savage; rational/fanatic; trustworthy/deceitful, and other opposing combinations, contrasted with the positives used for the Christian Filipinos (Rivera, 2006). Thomas McKenna noted “Christian Filipinos who controlled the Philippine state regarded all un-Hispanicized citizens as impure and marked Philippine Muslims as especially untrustworthy because of their long history of mutual enmity” (McKenna, 1997). Therefore, minority nationalism remains and important motivation for Muslim minorities who have been in conflict with the political objective of either an independent territorial state or a restitution of local political identity in response to their othering (Liow, 2006). Macapagal, 2018, reaffirms that based on survey over 394 Muslims identify themselves more strongly with their religious identity over their ethnopolitical affiliations. Religious identity provides a unified sense of belonging and serves as a unifying element in the conflict-ridden context of the Southern Island of Mindanao in the Philippines. A study by Abanes (2014) examines the way in which these differing religious and national identities affect inter-group relations, highlighting that contact avoidance results from ethno-religious conflict. While both Christians and Muslims tend to avoid placing public contact roles, bequeathed with power in the hands of out-groups, they are less likely to do so in private contact roles, which has less power. However, Christian ethnic groups are more inclined to avoid contact with out-groups than Muslim ethnic groups. In particular, the Cebuano and Chinese Christians have the two highest levels of contact avoidance towards out-groups (Abanes, 2014). This study highlights the negative impact on inter-religious relations in the Philippines, producing exclusionary encounters among some groups (Abanes, 2014).

Scholars have drawn on the socio-economic challenges faced by Muslims as a result of their exclusion, limiting their **social mobility** in the Philippines. A driving force for the region’s long history of resistance and resentment against the central government has been the economic marginalization of the Muslim-dominated provinces (Rivera, 2006). As a region, the ARMM is the poorest in the country and its five constituent provinces are also the poorest both in Mindanao and in the whole country (Rivera, 2006). Aquino (2009) similarly notes the direct impact of colonial and post-colonial land ownership on increased discrimination against, and marginalization of Muslims in Mindanao, fueling resentment and grievances. Further, access to education has been limited, whereby successive colonial and postcolonial governments deployed secular educational policy as a primary weapon in their effort to heal that social rift (Milligan, 2004). Those efforts have failed, however, to integrate Muslim Filipinos into the national mainstream, and instead, undertook a form of pedagogical imperialism would come to be characterized by policies and practices that were similar to those developed in the Americans’ earlier encounters with African Americans and Native-Americans (Aquino, 2009). American schooling replaced militant Spanish Catholicism as the weapon of choice in integrating Muslim Filipinos into an emerging Philippine state as a marginalized and subordinated minority stripped of all but a nominal Muslim identity (Milligan, 2004). Therefore, there have been ongoing efforts to Islamize education in Mindanao, in resistance to the integrational
education policies of colonial rule, resulting in a decreased access to public education among Filipino Muslims.

Emerging perspectives have also brought attention to the role of the media in portraying Muslims negatively. Vivienne Angeles’ study on Philippine Muslims in early film shows them not only as a people who profess a “heathen religion” but also whose culture is dominated by notions of superiority and violence against women and non-Muslims (Angeles, 2016). These depictions are traced to Muslim resistance against the colonial legacies of Spain and the United States. Angeles notes negative media portrayals of Muslims from early films beginning in the 1930s. This paper argues that representations of Philippine Muslims in films changed over time, according to prevailing government policies and perceptions of people on Christian-Muslim relations. Much of the representations of Philippine Muslims in the films studied reflect the stereotypes that were shaped by the Filipino experience of colonial rule. Over and above the courage and bravery displayed (whether provoked or not), Muslims are presented as completely other, with a different religion and while they consider themselves superior to the pagan Badjaos, they are viewed as inferior and different from the Christianized Filipinos thus reflecting Said’s views on orientalism and Plate’s “other” (Angeles, 2016). However, limited scholarly works have engaged in how Muslims are perceived in mainstream news media in the Philippines, particularly in light of media reporting around the Marawi crisis.

List of Citations

Theorizing the Field


### National Security and Foreign Policy


**Citizenship and National Identity**


**Mainstream and Digital Media**


**Social Mobility**


Counter-Narratives and Strategies


Islamophobia in South Korea

Overview

SCHOLARLY WRITING ON MUSLIM COMMUNITIES in South Korea that focus on Islamophobia as phenomenon are only recently emerging, and remain limited in number (Koo, 2018). However, a recent theoretical contribution on Islamophobia in Korea highlights that it is similar to that of the West in that “Islam is often understood as an isolated, monolithic, and violent political ideology, while the internal pluralism of the Islamic world is not acknowledged” (Koo, 2018). Further, there are “three types of fear present in Korean Islamophobia, which have grave implications for policy making” (Dong-Jin and Jae, 2012). The first fear is security-related, around fear of Islamic terrorism while the second is economic, with concerns that foreign laborers, including Muslims deprive Koreans of jobs, and the third is religious, centered in concerns around Islam’s incompatibility with Korean culture, and ensuring potential religious conflicts with the Christian majority as the Muslim population in Korea grows.

It is important to note that Islamophobia in Korea is a new and emerging phenomenon. Despite accounts of interaction between the Islamic world and Korea in earlier dynasty’s, the Muslim community in Korea first appeared in the 1950s due to the influence of Turkish troops who stayed in South Korea after the Korean war (Dong-Jin and Jae, 2012; Fathil and Fathil, 2011). The small Muslim community grew in the 1960s and 1970s, with the first mosque being built in 1976 in Itaewon, Seoul (Baker, 2006). Islam did not grow significantly in Korea until the 1988 Seoul Olympics, after which many Asian workers and workers from Islamic countries began to move to Korea resulting in a population of 35,000 Muslims in Korea by 1990. Additional mosques also opened in Busan, the second largest city in Korea, and in Jeonju, the provincial capital of Jeollabuk-do province. Gi Yeon Koo (2018) emphasizes that a greater awareness and critique of Islam and Muslims began to surface around 2000 when the concept of a multicultural society was first introduced to Korean society. This coincided with the increase in Muslim migration in the early 2000s, mostly as laborers from South and South East Asia. Despite the small minority of Muslims in Korean negative images and fear of Islam and Muslims among Koreans began to increase in the early 2000s, resulting in the struggle for a toehold in Korea (Baker, 2006). Since, there has been a steady growth of Muslim populations and increase in mosques built across the nation.

San Yong Han (2018) traces the roots of Islamophobic discourse to increasing security and political discourses around Muslims, placing national interests above other issues like tolerance and acceptance. Within the frame of security, the rise of Islamophobia within
Korean society has been attributed to key geopolitical events and external influences, particularly the fear of terrorism. These include the 9/11 attacks, the shock killing of the South Korean interpreter and Christian missionary Kim Sonil by an Iraqi militia group in 2004, and the 2007 Korean hostage crisis in which some members of the Saemmul Church (Koo, 2018). This phenomenon of Islamophobia has been further fueled by a series of interconnected terror attacks throughout the world mainly conducted or inspired by ISIS since 2014 (Han, 2018). Drawing particular attention to the impact of 9/11, Dong-Jin and Jae emphasize that this event marked a turning point for Korean perceptions of Islam, triggering a negative anxiety towards Muslims and Islam in general, and on the other hand, eliciting the greater understanding of Islam among Koreans. However, the majority of perceptions of Islam among Koreans have been found to be negative, “greatly influenced by a Western tendency that connects Islam with terrorism, particularly after 9/11” (Dong-Jin and Jae, 2012).

National security factors paramount in South Korean politics contributing to Islamophobia include right wing politicians, intelligence authority, and conservative civil and religious groups regarding Islamic issues and Muslim migrants living in South Korea (Han, 2018). Cumulatively, these actors influence government policies and laws that discriminate against Muslims in South Korea such as the legalization of the Anti-Terrorism Act in 2016 (Han, 2018). This act verified the government’s increasing concerns against the potential threat of Islamic extremists and illegal Muslim migrants, allowing the monitoring of suspicious groups and collecting information for anti-terrorism missions (Han, 2018). Anti-Muslim lobbying by Christian organizations against Muslim activity is reflected in Islamophobic smear campaigns, the cancellation of halal food complexes (worth US$1.5 billion in export value) being built in various locations across South Korea (Koo, 2018), and protest phone calls by Protestants against the installation of prayer rooms for Muslim athletes during the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympics (Kang, 2018).

It has been noted that this increase in Islamophobic discourses and attitudes is most pronounced in Protestant communities and churches, who have been active agents in producing Islamophobic discourses in South Korea (Koo, 2018; Jeong, 2017). Korean Protestant churches were first noted to express anxieties over Islam as a fundamentalist doctrine in 2004, in opposition to the gathering of 2004, of Islamic scholars and religious leaders in Korea for the “Islam and Other Religions: Coexistence and Cooperation,” international conference (H. Park 2007, 40-44, cited in Dong-Jin and Jae, 2012). A third Nami Kim book examines the ways in which Islamophobia is inscribed in the Protestant Right’s discourse on Islam and Muslims, discursively constructing Islam and Muslims based a gendered racialized interpretative framework of Muslim men as violent, deceitful, incapable, and non-monogamous. These constructions are in contrast to an ethnonationalist view of Korean women as hapless victims who are desperately in need of being rescued by fellow Korean men from their violent and incapable (im)migrant Muslim spouses (Nami Kim, 2016). These constructions that otherize, and demonize Muslim men are often in contrast with the depiction of Korean men who are, in contrast, “responsible,” “reliable,” “capable,” “faithful,” and, thus, the “masculine” ideal in Korea. According to Yi Chin’gu, 2011, cited in Koo, 2018, some people within Korea’s Protestant communities have begun to voice concerns about the penetration
of Islam in Korea, using incendiary slogans like “the Islamic tsunami is rolling in” or “Islam is after us.”

A number of scholars have noted the way in which such discourses in Korea “reflect the fundamentalist traditions among Protestant churches in Korea, which inherited its fundamentalism from American churches” (Dong-Jin and Jae, 2012) – what has been described by Kim Nami (2016) as the blind adoption of the racist ideology of conservative American churches. The implications of these discourses are reflected in the attitudes of Korean protestant students who have the most negative perception of Islam compared to Catholic students who viewed Islam most favorably (Dong-Jin and Jae, 2012).

Emerging perspectives on this phenomenon frame Islamophobia as an extension of anti-multicultural sentiments and nationalist ideologies within South Korea (Joo, 2015). “A single-nation sentiment based on ethnic homogeneity is deeply embedded in the Korean self-identity, resulting in foreign immigrants in South Korea being treated as outsiders (Dong Jin and Jae, 2012). Deeply rooted in the excessive aspiration for a single-race country in Korean society (Koo, 2018), the multicultural policy of Korea is oriented towards differential exclusion and assimilation, resulting in simultaneous issues of classism, religious exclusivism, sexism, racial prejudice and discrimination (Dong-Jin and Jae, 2012; Han, 2018). Islam is seen as a religion of foreigners, not of Koreans (Dong-Jin and Jae, 2012), resulting in Islamophobic sentiments being tied with hatred towards foreigners, immigrants, multicultural families and sexual minorities (Koo, 2018). The National Human Rights Commission of Korea (NHRC) report on hate speech uncovered hatred against immigrants was mostly directed towards immigrant workers, including Muslims, migrant women involved in international marriage, mixed children of multicultural families, and African Americans. The survey revealed that the public viewed immigrants as “dirty,” “loud,” “smelly,” “uncivilized,” “stupid,” and “lazy” people “obsessed with money” and who needed to be shunned. Meanwhile, Muslims were perceived as a potential “terrorist group.” (Koo, 2018). Conspiracies around the “Islamization of South Korea” often express such anti-immigrant sentiment, linking the higher threat of terrorism with the influx of Muslim migrants, illegal foreign workers, and the refugee crisis (Han, 2018). Muslim practices are also commonly presented in contrast with Korean national identity, often drawing on Islamic fundamentalist intolerance and illiberal practices such as polygamy and intermarriage between Muslims that are not compatible with contemporary Korean practices. This has resulted in the prevailing debate that Muslims could be a potential security or cultural threat and thus should be assimilated into the relatively homogenous Korean society (Han, 2018).

Recent perspectives draw attention to the critical role of the media in perpetuating Islamophobic stereotypes and negative portrayals of Islam and Muslims in South Korea (Koo, 2018). Korean peoples understanding of Islam is mainly constructed through media and the news, including European media which often portrays Islam as a violent religion, and Muslims as terrorists and religious fundamentalists (Koo, 2018). A 2016 study on the image of Arabs and Islam in the Korean media found that they were mostly depicted in association with negative images of war, terrorism, and conflict, and that participants in this study believed these reports were sensationalist and provocative and lacking in fairness, objectivity, and
credibility (Kim Suwan 2016, cited in Koo, 2018). According to Kim Dong Mun (2016, cited in Koo, 2018), Islam-related news reports in Korea follow the American press model in how they label these events, without proper fact-checking and with an over-reliance on outside sources. For example, texts of reports dealing with migrants in Korea, aired on KBS News 9 from 1 January 2004 to 31 December 2008 reveal that Public Service Broadcasting (PSB) failed to fairly represent culturally diverse groups in Korean society, reflecting ideological bias towards nationalism. In the case of Muslims, the issues of IS terrorist attacks and Syrian refugees in 2015-2016 resulted in increased news articles that spread negative images of Islam (Kang, 2018). Christian missionary media are particularly responsible for such reports, writing articles with titles such as “surging Islamic raid” or “Islamization of Korean until 2020” (Dong-Jin and Jae, 2012). The Korean press also tends to otherize and demonize Muslims and Islamic culture as a monolithic religious bloc, ultimately spreading anti-multiculturalist discourse (Koo, 2018). These media portrayals of Muslims have resulted in increased Islamophobic activity online, such as hate groups and communities on social media sites including Facebook (Koo, 2018) and Twitter. Such Islamophobic discourse is particularly reflected in the social media activities of conservative groups in South Korea who use social media to not only expand this discourse, but also spread hate speech and images regarding Muslims and Islam. (Han, 2018).

Islamophobia in South Korea has been documented to affect Muslim foreigners and Korean converts to Islam in a number of ways. First, Islamophobic discourses are gendered, creating a fear of Muslim men alongside a paternalistic concern for Korean women supposedly mistreated by Muslims (Kim 2016; Koo, 2018). On the other hand, Muslim women in Korea who choose to adopt a visible Muslim identity have reported instances of workplace discrimination, including being fired for converting to Islam and wearing the hijab in the workplace (Koo, 2018). Others who remain employed report difficulties wearing the hijab to work (Koo, 2018) or maintaining their Islamic practice of praying five times a day whilst at work (Han, 2018). Problematically, there is a lack of legal protection afforded to immigrant groups such as Muslims from hate speech or such discrimination (Han, 2018).

Islamophobia in South Korea is therefore an emerging and intensifying phenomenon, produced by global influences around the fear of terrorism, and local issues of nationalism, as anti-multiculturalism sentiment and media perpetuation of fear and negativity around Muslims and Islam. A limited body of work documents the impacts of this newly emerged form of discrimination on the growing Muslim community in South Korea, and such research is crucial and timely.
List of Citations

Theorizing the Field

3. Han, Sang Yong. “Islamophobia in South Korea with a focus on Muslim migrants.” Thesis submitted to the American University in Cairo (2018).

National Security and Foreign Policy


Xenophobia (anti-immigrant and anti-refugee sentiment)

3. Han, Sang Yong. “Islamophobia in South Korea with a focus on Muslim Migrants.” Thesis submitted to the American University in Cairo (2017).


Mainstream and Digital Media


**Othering and Discrimination**

1. Han, Sang Yong. *Islamophobia in South Korea with a focus on Muslim Migrants.* AUC Knowledge Fountain, American University in Cairo, Master’s Thesis (2017).


**Gender and Sexuality**


Islamophobia in Sri Lanka

Overview

SRI LANKA'S DIVERSE SOCIAL COMPOSITION is reflected in the island's various ethnic groups, faiths and languages. Sri Lanka, an island approximately the size of West Virginia with over 20 million people, is a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society (DeVotta, 2016). Ethnically, the Sinhalese comprise 74.9% of the population, while Sri Lankan Tamils, Indian Tamils, and Muslims are 11.2%, 4.1%, and 9.3%, respectively (DeVotta, 2016).

Sri Lanka's religious and ethnic diversity echoes the multiracial and pluralistic character of Sri Lankan society (Imtiyaz and Mohamed-Saleem, 2015). The majority of perspectives theorizing Islamophobia in Sri Lanka emphasize that anti-Muslim sentiment is not a new and emerging phenomenon in this context. However, there is also consensus that there has been a rapid increase in anti-Muslim rhetoric and acts of violence against the Muslim community in some parts of Sri Lanka, resulting in the need to critically examine this phenomenon (DeVotta, 2016).

The scholarship theorizing Islamophobia in Sri Lanka can be divided into a few key areas: the history of Islamophobia, the rise of Islamophobia and global influences and impact. A wide range of perspectives noted in this reading pack, emphasize the way in which up until the twentieth century, Muslims enjoyed harmonious and prevailing relations with other communities in Sri Lanka, including with Sinhalese kings who benefitted from their trading (Long et al., 2010). The cordial relationship between the Buddhists and the Muslims has been recorded to have lasted over 1200 years (Razick et al., 2016). In the past, Muslims were also commonly characterized as being among the most peaceful communities on the island, interacting with other religious and ethnic groups cordially interlinking those cultures with their own culture (Fowsar, 2016). However, as emphasized by a range of perspectives, it was only since the beginning of Sinhala Buddhist revivalism in the 1880s–90s that conflict between Muslim and Buddhist communities began to truly develop (Stewart, 2014). Such Sinhala revivalism, originally intended to target and defend against Christian missionary work in time, shifted to include Tamils and now, also Muslims. Many perspectives listed in this reading pack therefore highlight that the current targeting of the Muslim community is an extension of the racism and Sinhala exceptionalism that ultimately led to the anti-Tamil pogroms of the 1970s and 1980s.

Ameer Ali proposes that there have been three key periods of Islamophobia that predate the recent increase of Islamophobia in Sri Lanka in 2012. Ali points to the first wave, as being “during the British colonial regime, which culminated in the 1915 racial riots, the second
during the so-called socialist era of Prime Minister Srimavo Bandaranaike, climaxing in the 1976 Puttalam riots, and the third after the 1983 anti-Tamil pogrom” (Ali, 2015). The Sinhala-Muslim riots in 1915 are therefore constructed as a key moment in understanding the history of Islamophobia in Sri Lanka, and namely how these riots inspired Muslims to organize themselves politically within the discriminatory policies of Sinhalese-dominated governments (Mansoor Mohamed Fazil, 2005). This Buddhist revival that began in the late nineteenth century saw some Sinhalese nationalists denounce minorities, including Muslims. For instance, a few years before independence in 1948 one writer referred to Muslims as “barbarians” when comparing them to the Sinhalese (DeVotta, 2016). During the Civil War, there was also a sentiment among the Sinhalese claim that it was possible to coexist with Tamils provided they stopped supporting separatism, while Muslims were not to be trusted as they were more loyal to Muslim countries such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia than they were to Sri Lanka (DeVotta, 2016). Key readings listed explore these histories of rising tensions between Tamils and Muslims in the East of the country following the escalation of violence in 1983, resulting in a range of violent incidents targeting Muslims by Tamil militants (Ali, 1997; Fazil, 2005). Despite these historical phases of Islamophobia, the Muslim community on the most part, was commonly branded as the “good minority” in Sri Lanka (DeVotta, 2018), therefore highlighting the need to engage in the recent rise of anti-Muslim violence documented in Sri Lanka.

Rising anti-Muslim sentiments from 2012 therefore emerged as communal conflicts took a clearer religious articulation as groups under attack defined with religious orientation rather than ethno-linguistic nationalist aspirations” (Holt, 2016). According to a range of scholars listed, the end of the civil war in Sri Lanka (1983-2009) marked an unfortunate period of increased discrimination among ethnic minorities, which has particularly targeted Muslims (Ali, 2015; Razick et al., 2016). A range of perspectives draw on the way in which the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam’s (LTTE) has further emboldened Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists to target other minorities (DeVotta, 2016). Despite Muslims being closer aligned to the Sinhala political elite during the civil war, Muslims have still been targeted by the anti-Muslim sentiments and violence, within the specific political setting of postwar Sinhala triumphalism and increased authoritarianism of the Rajapaksa regime (Holt, 2016). Key scholarly works connect this rise in anti-Muslim sentiment in Sri Lanka with the Islamophobia trending globally, which was especially rife under former President Mahinda Rajapaksa, whose majoritarian ethno-religious policies were dictated by the Sinhalese Buddhist nationalist ideology. These contributions therefore demonstrated the need for scholarly attention to reorientations in Sinhala Buddhist nationalism as well as new Muslim identity formations and the relations between the two.

A few contributions noted in this reading pack contextualize rising Islamophobia in the broader transition of practice of more syncretic forms of Islam in Sri Lanka to more pietistic Islam (DeVotta, 2016). Concerns around this transformation towards a more conservative Islam has been met with a rise in anti-Muslim sentiment, the painting of the Muslim community as enablers of terrorism by Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists (DeVotta, 2016). Such Islamophobic discourses often drawn on the stronger outward expressions of Muslim
identities as a sign of “difference” in the general public, contributing to the othering of Muslims in the public sphere (McGilvray, 2011). Perspectives highlighted how Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists have drawn on increased internal conflict between locally popular Sufi sheiks and the followers of hostile Islamic reformist movements to further perpetuate the portrayal of Sri Lankan Muslims as violent jihadi extremists and tarnish the public image of the Muslim community (McGilvray, 2011).

As elucidated in this context, examinations of Islamophobia in Sri Lanka require an understanding of identity politics, and how these have contributed to inter-ethnic and inter-religious conflict in the region which ultimately shapes the citizenship and identity of Muslims in Sri Lanka. First and foremost, existing research highlights that Muslims in Sri Lanka face long-standing external threats of ethno-linguistic Tamil nationalism as well as Sinhala Buddhist nationalism (Fazil, 2005; McGilvray, 2010). The rise of radical and violent Buddhist nationalism in Sri Lanka has therefore been a key area of research documented in this resource pack, with research documented since the early 1990s (Tambiah, 1992; Zackariya and Shanmugaratnam, 1997; Ali, 1997). Of particular importance, is the negative impact of recent xenophobic Buddhist nationalism on experiences of belonging among Sri Lanka’s ethno-religious minorities (Gravers, 2015). Most perspectives attribute such xenophobia to the politicization of Buddhism and the attempt to “Buddhicize” socio-politics in Sri Lanka (Rāghavan, 2013) which has acted as a key hindrance to the peaceful coexistence of other minorities (Imtiyaz 2010; Fowsar, 2014).

Sinhalese Buddhist majoritarianism and associated activism among Buddhist monks is described to have its roots in the anti-colonial struggle of the early twentieth century, when Buddhist institutions were ridiculed and neglected and promoted Christian proselytization (Gravers, 2015; DeVotta, 2016). This colonial struggle has played a small, but important role in shaping the siege mentality of the Buddhist clergy and Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists that justifies majority domination and minority subordination by the need to protect Buddhism as a social and material entity in this world (Holt, 2016).

A range of perspectives claim that the nationalist ideology undergirding Sinhalese Buddhist majoritarianism has exacerbated religious intolerance especially towards the island’s Muslims and Christian Evangelicals (DeVotta, 2018). They also argue that recent anti-Muslim sentiment, is connected to historical anti-Tamil Buddhist nationalism highlighting that a xenophobic discourse of terrorism has been imposed and transferred from Tamil to Muslim minorities in Sri Lanka (Ali, 2015; Sivaloganathan, 2017; Stewart, 2014). Such discourses prevent a multi-ethnic and multi-religious nationality in Sri Lanka (Sivaloganathan, 2017) ultimately jeopardizing the pluralist character of Sri Lanka’s democracy (Ali, 2015).

Sinhalese Buddhist majoritarianism has influenced the growth of a militant movement that has grown recently in the form of extremist religious forces, including nationalist grassroots and organizations (Fowsar, 2014). Three major political parties can be exclusively categorized as political parties that employ Sinhala-Buddhist concerns and demands for electoral gains: Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) and Jathika Nidahas Peramuna (JNP) (Imtiyaz, 2010). Presently, however, Bodu Bala Sena (BBS) and Sinhala
Ravaya (SR) are both grassroots organizations that are viewed as main ethno-religious forces influencing political parties and society with Islamophobic rhetoric, campaigns and violence (Fowsar, 2014). These organizations, disillusioned with official politics and traditional bureaucratic systems share common goals: to uphold Buddhism and establish a link between the state and religion; to advocate a violent solution to the Tamil question and; to oppose all form of devolution to the minorities (Fowsar, 2014; Stewart, 2014). These organizations, are at the heart of grassroots anti-Muslim politics that have materialized in the form of hate campaigns and thus inspired recent attacks against Muslims in Sri Lanka (Stewart, 2014; Long et al., 2017; Ali, 2015). Buddhist nationalist formations identify Muslims as a major threat to Buddhism, framed as a legitimate economic grievance against increased economic inequalities and global capitalism (Holt, 2016). Buddhist nationalists, such as BSS are noted to construct Muslim communities in Sri Lanka “foreign invaders” who through alleged demographic/sexual, economic and cultural invasion, threaten the Sinhala race and the Buddhist religion (Holt, 2016).

Sinhala-Buddhists groups (led by Buddhist monks) with tacit support from politicians has resulted in a wave of Islamophobic rhetoric and violence against the Sri Lankan Muslim community (Imtiyaz and Amjad, 2015; Holt, 2016; DeVotta, 2016, 2018). The ultra-nationalist Bodhu Bala Sena (BSS), Buddhist organization in particular has been described as responsible for this nationwide anti-Muslim hate campaign, blaming Muslims for supposedly undermining Buddhism in Sri Lanka and throughout the world (Ali, 2015; DeVotta, 2018). These anti-Muslim campaigns are spread online, utilizing new information technologies, and on the ground, manifesting in a range of settings and contexts (Imtiyaz and Mohamed-Saleem, 2015; Stewart, 2014). A few studies however, point out that these hate campaigns have not been effective in negatively affecting Buddhist-Muslim relations on the ground (Long et al., 2016). For example, one study reported that the majority of the Buddhists interviewed, did not share the views of these Buddhist Nationalist Groups, and rather, had a positive view, as well as harmonious relations with Muslims. This was similarly discovered by a study that noted animal slaughter as the only negative “Muslim” behavior noted by Buddhists surveyed (Razick et al., 2016). In both studies, Sri Lankan Buddhists did not identify any issues or problems in their relationship with the Muslims, and also demonstrated strong interest in helping Muslims, including in business (Long et al., 2010; Razick et al., 2010). Sinhala-Buddhists groups (led by Buddhist monks) with tacit support from politicians have subjected the Sri Lankan Muslim community to a wave of Islamophobic rhetoric and violence (Imtiyaz and Amjad, 2015; Holt, 2016; DeVotta, 2016, 2018; Fazil, 2005). Buddhist nationalist groups are largely responsible for the othering and discrimination of Muslim communities in Sri Lanka, which can be categorized in three main categories (i) hate movements and campaigns against Muslim practices and institutions, (ii) acts of violence against Muslim bodies and (iii) acts of violence against Muslim property. As emphasized by numerous scholars in the field, it is important to connect these forms of discrimination to the broader rise of violence against other religious and ethnic minorities across Sri Lanka (Imtiyaz and Amjad, 2015).

On hate movements and campaigns, most works cited in this reading pack draw on how Buddhist Nationalist Groups such as the BSS have campaigned against Muslim practices and institutions in the form of demonstrations, letters, rallies and poster and leaflet campaigns.
There have been campaigns to boycott Muslim-owned trade shops, pressure to evict Muslims from regions assigned as “sacred areas” by Buddhist nationalists, as well protests against Muslim businesses (Razick et al., 2018). Among the most prominent of these hate campaigns has been halal abolitionist movements, which are driven by ethnic and religious motives to further attack Muslim practices and businesses (Stewart, 2014; Imtiyaz and Amjad, 2015; Razick et al., 2014). The movement is described to be masked by claims of being a peaceful animal welfare movement protecting animals, particularly bulls and cows from halal slaughter out of a sense of Buddhist compassion towards animals (Stewart 2014; Razick et al., 2018). Agitation against Halal certification was launched by the BSS in 2013, which was led with a campaign of anti-Islamic slogans and placards with drawings of pigs with Arabic letters saying “Allah” (see also Long et al., 2010; Neil, 2018). This movement has had implications on the ability for Muslims to uphold their religious practices, including obligatory religious norms and duties (Yusoff and Sarjoon, 2017). For example, recently introduced restriction permits on the slaughter of cattle has limited the ability for Muslims to perform *udhuhiya* by slaughtering cattle during Hajj before *Eid-ul-Adha* (Razick et al., 2018; Yusoff and Sarjoon, 2017).

**Muslim women and Islamic dress (politics of veiling) campaigns by BBS have also focused on targeting Muslim dress, such as against the long garment covering the body, worn by many Muslim women, commonly referred to as “Abaya” in Arabic, “Burqa” in Urdu and “Purdah” in Farsi (Imtiyaz and Mohammed Saleem, 2015), as well as the hijab and niqab (Long et al., 2010; Razick et al., 2018; Neil, 2018). The calls of Buddhist National Groups for the government ban the headscarf (hijab) and face cover (niqab) have been rationalized by their perception that such Muslim clothing is a security threat (Razick et al., 2018). In recent years, there have also been hate campaigns directed towards the alleged “unethical organized conversions” of people to Islam through education, inter-marriage and the organized purchase of land around Buddhist places of worship (Razick et al., 2018).**

Othering and discrimination against Muslims have been traced back the early 1980s from Muslims in Sinhalese areas. In 1983 in particular, a number of Muslims were killed, many houses were burned down, and nearly 300 shops and factories destroyed, in addition to anti-Muslim attacks from Tamil militants in early 1985 where cases of extortion of money and robbery at gunpoint were reported (Fazil, 2005). Particular attention is drawn to an attack against Muslims by armed Tamil separatists on 30 December 1987 that killed nearly 60 Muslims, leaving more than 200 injured in Kattankudy (Fazil, 2005). Many organizations, especially Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA), Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) and Muslim Secretariat (MS) have listed the attacks carried out by the BNGs more recently (Razick et al., 2018). CPA recorded a total of 63 attacks on places of religious worship, SLMC reported 241 anti-Muslims attacks and MS recorded 284 incidents including threats, attempted attacks, harassment, incitements and provocations in 2013. In 2014, a total of 213 incidents against the Muslims recorded by MS nation- and district-wide, including a few instances of anti-Muslim violence, such as the first, organized, post-war anti-Muslim rioting in June 2014 in Aluthgama, a town about 40 miles south of Colombo (DeVotta, 2018; Holt, 2016). Sri Lanka’s extremist nationalists and especially Buddhist monks are noted to operate...
with impunity, which was evident during extra-violent incidents that took place on November 2017 in Gintota, within the Galle District of the Southern Province, which saw nearly 90 businesses and houses (mainly Muslim, but some Sinhalese), three mosques, and a number of vehicles being damaged. Concerningly, the nonchalant way that Sri Lankans have reacted to anti-Muslim propaganda and violence may highlight the dormant acrimony they harbor towards the Muslim community (DeVotta, 2018).

A range of attacks against Muslim property, including places of worship and shrines (Long et al., 2010), have been documented by the research cited in this reading pack. For example, the destruction of a Muslim shrine that had stood for 300 years in September 2011, which was destroyed by a mob reportedly led by monks is reference (Imtiyaz and Amjad, 2015). The nature of the attacks on Muslims places of worship differs from place to place, and emphasized to be a part of the intensified anti-Muslim agenda of Buddhist Nationalist Groups, particularly in the years of 2013 and 2014 (Razick et al., 2018). Further, a few references also highlight that these attacks are not purely against Muslim sites, rather against Muslim practices such as prayer. For example, some sources draw on protests against religious places such as mosques, prayer spaces and the Muslim call to prayer since 2012, leading to the cancellation of prayers in some instances, as well as the restriction of constructing new mosques (Imtiyaz and Amjad, 2015; Razick et al., 2018). Recent violence in Ampara and Kandy the caused damage against mosques, businesses and properties of Muslims. Muslims in Sri Lanka have therefore suffered from the policies of successive Sinhala-dominated governments with regards to language, citizenship, and land allocation (Rameez, 2018). Despite living interspersed with Tamil and Sinhala communities, Muslims are discriminated against in employment, economic opportunities, and education (Fazil, 2005). This has been particularly exacerbated in recent years, following the Easter Sunday bombings of 2019, whereby three churches in Sri Lanka and three luxury hotels in the commercial capital, Colombo, were targeted in a series of coordinated ISIS-related terrorist suicide bombings. These attacks have led to post-war violence and organized Islamophobia among non-Muslim communities, and particularly increased fears and distrust towards Sri Lankan Muslims among the Sinhalese (Imtiyaz, 2019).

An emerging body of literature has noted the gendered dimensions and impacts of nationalist ideological projects on Islamophobia in Sri Lanka. In particular, Muslim women in particular are targeted by ethno-nationalist discourses that served to erase or flatten nuances with respect to ongoing “veiling” practices. Such discourses undermine the ability for Muslim women to adopt religious clothing and silences their own diverse motives for veiling (Siriwardane, 2014). An analysis of BBS discourse demonstrates that nationalism is deeply gendered, finding that the Sinhala woman is metaphorically representative of the nation itself, the Muslim man symbolizes the threat of foreign penetration (Jones, 2015). In its use of gender to portray Muslims as outsiders attempting to permeate the Sinhala nation, the BBS draws upon common nationalist motifs that can be traced back to colonial times.

A range of perspectives also draw on how digital technologies, including mainstream and digital media are being used to disseminate the views of Buddhist nationalist groups, appealing to young computer-savvy Sinhalese through the liberal use of new social media technologies
such as Facebook, Twitter and SMS messaging services (Stewart, 2014). Nationalist identity has been caught up in new technologies, such as the Internet and online social media, and in new progressive impulses such as the objectives advocated by BBS. Socio-political tensions have now metastasized into short-form video, memes and tweets produced by and for a young demographic. In Sri Lanka, social media platforms have increasingly provided a channel to incite hate and mob violence against Muslims, such as in Digana, Kandy, in March 2018 (Hattotuwa, 2018). Facebook in Sri Lanka. Facebook, over any other social media platform or service, drives and defines political communication and conversations, largely in Sinhala. However, Prosocial content framing co-existence, communal and religious harmony and non-violence, on Twitter at the height of the violence, counter-intuitively and organically (i.e., without any paid promotion) was also popular. Overall, the weaponization of Twitter since at least 2015 and Facebook since around 2014 highlights the significant power of social media to derail democratic dialogue and the negotiation of difference in Sri Lanka (Hattotuwa, 2018).

Discussions on the geographical dimensions of Islamophobia in Sri Lanka remain limited. Most Muslims (62%) live outside of the north and east of Sri Lanka where the Sinhalese predominantly live, 38% of the Muslim population lives in the Tamil-dominated north and east. Further, these Muslims living in areas where Sinhalese are the majority have legitimate grievances, which deserve both local and global attention (Imtiyaz and Amjad, 2015). A primary issue relating to geography and the public space, is the opposition to Muslim construction of religious spaces (DeVotta, 2018; Razick et al., 2018). This is an emerging issue, highlighting that following anti-Muslim attacks, there have been “attempts to use indirect means, such as government regulations, to control the construction and activities of religious places” (Razick et al., 2018). This is restricting the ability for Muslims to construct new mosques or Muslim schools (DeVotta, 2018). There has also been reports of Muslim land loss, beginning with the Tamils who had occupied Muslim-owned paddy lands (Fazil, 2005), as well as the eviction of Muslims from “sacred areas” by Buddhist nationalists. Finally, on the geography of Islamophobia, regions with majority Buddhists are where the Muslims are largely affected by the BNGs’ hate campaigns and attacks especially in the Western and Southern part of Sri Lanka than the Muslims living in the North and Eastern regions (Razick et al., 2018). Though between 2009 and 2012 these attacks became intense, it gradually further intensified in 2013 and 2014. The BNGs furiously undertook these attacks as the government of former president Mahinda Rajapaksha (2009-2014) did not take any action against these hate campaigns.

Finally, on national security and foreign policy an emerging body of work problematizes the limited role of the government in mitigating the effects of Islamophobia incited by Buddhist National Groups. In particular, a few scholars in recent years have brought attention to global connections between anti-Muslim Buddhist nationalism in Sri Lanka and other parts of Asia such as Thailand and Myanmar (Gravers, 2015; Lehr, 2018) These perspectives emphasize that these nationalistic monks and their messages disadvantage Muslims in their respective nations, producing Buddhist nationalist agitation (see also Rāghavan, 2013). These comparisons are also drawn with India’s Hindutva adherents, and the Muslim 969 Movement in Burma (DeVotta, 2016). Holt, 2016, therefore highlights that future research into Islamophobia in Sri Lanka must undertake comparative analyses that track the patterns
of political powers that are indirectly and perhaps directly supporting BNG’s that are targeting Muslim communities. There is therefore a need for international pressure on government to address Islamophobia and other forms of violence against ethnic and religious minorities in Sri Lanka, such as Muslims and Christians (Razick, 2018).

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**Theorizing the Field**


National Security and Foreign Policy


ISLAMOPHOBIA IN SRI LANKA


Citizenship and National Identity


Mainstream and Digital Media


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Geography and the Public Space


Counter-Narratives and Strategies


Islamophobia in Thailand

Overview

A WIDE RANGE OF PUBLICATIONS have attempted to theorize the issue of Islamophobia in Thailand, primarily over the last two decades. These publications focus on increased interreligious conflict and violence predominantly in the southern provinces of Thailand.

First, scholars have provided demographic overviews of the Muslim population in Thailand to contextualize the community within these broader issues. There are approximately five million Muslims in Thailand, comprising around 5% of the total population, most of which are highly concentrated in the Southern provinces of Thailand (Scupin, 2013; Ross-Harrington, 2009). According to Yusuf (2007) it is fundamental to understand that Islam in Thailand operates in three configurations defined by history and location. (i) Ethnicized Malay speaking Islam, which is practiced in the Southern provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat of the deep south. These southern Muslims made up about 80% of the total Thai Muslim population in 2007. (ii) The integrated ethnically Malay but Thai speaking Islam which is practiced in the provinces of Satun and in upper South such as Songkla, Nakorn Si Thammarat, Phuket, Krabi, and Phangnga. (iii) The multi-ethnic Thai speaking integrated Islam of the central Thai provinces of Bangkok and Ayudhaya and also of north and northeast Thailand. This group comprises Muslims of Persian, Malay, Cham, Indonesian, Indian, Bengali, Pathan and Chinese ethnic backgrounds.

When discussing Islamophobia in Thailand, the majority of scholars refer to interreligious conflict and discrimination against ethnically Malay inhabitants of Southern Thailand. The ethnically Malay inhabitants of southern Thailand were converted to Islam during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries A.D. For the last four hundred years the whole region has remained a peripheral area, regularly contested between the Thais in the north and the various Malay states-most notably Malacca-in the south (Forbes, 1982).

Scholars emphasize that these historical contestations are fundamental aspects of recent struggles among Muslims in Thailand, particular those in the southern provinces. An influx of interest in Muslims in Thailand is evident following the 2004 insurgency of interreligious conflict in Southern Thailand. These perspectives often draw on the historical marginalization of Islamic populations from previous Thai governments (Leyland, 2009; Storey, 2008), and longstanding history of Thai Malay separatism as fundamental causes of recent insurgencies (Forbes, 1982). Some trace the roots of separatist movements back to the annexation of the Patani Kingdom in 1902 and subsequent efforts by Bangkok to coerce Malay Muslims into...
becoming Thai Muslims, exacerbating feelings of resentment over the following decades (Storey, 2008) as former autonomy and internal self-governance afforded to minorities such as Muslims was progressively discarded. Such resentment among Muslims intensified under ultranationalist governments in history including Thai ultranationalist Field Marshal Phibun Songkhram’s rule from 1938–44 (Forbes, 1982; Jory, 2006). Under Phibun’s rule, religious holidays in the south were abolished, and Malay Muslims were prohibited from wearing traditional dress, teaching Yawi, practicing Sharia law; and encouraged to adopt Thai-sounding names (Storey, 2008). Organized insurgency has thus existed since the late 1940s, active in the 1960s and 1970s (Funston, 2008), such as accounts of bombings by Thai Malay separatists in September of 1977 (Forbes, 1982). Although violence has waned in certain periods, Thailand has struggled to achieve lasting peace. Despite the advent of democracy, and the adoption of a more holistic counterinsurgency strategy by the government, resentment toward the Thai authorities continued to simmer throughout the 1990s, rising significantly in the first few years of the new century (Storey, 2008; Jonathan Ross-Harrington, 2009). In drawing on this history, scholars emphasize that the southernmost provinces of Thailand are therefore not in a state of open, conventional war, but rather a constant, low-level separatist insurgency fueled by a variety of groups engaging in intercommunal and terrorist violence coupled with more traditional insurgent attack (Ross-Harrington, 2009; Sathian and Derin, 2006).

The majority of perspectives on Islamophobia in Thailand however draw on the shift in the political trajectory of Thailand’s Muslims in 2001, which marked the beginning of a time of unprecedented violence (Funston, 2008). In particular, Prime Minister Thaksin’s support for the “war on terror” in the immediate aftermath of September 11, 2001 through involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq proved deeply unpopular, however, with Thai Muslims, including ethnically Malay Muslims in the south who demonstrated against what they perceived as a war against Islam (Storey, 2008). This marked the beginning of conflict on the evening of December 24, 2001, with coordinated attacks on police posts in Pattanim Yala and Narathiwat Provinces that killed police officers and one paramilitary village defense volunteer. Over the next few years, several similar attacks took place that resulted in around 56 deaths (Funston, 2008).

As a result, in early 2004, violent confrontations erupted in the Malay-speaking provinces of Thailand’s far south. A considerable literature in history, anthropology, political science, international relations, and religious studies has thus been produced since January 4, 2004, following the eruption of this violent Muslim insurgency dramatically in the area (Scupin, 2013), presenting the most serious security threat to the region (Storey, 2008). It has been documented that since 2004, violence has escalated, with insurgents assassinating many local officials, teachers, including Buddhist monks and novices (Keyes, 2016). In 2004 Thai government troops killed a large number of Muslim youth at Krue Se mosque in Pattani and subsequently caused the deaths of many more who suffocated after being piled on trucks by security forces (Keyes, 2016). This was followed by disruptive searches of Muslim homes and schools and detention of large numbers for indefinite interrogation – several were tortured and disappeared (Funston, 2008). This intensified following the military government coup
in September 2006, led by General Sonthi Bunyaratklin, a Thai-speaking Muslim. However, even he was unable to resolve the situation in the South, and instead, the violence intensified (Keyes, 2016), resulting in a deeply divided politics in Thailand (McCargo, 2017). Since 2004 the insurgency in the southern provinces of Yala, Narathiwat and Pattani grew in intensity in the following years (Funston, 2008), whereby “there have been over 5,000 deaths and at least 8,000 related injuries for both Buddhists and Muslims in the largest insurgency outside of Iraq and Afghanistan” (Scupin, 2013). Further, this violence since the early 2000s has led to militarization, harassment, human rights violations, ethnic cleansing and rising numbers of refugees (Horstmann, 2011). Scholars note that ethno-religious dimension of the conflict in southern Thailand has not only had an impact on local ethnoreligious relations, but also impacted foreign policy (Yusuf, 2007). The conflict has impacted relations between the Muslim world and Thailand, with criticism of the Thai government’s handling of this deadly crackdown by Islamic countries in ASEAN such as Malaysia and Indonesia (Scupin, 2013; Yusuf, 2007).

Perspectives on Muslims in Thailand highlight that the conflict in southern Thailand has been “profoundly influenced by local history and the social, cultural and economic differences that separate Malay Muslims from the Thai Buddhist majority” (Funston, 2008). The contested history around the national identity of Muslims in Thailand is therefore a fundamental aspect of this conflict and their ongoing experience of citizenship in the nation. Liow, 2006, has highlighted that these conflicts share little with broader racial global Islamist and Jihadist ideologies and movements, with their contents and contexts remaining primarily local and political, reflecting the key objectives of self-determination, in terms of the territorial and ideational boundaries of activism and agitation. This is connected to regaining lost national identities, setting right historical wrongs, and creating a sovereign nation-state (Kulnataporn, 2016). Therefore, understanding the religious content of these conflicts must be read in connection to specific historical, political and ethnic contexts, as well as the local identities and politics that frame them (Kulnataporn, 2016). Separatist sentiment among Muslims in southern Thailand therefore emerge from the failure of the Thai state to force Malay Muslims to assimilate their ethnic identity to become Thai Muslims and has been fueled by Bangkok’s lack of investment in the south, maladministration, poor governance, and the political marginalization of its people (Storey, 2008).

Today, being a native speaker of Malay precludes being fully Thai, resulting in the construction of Malay-speaking Muslims in southern Thailand as radically “other” (Keyes, 2009). Therefore, in Southern Thailand the mobilization of Islam draws attention to the importance of religion as a marker of Malay ethnic identity (Liow, 2006). It has been argued that social conflicts involving religion and ethnicity have therefore responded to policies of cultural assimilation adopted by the government and kingdom, which discriminates against Muslim Malays in their religious and cultural lives (Kusuma, 2017). Malay Muslims feel their ethnic identity is threatened not only by the Thai state, but also by the forces of modernity and globalization (Storey, 2008). Therefore, the new visibility of Muslim women and veiling in the public sphere reflects ongoing resistance to such assimilationist policies, and an ensuing growing separation between Buddhist and Muslim identities in Thailand, leading to increased
ultra-nationalism and anti-Muslim feelings in the Thai Buddhist Sangha (Horstmann, 2011). In response, Thai governments in the twenty-first century justified militant policies adopted toward the Malay-speaking Muslims of Thailand’s most southernmost provinces on the basis of their “alienness” despite having deep roots in the area in which they live (Keyes, 2009). This exclusion is felt by Malay Muslims in Thailand, who note that in addition to perceived threats against their ethnic identity and being treated as “other,” Malay Muslims view themselves as second-class citizens, politically marginalized and denied access to educational and employment opportunities (Storey, 2008). Sugunnasil, 2005, indicates that problems of poverty and high unemployment, drug addiction, crime, and other social problems also created conditions for violence and the reemergence of separatist movements. Storey supports this position by highlighting that the Thai insurgency was produced by feelings of ethnic identity being under siege, combined with feelings of alienation, injustice, and discrimination caused by poor governance and lack of access to educational and employment opportunities (Storey, 2008).

In understanding the ethnoreligious conflict, scholars draw on the historical othering and marginalization of Muslims in Thailand. They highlight that in the Thai populace, the Muslim minority is commonly referred to collectively – sometimes pejoratively – as khaek isalam, literally meaning “Muslim guests” or “strangers,” a term that carries subtle exclusionary connotations implicit in a sense of otherness” (Van Roy, 2016). A recent Thai encyclopedia glosses khâçk as “meaning visitor, guest, foreigner, stranger, is also an old word found in the premodern law code referring to people from India, Persia, Turkey, and the Arabian Peninsula” (Keyes, 2009). From the time of subjugation of Pattani in the late eighteenth century on, khâçk Mâlâyû have been construed in Thai written and oral discourse as alien even though they and their ancestors have always lived in the area where they are found today in southern Thailand (Keyes, 2009). Indeed, existing perspectives highlight that Thai society is implanted with the concept of “Thai-ness” that was built around the fundamental three concepts: loyalty to the King, dedication to the nation, and devotion to Buddhism (Posrithong, 2009). The Thai citizen is always identified with being Buddhist, and the king of Thailand must be Buddhist, according to the constitution (Keyes, 2012). In contrast, the figure of Muslim terrorist is created as the destroyer of Buddhism and regional separatists. Buddhism therefore takes part and changes the nature of this conflict (more details in Jerryson, 2011; Keyes, 2012).

Scholars have noted that in response, there has been a rise of Buddhist nationalism with many Buddhists outside of southern Thailand noted to embrace a “Buddhist chauvinism” (McCargo 2009b, 32), also termed “militant Buddhism” – in response to the conflicts in the South of Thailand (Keyes, 2009) since as early as the 1970s. This has resulted in a tension between peace activist Buddhism and militant Buddhism in Thai politics (Keyes, 2009). Buddhist nationalism therefore shapes relations with Muslim minorities in Thailand (Keyes, 2016), whereby (Jerryson, 2014) documents how the Buddhist monks both influence and were influenced by the violence surrounding their communities, a neglected area of research. Jerryson notes that violence in the three southern border provinces has resulted in a rise of a chauvinistic discourse that is now demonizing Islam. He has found that Buddhist monks
describe Islam as a radical religion that promotes violence for its egoistical interests, often suspecting Muslims who have been educated in the Middle East as being under “terrorist” influences (Horstmann, 2011).

Emerging perspectives have also brought attention to the role of the media in reporting violence and unrest in the southern provinces in Thailand. During the unrest, Thai media gave full attention to the violence in the four most southern provinces of Thailand, reporting the murders of innocent non-Thai Muslims on TV and newspapers (Posrithong, 2009). However, the Thai press was found to be emphatic about reporting the events in southern Thailand as largely an internal matter (Yusuf, 2007). McCargo (2017) associated the rise of partisan television channels closely with mass protest movements, such as ASTV, Asia Update, and Blue Sky (McCargo, 2017). In particular, mediatized populism fueled use of social media such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube to promote partisan political stances. It was found that each movement invoked its own competing notion of “the people,” offering highly selective and self-serving definitions of what constituted the public sphere and who was entitled to inhabit and, indeed, occupy this space (McCargo, 2017). Jerryson (2014) argues that the prevalence of a “master narrative” – that produces a national identity as allegiance to the Thai state – is used by contemporary Thai journalists to portray the current violence as a recent random and chaotic phenomenon without any historical context. Media reporting around the insurgencies of the early 2000s thus further mutes any Islamic or Malay past and fails to capture the narratives and grievances of Malay Muslims in the South (Jerryson, 2014). Further, the media characterizes relations between Buddhists and Muslims as that of deep hatred, and fails to report on regions of Thailand such as the Songkhla Lake basin where peaceful relations between Buddhist and Muslim communities prevail (Horstmann, 2011).

Overall, perspectives on recent events in southern Thailand demonstrate how the complex intermixing of religion and ethnicity has destroyed social relations between the Thai Muslims and Thai Buddhists who have been living as neighbors for centuries (Yusuf, 2007). Therefore, a range of perspectives stress that ethno-religious identity is a large determining factor in the forming, and shaping, of the consequences of the conflict, with a lack of mutual recognition of the Thai and Malay identities within Thai space (Yusuf, 2007; Jory, 2006). Within these existing bodies of work, there remains an inadequate focus on how Islamophobia in Thailand is manifesting in daily experiences, as well as how the intersection of Muslim identities is affected differentially across various spaces such as education, healthcare and the public sphere. There is a need for research documenting these everyday experiences following the violence of the previous decade.
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