

FEATURING A SPECIAL INDEX ON COVID-19

2020 Inclusiveness Index

Measuring Global Inclusion and Marginality



This report is published by the Othering & Belonging Institute at UC Berkeley

The Othering & Belonging Institute at UC Berkeley, formerly the Haas Institute for a Fair and Inclusive Society, is a vibrant hub of researchers, community leaders, policymakers, artists, and communicators that advances research, policy, and work related to marginalized communities. It engages in innovative narrative, communications, and cultural strategies that attempt to re-frame the public discourse around marginality and inclusion and respond to issues that require immediate and long-term action.

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Additional info on methodology, case studies, maps, videos, infographics, and the entire data set is available at belonging.berkeley.edu/inclusivenessindex.

The full report and database are online at belonging.berkeley.edu/inclusivenessindex.

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Introduction

THE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION of “who belongs?” is an increasingly acute one in every part of the globe. Matters of identity divide societies on every inhabited continent. Religion, ethnicity, skin color, age, sexual orientation, and race, among other identity groups, are shaping politics everywhere. Societies are polarizing around these fundamental axes, as demagogic political leaders promise to keep outsiders away. Xenophobia is on the rise, and anti-immigrant sentiment swells in a period of mass migration.

To what extent do societies, fracturing along these dimensions of difference, strive or even successfully bridge these social cleavages with fair and inclusive policies? In this, our fifth annual Inclusiveness Index report, we strive to answer this question, not simply by reference to particular policies or initiatives, but by examining the data to track how marginalized populations actually fare relative to dominant groups.

The Othering & Belonging Institute’s Inclusiveness Index is one of the first indices that measures equity without regard for national wealth or economic conditions. One of the challenges in measuring inclusivity is that it is difficult to disentangle policies aimed at inclusivity from the investments and resources available to marginalized communities. They are often the same and can be conflated. We surmount this challenge by focusing on policies, laws, and outcomes rather than government expenditures or investments. The Inclusiveness Index is uniquely focused on the degree of inclusion and marginality rather than a more general assessment of group-based well-being.

In addition to assessing how inclusive various societies are, the Inclusiveness Index serves as a diagnostic tool. It helps us identify places and societies that are improving, in terms of developing a more inclusive polity and set of institutions, and those places where societies are fracturing and becoming more divided along these lines. The data tells the main story, but we also seek to surface stories and trends that lie beneath the data.

In our conception, inclusiveness entails access to power and public and private resources, and it improves the way society views marginalized group members. Inclusivity is realized when historically or currently marginalized groups feel valued, when differences are respected, and when basic and fundamental needs and rights—relative to those societies’ dominant groups—are met and recognized. Our index focuses on social groups rather than individuals, as marginality often occurs as a result of group membership.

We operationalize this definition of “inclusivity” by focusing primarily on the performance of groups that span salient social cleavages, such as gender, race, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, and (dis)ability. We realize that such an approach cannot fully account for the unquantifiable or more qualitative aspects of belonging and inclusivity. For that reason, each version of the Inclusiveness Index report highlights stories and themes that go beyond the data.

Thus, each issue looks for patterns or stories that lay behind the data and touch on issues of inclusivity both across the globe and within the United States. Our 2016 report examined the global migrant crisis. Our 2017 report focused on the rise of ethnonationalism. Our 2018 report surveyed the reckoning brought about by the global #MeToo movement and the growing global water crises. For 2019 we took a closer look at the role of social media in spreading hate and falsehoods, and how global leaders are responding. And in this 2020 report we focus on the responses nationally, and globally, to the COVID-19 crisis.

As always, a word of caution: our rankings are not the final word on inclusivity nor a definitive assessment of any national or state performance. Rather, they are intended to spark a conversation and generate further inquiry into how and why some places, communities, and nations are more inclusive than others.

Please be sure to send us your suggestions, feedback, and ideas. Additional information about this project, including past reports and downloadable data files, is available at belonging.berkeley.edu/inclusivenessindex.

Inclusiveness Index Indicators

DEVELOPING AN INDEX that is capable of measuring inclusivity and marginality across many of the full range of human differences is an immense challenge. The Inclusiveness Index attempts to meet this challenge by selecting universal indicators that reflect group-based marginality in any context. In addition, the Inclusiveness Index relies on data sets for those indicators that can be measured across a range of social groupings.

In developing this index, we were guided by the conviction that multifactor indices paint a more vivid portrait of underlying structural conditions and forms of advantage and disadvantage experienced by marginalized groups than any single indicator, such as poverty or per capita GDP. Single indicator metrics fail to capture the myriad of inputs that shape individual and group life chances.¹ As a multifactor index that incorporates six core indicators of inclusivity, each indicator is given a preassigned weight within the Inclusiveness Index.

Another practical criterion for inclusion was that each indicator had to be scalable to the global level. Developing a global country ranking would not be possible if similar data sets did not exist for enough countries to justify a global ranking. Not only are there a multiplicity of measures across nations for similar information, but some countries track and collect data sets that others do not. We were also limited by data sets that were commensurate or comparable across geographies and national boundaries.

Finally, we wanted our indicators to reflect cultural norms, policies, laws, and institutional practices rather than economic strength or tax base capacity. Otherwise, any measure or ranking of inclusivity risks becoming a function of national wealth. In the Inclusiveness Index, the poorest nations on the planet can fare the best in terms of inclusivity, while the wealthiest can fare the worst. Insofar as possible, the indicators are noneconomic, and not proxies for governmental expenditures or investments in human capital, but rather reflect legal and institutional regimes.

In reviewing the range of possible indicators for the Inclusiveness Index, we ultimately selected six domains that we believe reflect the inclusivity or exclusion of marginalized populations: out-group violence, political representation, income inequality, antidiscrimination laws, rates of incarceration, and immigration or asylum policies. Within these domains, we selected indicators that measure how various demographic subgroups fare, including by gender; LGBTQ populations; people with disabilities; and racial, ethnic, and religious subgroups.

Out-group Violence

Out-group violence is a direct indicator of group marginalization and oppression. Disproportionate violence suffered by discrete social groups reflects prejudice toward those groups as well as group vulnerability. For example, in the United States, lynchings of African Americans in the early twentieth century or assaults on LGBTQ people in more recent decades reflects both prejudice as well as vulnerability. This is also true internationally, where ethnic or religious conflict may result in violence and fatalities, with genocide being an extreme expression.²



Political Representation

Political representation and the extent to which citizens can participate in governance is another strong indicator of group-based marginality or relative inclusion. In democratic societies, ethnic, racial, or religious majorities are capable of outvoting minority groups in electoral politics. This can result in underrepresentation of minority groups. Similarly, if certain groups are marginalized within a society, even if they are not a numerical minority, we might also expect members of those groups to be underrepresented in electoral politics. If members of certain groups, such as women or religious or racial minorities, are consistently underrepresented in elected bodies, that is often suggestive of marginality.



Although there may be limited choices ideologically or between political affiliation and party membership in some nations, there may still be a choice among social group membership. Political representation among appointed representatives is less indicative of marginality than representation among elected representatives because, in the case of appointments, democratic majorities lack direct say. For that reason, we only look at elected officials rather than appointments.

Income Inequality

Group-level income inequality is a revealing indicator of group-based marginality. It not only reflects discrimination in the provision of educational resources, investment in human capital, and employment opportunities, but may also be indicative of discrimination in private markets and segregation in social networks.³ The degree of income inequality within a nation or state is not dependent upon the size of the economy or the wealth of a nation, but is rather a function of political institutions, cultural norms, and law.⁴ In other words, group-level income inequality does not depend on the size of the economic pie, but the distribution of that pie among groups.



Antidiscrimination Laws

The presence of antidiscrimination laws protecting marginalized groups is another direct indicator of institutional inclusion. Examples include laws that prohibit government and private discrimination based on race, national origin, disability, religion, gender, or sexual orientation. Explicit protections for marginalized populations and social groups through antidiscrimination laws reflect not only a society's commitment



to equality norms for minority or marginalized groups, but also the presence of a discriminatory problem requiring a policy and legal response. Enacting antidiscrimination laws is not an easy task, especially where a marginalized group is an unpopular minority or lacks political clout or influence.⁵ Such laws often reflect broad consensus about the moral and practical necessity of enacting such protections.

Rates of Incarceration

Marginality and inclusivity are often most dramatically evident in a nation's use of criminal law enforcement and incarceration differential rates. Criminal law reflects the cultural norms and values of the dominant group, and its enforcement through incarceration and other forms of criminal punishment are often inflected with social biases. Even in the absence of state oppression against minority or marginalized populations, incarceration rates may reflect cultural or social prejudices that disparately impact marginalized groups. Rates of incarceration more broadly reflect institutional and legal structures that impede inclusivity.

Rates of incarceration vary dramatically from state to state domestically and country to country globally. Lower rates of incarceration are sometimes reflective of more inclusive cultural norms generally, and an emphasis on rehabilitation and reentry over retribution and punishment. Differential rates of incarceration across subgroups, specifically, serve as an indirect measure of cultural perceptions of those subgroups and their relative social position within a society. For especially marginalized social groups, criminal law is a tool of social control that may result in higher rates of incarceration and punishment. This is why differential rates of incarceration by group is an indicator of inclusivity within the index.




Immigration or Asylum Policies


Another indicator of a society's degree of inclusiveness and group-based marginality is its immigration or asylum policies. These policies are reflective of the values and perspectives of the society vis-à-vis the marginalized group and how welcoming or tolerant the dominant group is of out-groups. For example, Uganda has made hosting refugees a core national policy, making it "one of the most welcoming countries in the world."⁶ As an example of exclusionary immigration policies, the United States infamously had the Chinese Exclusion Act, quotas on many ethnic and racial groups, and a blanket prohibition on African immigration shortly after its founding. Strains of nativism and xenophobia tend to not only reflect the openness of a society with respect to the immigrant group, but also the degree of inclusivity within a society.

Each of these indicators reveals something distinctive about a nation's or state's inclusiveness. Finding data sources and measures for each indicator among many nations is a challenge, but not an impossibility. A complete list of measures used for each indicator and a description of sources is provided in the appendix of this report along with a more detailed explanation of the index calculation methodology.



Global Inclusiveness Map





Global Inclusiveness Rankings

	COUNTRY	RANK 2020	2020 Scores		Change from 2019	
			RAW	SCALED	CATEGORY	RANKING
HIGH	Netherlands	1	1.4796	100.00	•	•
	New Zealand	2	1.0646	83.59	New	-
	Sweden	3	1.0509	83.04	•	↓ 1
	Norway	4	0.9937	80.78	•	↓ 1
	Portugal	5	0.8446	74.89	•	↓ 1
	Ireland	6	0.7879	72.64	•	↓ 1
	United Kingdom	7	0.7399	70.74	•	↓ 1
	Finland	8	0.7030	69.28	•	•
	Canada	9	0.6837	68.52	•	↓ 2
	Denmark	10	0.6598	67.57	•	•
	Luxembourg	11	0.6506	67.21	•	↓ 2
	Germany	12	0.6423	66.88	•	↓ 1
	Croatia	13	0.6136	65.75	•	•
	Austria	14	0.5974	65.11	•	↓ 2
	Belgium	15	0.5736	64.17	•	↓ 1
	Australia	16	0.5262	62.29	•	•
	Czech Republic	17	0.5004	61.27	•	↑ 2
	Lesotho	18	0.4908	60.89	•	↑ 3
	Dominican Republic	19	0.4867	60.73	•	↑ 1
	Albania	20	0.4797	60.45	•	↓ 2
	Estonia	21	0.4787	60.41	↑ 1	↑ 6
	Argentina	22	0.4767	60.33	•	↓ 5
	Switzerland	23	0.4617	59.74	↑ 1	↑ 5
	Japan	24	0.4580	59.59	•	•
	Italy	25	0.4461	59.12	•	•
	France	26	0.4459	59.12	•	↓ 4
	Lithuania	27	0.4371	58.77	•	↓ 1
MED-HIGH	Slovenia	28	0.4199	58.09	•	↑ 2
	South Africa	29	0.4128	57.81	↓ 1	↓ 14
	South Korea	30	0.4092	57.66	New	-
	Fiji	31	0.4021	57.38	•	↓ 2
	Bolivia	32	0.3940	57.06	↓ 1	↓ 9

	COUNTRY	RANK 2020	2020 Scores		Change from 2019	
			RAW	SCALED	CATEGORY	RANKING
MEDIUM-HIGH	Cyprus	33	0.3900	56.90	●	●
	Costa Rica	34	0.3701	56.12	●	↓ 3
	Mongolia	35	0.3529	55.44	●	↓ 3
	Paraguay	36	0.2698	52.15	●	●
	Ghana	37	0.2679	52.08	●	↓ 3
	Ecuador	38	0.2640	51.92	●	●
	Liberia	39	0.2626	51.86	●	↑ 4
	Uruguay	40	0.2620	51.84	●	↓ 1
	Poland	41	0.2505	51.38	●	↓ 4
	Namibia	42	0.2337	50.72	●	↓ 7
	Serbia	43	0.2332	50.70	●	↓ 3
	Cape Verde	44	0.2090	49.75	New	-
	Madagascar	45	0.2088	49.74	●	↓ 3
	Honduras	46	0.2057	49.61	●	↓ 5
	Burkina Faso	47	0.2045	49.57	●	●
	Bosnia and Herzegovina	48	0.2009	49.42	●	↓ 3
	Tanzania	49	0.1954	49.21	●	↓ 5
	Malawi	50	0.1881	48.92	●	↓ 2
	Djibouti	51	0.1872	48.88	●	↓ 5
	Sierra Leone	52	0.1661	48.05	●	↓ 2
MEDIUM	Hungary	53	0.1539	47.57	●	↓ 1
	Slovakia	54	0.1531	47.53	●	↑ 1
	Nicaragua	55	0.1522	47.50	●	↓ 2
	Armenia	56	0.1461	47.26	●	●
	Mali	57	0.1458	47.24	●	↑ 6
	Spain	58	0.1445	47.19	●	↑ 1
	Chile	59	0.1412	47.06	↓ 1	↓ 8
	Senegal	60	0.1412	47.06	↓ 1	↓ 11
	Burundi	61	0.1183	46.16	●	↓ 4
	Belarus	62	0.1175	46.13	●	↓ 4
	Latvia	63	0.1126	45.93	●	↑ 8
	Mozambique	64	0.1016	45.50	●	↓ 10
	Philippines	65	0.0977	45.34	●	↓ 5
	Azerbaijan	66	0.0872	44.93	New	-
	Colombia	67	0.0640	44.01	●	↓ 5

	COUNTRY	RANK 2020	2020 Scores		Change from 2019	
			RAW	SCALED	CATEGORY	RANKING
MEDIUM	Cambodia	68	0.0593	43.82	New	-
	Greece	69	0.0549	43.65	●	↓ 5
	Ethiopia	70	0.0497	43.44	↑ 1	↑ 12
	Panama	71	0.0436	43.20	●	↓ 2
	Mauritius	72	0.0427	43.17	●	↑ 1
	Gabon	73	0.0364	42.92	●	↓ 12
	Zimbabwe	74	0.0316	42.73	●	↓ 9
	Zambia	75	0.0136	42.02	●	↓ 8
	Kenya	76	0.0129	41.99	●	↓ 10
	Peru	77	0.0094	41.85	●	↓ 2
	Bulgaria	78	0.0028	41.59	●	↓ 6
	El Salvador	79	-0.0024	41.38	↑ 1	●
	United States	80	-0.0220	40.61	●	↓ 12
MEDIUM - LOW	North Macedonia	81	-0.0414	39.84	●	↓ 1
	Montenegro	82	-0.0497	39.51	●	↓ 1
	Vietnam	83	-0.0545	39.32	↓ 1	↓ 5
	Niger	84	-0.0660	38.87	↓ 1	↓ 8
	Cote d'Ivoire	85	-0.0662	38.86	●	↑ 2
	Rwanda	86	-0.0686	38.77	↑ 1	↑ 42
	Papua New Guinea	87	-0.0691	38.74	●	↓ 4
	Romania	88	-0.0871	38.03	●	●
	Mexico	89	-0.0956	37.70	↓ 1	↓ 12
	The Gambia	90	-0.1084	37.19	●	↓ 6
	Benin	91	-0.1114	37.07	●	↓ 6
	Eswatini	92	-0.1302	36.33	New	-
	Lebanon	93	-0.1590	35.19	●	↓ 4
	Chad	94	-0.1648	34.96	●	↓ 4
	Cameroon	95	-0.1749	34.56	●	●
	Sri Lanka	96	-0.2059	33.34	●	↓ 3
	Uganda	97	-0.2105	33.15	●	↓ 5
	Moldova	98	-0.2249	32.58	●	↑ 1
	China	99	-0.2265	32.52	●	↓ 8
	Bangladesh	100	-0.2272	32.49	●	↓ 3
	Guinea-Bissau	101	-0.2318	32.31	●	↓ 7
	Ukraine	102	-0.2384	32.05	●	↓ 1

	COUNTRY	RANK 2020	2020 Scores		Change from 2019	
			RAW	SCALED	CATEGORY	RANKING
MED - LOW	Nigeria	103	-0.2416	31.92	●	↓ 7
	United Arab Emirates	104	-0.2460	31.75	New	-
	Singapore	105	-0.2525	31.49	New	-
	Georgia	106	-0.2526	31.49	●	↓ 8
	Thailand	107	-0.3101	29.22	●	↓ 3
LOW	Nepal	108	-0.3156	29.00	↓ 1	↓ 3
	Brazil	109	-0.3186	28.88	↓ 1	↓ 7
	Turkey	110	-0.3230	28.71	↓ 1	↓ 10
	India	111	-0.3236	28.68	●	↓ 3
	Kazakhstan	112	-0.3272	28.54	●	↓ 6
	Tunisia	113	-0.3295	28.45	↓ 1	↓ 10
	Guatemala	114	-0.3573	27.35	●	↓ 4
	Indonesia	115	-0.3786	26.50	●	↓ 6
	Israel	116	-0.4005	25.64	●	↓ 9
	Republic of Congo	117	-0.4109	25.23	●	↓ 6
	Botswana	118	-0.4286	24.53	●	↓ 5
	Guinea	119	-0.4319	24.40	●	↓ 5
	Egypt	120	-0.4645	23.11	●	↓ 8
	Kyrgyzstan	121	-0.4909	22.06	●	↓ 5
	Togo	122	-0.4990	21.74	●	↓ 5
	Mauritania	123	-0.5195	20.93	●	↓ 5
	Russia	124	-0.5718	18.86	●	↓ 9
	Malaysia	125	-0.6074	17.45	●	↓ 6
	Pakistan	126	-0.6217	16.89	●	↓ 6
	Tajikistan	127	-0.6616	15.31	●	↓ 6
	Algeria	128	-0.6804	14.57	●	↓ 4
	Jordan	129	-0.6909	14.15	●	↓ 7
	Myanmar	130	-0.7418	12.14	●	↓ 5
	Iran	131	-0.8135	9.30	●	↓ 5
	Angola	132	-0.9268	4.82	●	↓ 5
	Morocco	133	-0.9433	4.17	●	↓ 4
	Iraq	134	-1.0487	0.00	●	↓ 3

Global Observations on Changes

THE INCLUSIVENESS INDEX is a holistic measure of inclusivity. As explained in the introductory sections of this report, we focus on race/ethnicity, religion, gender, LGBTQ status, and disability in the domains of political representation, out-group violence, income inequality, rates of incarceration, and immigration and refugee policies. We compile data sources for each domain to generate a holistic score, which you can see on the table on the preceding pages.

The raw score is a composite value based upon the indicators just described (see Inclusiveness Index Indicators for an explanation on why we selected these indicators). The scaled score is an adjusted score that more intuitively illustrates each country's relative performance. We seek, however, not only to assess how individual nations fare relative to one another, but how they perform over time.

It is important not only to know how inclusive a nation is, but whether it has become more inclusive or is regressing. A country may experience significant retrenchment or improvement on the front of inclusiveness, but their relative ranking may remain roughly stable. This is why we provide both a raw and scaled score—so that we can see how countries rank on a relative basis and in more absolute terms.

In the past reports, we explicitly noted country changes in rankings year over year, a feature we hope is helpful to readers trying to make sense of the data and our findings. Unfortunately, some countries drop out of our index over time and new ones are added. This is due to data availability. In some years, we lack sufficient data to accurately gauge a country's performance within our index. As more data or new sources become available, we try to expand the number of countries in our index.

In our 2019 index, we were able to get sufficient data for 132 countries, an improvement over the 125 in our 2018 index, and the 120 in our 2017 index. For 2020, we were able to get data for 134 countries, adding eight countries, while six dropped out. For the 2020 index, we added Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Cape Verde, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea, Swaziland, and the United Arab Emirates. The Central African Republic, East Timor, Haiti, the Solomon Islands, Sudan, and Yemen were dropped due to lack of data.

We wish to emphasize that our index focuses on outcomes and on policies, and not necessarily on effort or ideals. Further, policy implementation often takes time to generate tangible effects measured at the group level, let alone for the data to be collected and reported. As a result, outcomes are usually lagging indicators, and it will take some time for the most recent policy changes to appear in our data. Nonetheless, we can see trends and patterns within our index, which we now relay.

As before, most of the nations (117 out of 134) held the same ranking in 2020 as in 2019. Only seventeen countries (or about 13 percent) changed ranking, either improving or showing reductions in inclusiveness. Unfortunately, most of the country changes were declines within our index rather than improvements.

Between 2019 and 2020, only six countries improved their categorical ranking. Estonia and Switzerland

improved from Medium-High to High; Slovakia rose from Medium to Medium-High; El Salvador and Ethiopia, two troubled nations, improved from Medium-Low to Medium; and Rwanda climbed from Low to Medium-Low. Rwanda was the most improved nation in our 2020 index, climbing from an ordinal ranking of 128th to 86th. Ethiopia rose from 82nd to 70th. Although Latvia did not change categories, it was the third most improved on an ordinal basis, rising from 71st to 63rd.

The remaining eleven countries that changed categories declined in ranking. Bolivia and South Africa fell from High to Medium-High; Chile and Senegal fell from Medium-High to Medium; Mexico, Niger, and Vietnam fell from Medium to Medium-Low; and Brazil, Nepal, Tunisia, and Turkey each fell from the Medium-Low category to Low. Among these, South Africa also had the greatest ordinal ranking decline, falling from 15th to 29th place, followed by Mexico, which fell from 77th to 89th place.

Many of these countries have had political or economic instability or drastic new policy directions that may have shaped their ultimate ranking. We lack the space to explain why each country may have changed rankings but invite curious readers to dive into our online appendices to study changes in domain scores between years to better understand these dynamics. To illustrate this, we present a closer look at Estonia and Tunisia.


Improved relative scores for Gini index and for political representation for ethnic minorities have contributed to Estonia's final score in our 2020 index. Its Gini index changed from 32.7 in 2015 (the most recent data available for the 2019 index) to 30.8 in 2017 (the most recent data available for the 2020 index) as reported by the World Bank. Political representation data for ethnic minorities did not change from the previous year, but a change in methodology has improved scores for all the countries that have changed rankings.


On the flip side, Tunisia has performed worse in 2020 in terms of its ranking compared to 2019. One of the contributors to this drop has been its reduction of women elected to the lower house of parliament from 31.3 percent to 24.9 percent. This drop is offset by an improved score on political representation for ethnic minorities. Ironically, its index score improved slightly from the previous year, but its relative ranking among all countries in 2020 dropped.

As this analysis suggests, there are many nuances and complexities that shape the overall degree of inclusivity observed within nations around the world. We will continue to monitor developments and assess changes to better understand the policies that make for a more inclusive country.



Global COVID-19 Map





BETTER

WORSE

NO DATA

Global COVID-19 Rankings

COUNTRY	COVID RANK	COVID Scores	
		RAW	SCALED
United Arab Emirates	1	1.1885	100.00
Denmark	2	0.7609	86.15
Iceland	3	0.7309	85.18
Singapore	4	0.7070	84.41
Monaco	5	0.6750	83.37
Australia	6	0.5436	79.12
Bhutan	7	0.5378	78.93
New Zealand	8	0.4838	77.18
Mauritius	9	0.4501	76.09
Mongolia	10	0.4352	75.60
Barbados	11	0.4305	75.45
Brunei	12	0.4289	75.40
Norway	13	0.4110	74.82
Finland	14	0.4000	74.46
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	15	0.3931	74.24
China	16	0.3903	74.15
Saint Kitts and Nevis	17	0.3803	73.83
Cuba	18	0.3784	73.76
Dominica	19	0.3621	73.24
Grenada	20	0.3447	72.67
Rwanda	21	0.3443	72.66
Botswana	22	0.3433	72.63
South Korea	23	0.3423	72.60
Cambodia	24	0.3394	72.50
Benin	25	0.3387	72.48
Fiji	26	0.3382	72.46
Saint Lucia	27	0.3364	72.40
Vietnam	28	0.3360	72.39
Thailand	29	0.3357	72.38
Laos	30	0.3352	72.37
East Timor	31	0.3348	72.35
Solomon Islands	32	0.3313	72.24
Burundi	33	0.3303	72.21
Taiwan	34	0.3302	72.20
Gabon	35	0.3292	72.17

COUNTRY	COVID RANK	COVID Scores	
		RAW	SCALED
Papua New Guinea	36	0.3279	72.13
Togo	37	0.3262	72.07
Eritrea	38	0.3256	72.05
Niger	39	0.3233	71.98
South Sudan	40	0.3217	71.93
Sri Lanka	41	0.3208	71.90
Uganda	42	0.3198	71.87
Mozambique	43	0.3184	71.82
Malaysia	44	0.3183	71.82
Nigeria	45	0.3180	71.81
Malawi	46	0.3162	71.75
Cote d'Ivoire	47	0.3148	71.71
Mali	48	0.3145	71.69
Liberia	49	0.3125	71.63
Seychelles	50	0.3122	71.62
Angola	51	0.3114	71.59
Madagascar	52	0.3111	71.58
Zambia	53	0.3105	71.56
Guinea	54	0.3097	71.54
Yemen	55	0.3094	71.53
Ethiopia	56	0.3046	71.37
Central African Republic	57	0.3033	71.33
Uruguay	58	0.3018	71.28
Ghana	59	0.3016	71.28
Cameroon	60	0.3000	71.22
Zimbabwe	61	0.2992	71.20
Guinea-Bissau	62	0.2982	71.17
Uzbekistan	63	0.2977	71.15
Haiti	64	0.2975	71.14
Japan	65	0.2974	71.14
Senegal	66	0.2972	71.13
Republic of Congo	67	0.2971	71.13
Antigua and Barbuda	68	0.2957	71.09
Lesotho	69	0.2923	70.98

COUNTRY	COVID RANK	COVID Scores	
		RAW	SCALED
Kenya	70	0.2825	70.66
Venezuela	71	0.2804	70.59
Pakistan	72	0.2697	70.24
Myanmar	73	0.2672	70.16
Gambia	74	0.2646	70.08
Afghanistan	75	0.2603	69.94
Bangladesh	76	0.2476	69.53
Egypt	77	0.2469	69.51
Equatorial Guinea	78	0.2441	69.41
Djibouti	79	0.2359	69.15
Indonesia	80	0.2288	68.92
Mauritania	81	0.2275	68.88
Philippines	82	0.2193	68.61
Sao Tome and Principe	83	0.2036	68.10
Jamaica	84	0.1954	67.84
Trinidad and Tobago	85	0.1948	67.82
Saudi Arabia	86	0.1875	67.58
Kazakhstan	87	0.1872	67.57
India	88	0.1849	67.50
Maldives	89	0.1744	67.16
Nepal	90	0.1619	66.75
Cyprus	91	0.1576	66.61
Namibia	92	0.1491	66.34
Malta	93	0.1170	65.30
Estonia	94	0.1120	65.14
Belarus	95	0.1074	64.99
El Salvador	96	0.0905	64.44
Swaziland	97	0.0796	64.09
Bahrain	98	0.0550	63.29
Guyana	99	0.0425	62.89
Morocco	100	0.0278	62.41
Russia	101	0.0107	61.86
Suriname	102	-0.0015	61.46
Kyrgyzstan	103	-0.0056	61.33

COUNTRY	COVID RANK	COVID Scores	
		RAW	SCALED
Luxembourg	104	-0.0094	61.21
Guatemala	105	-0.0112	61.15
Latvia	106	-0.0449	60.06
Libya	107	-0.0552	59.72
Canada	108	-0.0711	59.21
Dominican Republic	109	-0.0803	58.91
Ireland	110	-0.0824	58.84
Cape Verde	111	-0.0902	58.59
Greece	112	-0.0983	58.32
Germany	113	-0.1244	57.48
Iraq	114	-0.1270	57.40
Lebanon	115	-0.1276	57.38
Azerbaijan	116	-0.1299	57.30
Honduras	117	-0.1321	57.23
Turkey	118	-0.1511	56.61
Paraguay	119	-0.1522	56.58
Tunisia	120	-0.1784	55.73
Palestine	121	-0.2600	53.09
Kuwait	122	-0.2789	52.48
Oman	123	-0.2833	52.33
Jordan	124	-0.2938	51.99
Israel	125	-0.2996	51.81
Bahamas	126	-0.3015	51.75
Albania	127	-0.3114	51.42
South Africa	128	-0.3171	51.24
Qatar	129	-0.3212	51.11
Ukraine	130	-0.3927	48.79
Slovakia	131	-0.4037	48.44
Iran	132	-0.4272	47.67
Ecuador	133	-0.5318	44.29
Costa Rica	134	-0.5426	43.94
Bolivia	135	-0.5554	43.52
Belize	136	-0.5752	42.88
Portugal	137	-0.6057	41.89

COUNTRY	COVID RANK	COVID Scores	
		RAW	SCALED
Lithuania	138	-0.6383	40.84
Mexico	139	-0.6784	39.54
Austria	140	-0.6847	39.33
United Kingdom	141	-0.7399	37.55
Chile	142	-0.7503	37.21
Serbia	143	-0.7556	37.04
Romania	144	-0.7788	36.29
Poland	145	-0.7809	36.22
Moldova	146	-0.8288	34.67
Netherlands	147	-0.8433	34.20
Colombia	148	-0.8488	34.02
France	149	-0.8871	32.78
Georgia	150	-0.8885	32.73
Sweden	151	-0.8912	32.65
Hungary	152	-0.9151	31.87
Spain	153	-0.9544	30.60
Andorra	154	-0.9686	30.14
Brazil	155	-0.9873	29.53
Bulgaria	156	-0.9976	29.20
Argentina	157	-1.0345	28.01
Italy	158	-1.0460	27.63
Switzerland	159	-1.0658	26.99
Peru	160	-1.0713	26.81
United States	161	-1.1226	25.15
Liechtenstein	162	-1.1701	23.62
Bosnia and Herzegovina	163	-1.2064	22.44
Croatia	164	-1.2069	22.42
Panama	165	-1.2538	20.90
Macedonia	166	-1.2611	20.67
Armenia	167	-1.2759	20.19
Czech Republic	168	-1.5179	12.35
Slovenia	169	-1.5797	10.35
Belgium	170	-1.6990	6.49
Montenegro	171	-1.7242	5.67
San Marino	172	-1.8993	0.00

Global COVID-19 Narrative

Introduction

THE CORONAVIRUS DISEASE (COVID-19) pandemic has brought the interconnected and dominant economic global system to a complete halt. It comes as a warning from the near future—a future in which national isolation, rising inequality, and a host of other unsustainable activities continue to exacerbate health, ecological, and economic instability, and precarity, and in which repeated and protracted instances of societal collapse is the norm. Nevertheless, in so doing, the crisis presents an opportunity for critical reflection to imagine a future of a more equitable and inclusive world. Our annual Inclusiveness Index assesses the performance of nations in terms of political and economic inclusivity across boundaries of difference. The COVID-19 pandemic and resulting economic crisis created a perfect storm to test national commitments and resolve around inclusion and equity. For that reason, we assess their performance on a separate index we created for that purpose.

When the news broke out about the COVID-19 virus in December 2019, it seemed that world leaders and media outlets were underestimating the seriousness of the virus, which quickly engulfed the whole globe. Many world leaders thought that COVID-19 would transpire the same way as the cases of SARS (2003), swine influenza (2009), MERS (2013), and Ebola (2014). Despite some early news coming out of China on December 30, 2019, when whistleblower Dr. Li Wenliang posted a video about the virus, the world and its health surveillance and preparedness institutions stood idle in the face of an upcoming tsunami of infections, hospitalizations, and deaths that would sweep the world.⁷

Furthermore, globally the COVID-19 pandemic has caused tremendous suffering and a heavy shadow. As of December 2020, more than 1.8 million people around the world have lost their lives due to the pandemic, with marginalized groups, including Indigenous communities and racial and ethnic minorities, suffering the most. Moreover, COVID-19 is having an impact on the efforts of least developed economies and the Global South to tackle intractable economic and environmental challenges to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals by 2030. As the global economy is expected to contract by 5.2 percent, a further 130 million people are expected

Global Economic Impact of COVID-19



1.8 million+
deaths

due to the pandemic in 2020

(Source: Worldometer)



4.3%
contraction

of global gross domestic product

(Source: The World Bank; Year 2020)



Global poverty is expected to rise
for the first time in 20 years

88 million+ pushed into
extreme poverty in 2020

150 million+ will be pushed into
extreme poverty by 2021
(Source: The World Bank)

to experience economic hardship in addition to the 780 million who are already living in extreme poverty.⁸

The sluggish response to the pandemic reveals that most of the global governance institutions were unprepared, with very few exceptions, to deal with a global pandemic, let alone to immediately unleash the power of multilateralism to control the virus from spreading all over the globe. The nature of global geopolitics, nationalistic pride, and antagonism have impeded the global response to act in the best interests of world health, particularly, the poor and vulnerable.

On December 31, 2019, China, while failing to inform the world, was battling the emergence and spread of an “unknown cause” of pneumonia cases in Wuhan. The illness, which several epidemiological units,⁹ including WHO’s Epidemic Intelligence, were aware of, marked the arrival of a novel virus.¹⁰ By January 3, 2020, China confirmed the first cases of COVID-19 infections, and within a month, the total cases in China peaked at 20,475. Even though most global epidemiological units were informed of the incidents in Wuhan, most world governments did nothing to prepare for the upcoming global pandemic. While the world was still watching, COVID-19 was spreading around the globe, bringing with it horror stories of infections, hospitalizations, and deaths. By the end of 2020, there were a total of 83,832,334 confirmed cases and 1,824,590 deaths worldwide.¹¹

Revelations and Challenges

While China was experiencing the worst of circumstances, the world was watching and didn’t take decisive action to act collectively. By January 5, 2020, WHO had shared detailed information about a cluster of cases of pneumonia of an unknown cause through the International Health Regulations, which legally binds and is visible to all 194 member states.¹² Yet most governments, with very few exceptions, didn’t take any precautionary measures to reduce the risk of infections among the world population.¹³

As the virus continues to spread across international borders, the lack of cooperation and solidarity among global and regional bodies and among countries has contributed to the increasing strength of the virus. Left unrestricted, the virus has room to spread widely without clear containment and mitigation strategies grounded in science-based risk assessment or the advice of health experts and the scientific community. Whereas the most effective tools to control the spread of the virus were available to almost all, such as basic health hygiene, mask wearing, and physical distancing, they were ignored and politicized. Many governments, such as those in Brazil,¹⁴ Italy,¹⁵ and the United States,¹⁶ have undermined their own health experts and continue to minimize the fatal impact of the virus and its capacity to spread worldwide and to bring the global economy to a standstill.

Global powers were preoccupied with fierce competition over geopolitics and the global supply chain, which were guided by internal nationalistic outlooks. International organizations fared little better. WHO played an informative and critical role in informing the world about the spread of the virus. However, its response to the outbreak of COVID-19 was marked by several inadequacies. WHO’s shortcomings stemmed from the internal politics of its member states and the lack of authority to enforce health surveillance and to collect health information without government permission.

This incapacity has diminished the organization’s ability to fulfill its role as the global governance mechanism for health. For example, the Chinese government had concealed the potential of the virus to become a global pandemic from WHO, and only released that information when it was beyond their ability to control it and was rapidly spreading beyond its border. Another example of poor response was the US government, which announced it was withdrawing from WHO amid the global pandemic instead of increasing their cooperation and solidarity with governments and people of the world.¹⁷ The decision to withdraw from WHO was reversed by the new administration in Washington in January 2021.

National Government Responses

For this report, we investigated how countries have fared relative to each other not in simple health or economic terms, but in terms of equity and inclusion. We created a separate COVID-19 index, which accompanies this brief narrative. Because of data limitations, our COVID-19 index ranks country performance along three key factors:

- **COVID-19 infections:** Effective policies and measures to control the spread of COVID-19 are reflected in the number of infections. A lower per capita number of infections reflects a better approach to mitigating the spread of this virus.
- **COVID-19 deaths:** A robust health infrastructure and lower proportions of vulnerable populations (people with comorbidities or seniors) in a nation-state are reflected in a lower number of deaths due to COVID-19.
- **COVID-19 testing:** A testing regimen can identify and isolate/quarantine COVID-19 cases to restrict the spread of the infection. A higher number of people tested is a measure of how robustly a country is trying to protect its people.

However, throughout the world, governments responded differently in how they acknowledged and dealt with the virus. Whereas some governments preferred to downplay the severity of the virus to avoid the economic impact of health measures or due to lack of a preparedness system, other governments decided to act decisively and responsibly despite the economic cost. For instance, New Zealand, Rwanda, Taiwan, and Vietnam, among others, initiated rapid and science-based risk assessments to guide their early responses. This decisive government action was critical and led to positive outcomes to control the spread and suppress the virus and sustain fewer infections and deaths. We highlight some notable cases.

Taiwan confirmed its first case of COVID-19 on January 21, 2020, and immediately activated its task force (the National Health Command Center) to combat the virus. It integrated several national agencies' databases,



including immigration and customs data, into its health-care system data to coordinate, identify, and guide government efforts to respond to the virus. Taiwan had developed its public health surveillance infrastructure fifteen years earlier during the SARS outbreak in 2004, which allowed the government to test, trace, and isolate all reported cases. The success of the Taiwanese government's actions resulted in controlling and suppressing the virus, with very few cases of community transmission, without a lockdown. At the end of 2020, of the 167,555 reported and 164,675 excluded cases, Taiwan had only 937 confirmed cases and nine deaths.¹⁸

New Zealand, which benefited from its isolated geographical location, administered rigorous science-based measures, including “test, trace, and isolate,” and a nationwide lockdown that afforded the country to avoid worse health outcomes.¹⁹ By mid-March 2020, the central government decisively switched from a mitigation strategy to an elimination strategy while devising plans for economic support of its population. Furthermore, the government leadership made it their utmost responsibility to visibly communicate with the public about the pandemic and to explain the health measures to combat the virus, including border restrictions and mandatory self-isolation. By the end of 2020, New Zealand had 2,162 confirmed cases and twenty-five deaths and had returned to some sense of normalcy.²⁰

Vietnam reported its first known case of COVID-19 on January 23, 2020, and by March the government announced the nationwide outbreak of COVID-19. The government enacted several immediate health measures, including mass mobilization of the country's military and public employees to test, trace, and isolate all reported COVID-19 cases. Additionally, the government supported a creative public education campaign to raise awareness about the importance of health measures.²¹ Furthermore, by late March, the government had suspended entry for all foreigners and introduced rigorous isolation measures for fourteen days in all cases of entry for Vietnamese citizens in addition to a nationwide lockdown for fifteen days. These robust measures have had positive results that enabled Vietnam to avoid major cases of community transmission. By the end of 2020, Vietnam registered 1,465 confirmed cases and thirty-five deaths.²²

Rwanda, which is considered one of the lowest-income countries worldwide, was one of the first African countries to detect an outbreak in March 2020. After the 1994 genocide, the Rwandan government embarked on rebuilding key institutions, most notably, its health-care and health surveillance systems. This forward thinking has allowed the Rwandan government to use science-based risk assessment to decisively mobilize the state capacity to deal with the spread of COVID-19. The government pledged to identify every COVID-19 case and to immediately isolate anyone who tests positive at a dedicated COVID-19 clinic. Furthermore, the health authority embarked on contact-tracing campaigns to reach those who were deemed high risk and isolate them, either at a clinic or at home, until they can be tested and cleared of the virus.²³ By the end of 2020, Rwanda had registered 8,383 confirmed cases and ninety-two deaths.²⁴

Additionally, several other countries have enacted a successful range of strategies to control and suppress the virus with different policies, such as:

- **Mauritius:** 527 confirmed cases and ten deaths ²⁵
- **Cuba:** 11,863 confirmed cases and 146 deaths ²⁶
- **South Korea:** 60,740 confirmed cases and 900 deaths ²⁷
- **China:** 87,052 confirmed cases and 4,634 deaths ²⁸

However, numerous countries have fared the worst and proved unable to control and suppress the virus during 2020, mainly due to a lack of earnest public health measures and strategies. Among the worst performing are:


- **United States:** 20,517,765 confirmed cases and 358,771 deaths ²⁹
- **Brazil:** 7,675,973 confirmed cases and 194,976 deaths ³⁰
- **India:** 10,286,329 confirmed cases and 149,018 deaths ³¹
- **Russia:** 3,159,297 confirmed cases and 57,019 deaths ³²

Global Economic Impacts of COVID-19

The economic impact of COVID-19 has been felt throughout the world. While Indigenous communities, ethnic and racial minorities, and low-income households across the globe suffered severe economic losses,³³ women and children have faced rising domestic violence.³⁴ In addition, least developed economies witnessed economic contraction. Specifically, as the virus continues to spread across the world, many countries have experienced the pandemic shock differently: some have been forced to implement a lockdown, some have experienced an economic downturn in foreign direct investment (FDI) due to the crippling of the global supply chain, and some have experienced varying degrees of money inflow from remittances or structural austerity due to mounting national debt that put stressors on their fiscal policy.

Trade has fallen dramatically in most regions except in East Asia and the Pacific


Source: UNCTAD calculations based on national statistics



The number of cross-border economic activities, specifically FDI, dropped by 15 percent in the first three quarters of 2020, compared with the previous year. In advanced economies, where a significant amount of FDI originates, the FDI fell by 21 percent. In least developed economies, the value of FDI decreased sharply; for example, in Africa, it was at -44 percent, and in Latin America and the Caribbean, it stood at -73 percent; while in Asia, it was more than offset by a 60 percent increase. However, in transition economies,³⁵ even

Estimated drop in aggregated working hours, 2020

Source: International Labor Organization (2020)




though the number of cross-border economic activities rose by 84 percent, it was from a very low base and reflected mostly corporate mergers and acquisitions, and corporate restructurings, which do not improve the livelihoods of the working poor.³⁶

In 2020, worldwide remittances were projected to experience a sharp decline of 20 percent and impact the least developed economies and their working poor. There are wide regional differences in the economic impact due to the downturn in remittances since countries of origin are affected differently by the pandemic. Inflows of remittances are expected to fall most in Europe and Central Asia by 27.5 percent, followed by sub-Saharan Africa by 23.1 percent, and South Asia by 22.1 percent. Also, these remittances are projected to contract considerably in the Middle East and North Africa by 19.6 percent, Latin America and the Caribbean by 19.3 percent, and East Asia and the Pacific by 13 percent.³⁷

Additionally, the national debt and servicing costs have burdened and hindered the capacity of many of the least developed countries' health-care systems to respond effectively to the pandemic. For example, most African countries' fiscal policies were impacted severely due to the pre-COVID-19 national debt conundrum, which averaged a 60 percent debt-to-GDP ratio; and for four African countries (Cabo Verde, Eritrea, Mozambique, and Sudan) the ratio exceeded 100 percent.³⁸ Additionally, there has also been a fall in FDI, which is closely linked to the extractive sector and hence the commodity price cycle.³⁹ The decline in crude oil prices by up to 60 percent has put significant strains on the revenue of the net oil exporters, particularly those whose revenues are highly determined by crude oil sales.⁴⁰

Projected Decline of Remittances in 2020

Source: World Bank



Vaccination

The development of the COVID-19 vaccine represents an unprecedented advancement of the global human scientific society. In less than nine months, major breakthroughs were registered with promising results. However, these developments also show the monopoly, in some cases, of the private pharmaceutical laboratories leading the way instead of state-sponsored laboratories. The problem with this approach is that it exacerbates issues related to equity and which countries or regions will be able to vaccinate their populations and which will not. A global vaccine for a global pandemic must provide the opportunity to all national governments to be able to access the scientific knowledge and build the manufacturing capabilities to produce an effective vaccine and make it available to their populations without economic discrimination.

In that context, the development of COVAX, the vaccines pillar of the Access to COVID-19 Tools Accelerator, which is convened by CEPI,⁴¹ GAVI,⁴² and WHO, remains one of the best practices of global cooperation and solidarity to ensure equity in vaccination across the globe. Primarily, it advances the future capability of national health-care surveillance systems of the least developed economies to combat early on any future pandemics across the world.

Lessons for the Future


There are several lessons we can learn from those governments and societies which enacted and accepted swift and science-based risk assessments to guide their early, decisive actions in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. These actions included interventions at various levels, such as with border-entry points, community-transmission control, and case-based control measures. In addition, empathic leadership, who effectively communicated key messages to the public, helped to avoid massive human suffering. Specifically, they framed combating the pandemic as the work of a unified government, public health experts, and society alike, which resulted in high public confidence and observance to stringent and difficult pandemic-control measures.

To effectively respond to growing destabilization, global efforts must remain robust. Such efforts will need to be grounded in an understanding of the systemic nature of the challenges we face at present. The vicious social, political, and economic disruption wrought by the pandemic presents a major opportunity to establish such priorities. As demonstrated by this crisis, viruses do not respect national boundaries. Thus, our planning must seek regional and global solutions. Furthermore, to confront the systemic nature of the globalized predicament we face, we must redesign our global systems of governance. Specifically, we must envision novel tools to invigorate global solidarity, cooperation, and coordination concerning holistic systems planning of global health surveillance, pandemic containment, and mitigation strategies. A vision that rests in, and advances, a human and non-human species and ecosystems-centered approach necessary for a more inclusive, sustainable, equitable, and resilient world.



US Inclusiveness Map

Inclusiveness Index 2020



US Inclusiveness Rankings

COUNTRY	RANK 2020	2020 Scores		Change from 2019	
		RAW	SCALED	CATEGORY	RANKING
Hawaii	1	1.2524	100.00	•	•
Maryland	2	0.6994	69.40	•	↑ 1
Rhode Island	3	0.6932	69.06	•	↑ 6
Nevada	4	0.6704	67.80	•	↓ 2
Illinois	5	0.3384	49.43	•	↑ 5
Georgia	6	0.2980	47.19	↑ 1	↑ 5
Washington	7	0.2774	46.05	•	↓ 3
Oregon	8	0.2642	45.32	↑ 1	↑ 8
Florida	9	0.2366	43.79	↑ 2	↑ 13
New York	10	0.2348	43.69	•	↓ 4
New Hampshire	11	0.2123	42.45	•	↑ 2
California	12	0.2115	42.40	↓ 1	↓ 4
New Mexico	13	0.1584	39.47	•	↑ 7
Maine	14	0.1457	38.76	•	↓ 2
Delaware	15	0.1291	37.84	↑ 1	↑ 9
Utah	16	0.1239	37.56	↑ 1	↑ 9
Colorado	17	0.0886	35.60	↓ 1	↓ 10
Arizona	18	0.0627	34.17	↑ 1	↑ 5
Alaska	19	0.0627	34.17	•	↓ 5
Virginia	20	0.0563	33.81	•	↓ 1
Michigan	21	0.0158	31.58	↓ 1	↓ 3
New Jersey	22	-0.0184	29.68	↓ 1	↓ 7
Vermont	23	-0.0218	29.50	↓ 2	↓ 18
North Dakota	24	-0.0621	27.26	↑ 2	↑ 24
Missouri	25	-0.0692	26.87	•	↑ 5
South Carolina	26	-0.0696	26.85	↑ 1	↑ 9
Nebraska	27	-0.0756	26.52	↓ 1	↓ 10
Wisconsin	28	-0.0907	25.68	↑ 1	↑ 3
Minnesota	29	-0.0935	25.53	•	↓ 8
Indiana	30	-0.1049	24.90	•	↓ 3
Idaho	31	-0.1245	23.81	•	↑ 2
Pennsylvania	32	-0.1294	23.54	•	↑ 6
Arkansas	33	-0.1441	22.73	↑ 1	↑ 13
West Virginia	34	-0.1501	22.40	•	↓ 2
Tennessee	35	-0.1546	22.15	↑ 1	↑ 7
Oklahoma	36	-0.1687	21.36	•	↑ 1
Kentucky	37	-0.1747	21.04	•	↓ 3
Iowa	38	-0.2028	19.48	↓ 1	↓ 10
Alabama	39	-0.2274	18.12	•	•
North Carolina	40	-0.2799	15.22	•	↓ 4
Kansas	41	-0.2839	14.99	•	↑ 3
Montana	42	-0.3016	14.01	↓ 1	↓ 2
Massachusetts	43	-0.3028	13.95	↓ 2	↓ 14
Texas	44	-0.3327	12.29	•	↑ 1
Mississippi	45	-0.3403	11.87	•	↑ 2
Ohio	46	-0.3601	10.78	•	↓ 5
Connecticut	47	-0.3792	9.72	↓ 2	↓ 21
Wyoming	48	-0.4748	4.43	•	↓ 5
Louisiana	49	-0.5395	0.85	•	↑ 1
South Dakota	50	-0.5549	0.00	•	↓ 1

US Observations on Changes

WHEN WE LOOK at our 2020 map of inclusivity across the United States, we can see clear trends and patterns. Although inclusivity is not the exclusive province of blue or coastal states, western states perform much better than the rest of the country, with the lower South and upper Great Plains states faring worst of all. The mid-western Rust Belt states occupy most of the middle category.

Inclusivity is a choice, not simply a matter of politics or culture. States and metropolitan areas with policies that reduce inequality, expand the rights of marginalized people, and draw back from the project of mass incarceration show improvements or high scores for inclusivity, whether they are red, blue, or purple (see Florida, for example). It is true that political polarization has been an endemic feature of American governance in recent years, with policy following suit. But inclusivity transcends politics and political borders.

Our rankings, scores, and maps are found on the preceding pages. As you can see, all states are categorized as either Low, Medium-Low, Medium, Medium-High, or High in their inclusivity designation. You can also see the ordinal ranking of each state relative to all others.

Twenty-one states changed their inclusivity designation from 2019. Only five of those states, or 24 percent, leapt or fell more than one category. For example, Florida, which adopted a ballot initiative that expanded voting rights for formerly incarcerated persons in 2019, rose from Medium to High. North Dakota also jumped two rankings, from Low to Medium. In absolute terms, Florida had by far the greatest percentage change in its raw score. But North Dakota had the largest increase in relative terms, leapfrogging twenty-four states by ordinal ranking (from 48th to 24th place). The only other state with a double-digit ordinal ranking increase was Arkansas, which went from 46th to 33rd place.

Three northeastern states—Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Vermont—each fell two categories, from Medium to Low in the case of the first two and from High to Medium in the latter case. Minnesota had one of the largest percentage decreases in raw score, despite remaining in the same category, falling from 21st to 29th place. The largest ordinal ranking decline was Connecticut (which fell from 26th to 47th place) followed by Vermont (which fell from 5th to 23rd).

Examining the data within our index allows us to better understand the reasons behind these shifts. Though all three of the states that fell two categories performed worse across the general population and disability subcategories, Massachusetts performed worse in four of the six subcategories, including race and sexual orientation. One of the major setbacks for Massachusetts is its much higher rates of hate crimes, second only to the state of Washington. The magnitude of this score is high enough to offset any gains it made on the Gini coefficient and its relative refugee intake. Within the race dimension, it performed worse in average nonwhite income compared to average white income, dropping from 20th to 30th position. It performed worse on all three indicators within the sexual orientation dimension.

Vermont performed worse under the gender dimension. Increasing income inequality for women is a major contributor toward its worse performance. Relatively poor performance on the Gini coefficient and refugee intake are other factors contributing to Vermont falling two inclusiveness categories.

Connecticut performed worse under the disability subcategory because of worsening income inequality for people with disabilities. The downgrading is also attributed to a slightly poor performance on the Gini coefficient. However, despite a substantial decline in sexual orientation-based hate crimes, Connecticut has fallen two categories from the previous year.


We detected improvements among several states. Oregon rose from Medium-High to High; Arizona, Delaware, and Utah rose from Medium to Medium-High; South Carolina and Wisconsin rose from Medium-Low to Medium; and Arkansas and Tennessee improved from Low to Medium-Low.

On the other side of the ledger, two deep blue states, California and Colorado, fell from High to Medium-High in our index. Nebraska, New Jersey, and Michigan fell from Medium-High to Medium. Iowa fell from Medium to Medium-Low, and Montana fell from Medium-Low to Low.

As always, our measures reflect data that takes months and sometimes years to collect and report, so they must be viewed in that context. This is why we should always look beyond the data to surface stories and trends for which data is either unavailable or difficult to collect systematically and consistently.



US COVID-19 Map



US COVID-19 Rankings

STATE	COVID RANK	COVID Scores	
		RAW	SCALED
Vermont	1	1.6629	100.00
Alaska	2	1.3950	91.79
Maine	3	1.2652	87.81
Hawaii	4	1.1078	82.99
Oregon	5	0.8734	75.81
New Hampshire	6	0.7629	72.42
Washington	7	0.5931	67.22
West Virginia	8	0.4714	63.49
Maryland	9	0.4282	62.16
California	10	0.3641	60.20
Virginia	11	0.3622	60.14
North Carolina	12	0.3147	58.68
Massachusetts	13	0.3018	58.29
Delaware	14	0.2975	58.16
Kentucky	15	0.2727	57.40
Rhode Island	16	0.2090	55.45
Colorado	17	0.1709	54.28
Ohio	18	0.0956	51.97
Connecticut	19	0.0719	51.24
Wyoming	20	0.0341	50.09
Minnesota	21	0.0163	49.54
Oklahoma	22	-0.0052	48.88
Utah	23	-0.0097	48.74
New York	24	-0.0137	48.62
Florida	25	-0.0418	47.76
Michigan	26	-0.0438	47.70
New Mexico	27	-0.0712	46.86
South Carolina	28	-0.1347	44.91
Nebraska	29	-0.1503	44.43
Missouri	30	-0.1769	43.62

COUNTRY	COVID RANK	COVID Scores	
		RAW	SCALED
Montana	31	-0.1809	43.50
Wisconsin	32	-0.2169	42.39
Texas	33	-0.2401	41.68
Illinois	34	-0.2631	40.98
Nevada	35	-0.2726	40.69
Georgia	36	-0.2884	40.20
Indiana	37	-0.3157	39.37
Tennessee	38	-0.3302	38.92
Louisiana	39	-0.4075	36.55
Pennsylvania	40	-0.4399	35.56
Arkansas	41	-0.4421	35.49
Alabama	42	-0.5387	32.53
Idaho	43	-0.5631	31.78
North Dakota	44	-0.5732	31.47
Kansas	45	-0.5996	30.67
New Jersey	46	-0.6081	30.41
Arizona	47	-0.6663	28.62
Mississippi	48	-0.9063	21.27
Iowa	49	-0.9704	19.30
South Dakota	50	-1.6003	0.00

US COVID-19 Narrative

WITHOUT QUESTION, the COVID-19 pandemic is the most significant and far-reaching story of 2020, affecting the economy, health, and politics of the United States in ways that we only partially understand. What is clear, however, is that the pandemic has had a severe and disproportionate impact on communities of color, the elderly, and people with disabilities. Moreover, the response to the pandemic has revealed or exacerbated dysfunctions in our health-care systems and governance.

In early January 2020, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) began circulating warnings to the upper echelons of the US government that a potentially novel respiratory illness was spreading in Wuhan, China, and issued a public alert a few days later. Despite a travel notice, the activation of the emergency operations center, the formation of a presidential task force, and a mandatory quarantine and ban on travel from Wuhan, the virus entered the United States quickly and spread fast. The first confirmed COVID-19 diagnosis in the United States was discovered on January 21, and by February 4, there were 293 cases under investigation as possible infections in thirty-six states and the District of Columbia.⁴³ By the end of the year, there were nearly 21 million cases in the United States, and more than 355,000 deaths directly associated with it, and an even greater total of “excess deaths” indirectly associated with it.⁴⁴


Initially, the federal government, and especially the Executive Branch, appears to have underestimated the risk and severity of the novel virus to public health and the economy. On January 22, President Donald Trump was asked if he was worried about a possible pandemic, and he responded: “No, not at all. And we have it totally under control. It’s one person coming in from China...It’s going to be just fine.”⁴⁵ President Trump later told Bob Woodward: “I wanted to always play it down. I still like playing it down, because I don’t want to create a panic.”⁴⁶ And in the spring, the president speculated that the virus might go away with summer heat, by stating, “Maybe this goes away with heat and light. It seems like that’s the case.”⁴⁷

State government responses varied greatly. Some state governments, especially those led by Republicans, tended to oppose mass shutdowns of the economy to slow the spread of the virus. On the other hand, states led by Democrats tended to be more aggressive in ordering shelter-in-place mandates and social distancing rules.

Based upon these factors, we find tremendous variations across the United States, as the accompanying map

COVID-19 U.S. Infections and Deaths in 2020

Source: CDC.gov





and table reflect. The best performing states are Vermont, Alaska, Maine, Hawaii, and Oregon, which all have the benefit of being more remote and isolated, but also had excellent public health responses. The worst performing states, however, were South Dakota, Iowa, Mississippi, Arizona, and New Jersey. Many of these states had outbreaks among vulnerable populations, such as Indigenous, Latinos, and African Americans. South Dakota, however, was notorious for its lax response, and for refusing, for example, to issue a mask mandate. One out of every five hundred South Dakotans died from the pandemic.⁴⁸


COVID-19 was discovered to have uneven effects across the population. As a virus that attacked the respiratory system and caused pneumonia, several underlying health conditions were quickly identified as risk factors for more serious infections, including hypertension, diabetes, and dementia. These underlying conditions, and other comorbidities, have higher incidence in people with disabilities. Furthermore, people with disabilities may have a more difficult time engaging in physical distancing or other preventative or precautionary measures that may reduce the risk of infection.⁴⁹

In addition, age appeared to be a significant factor in risk of hospitalization or death from infection. More than 80 percent of the deaths in the United States occurred in populations sixty-five years of age or older, and just 2.5 percent of deaths among people forty-five years of age or younger.⁵⁰

Early in the pandemic, however, racial and ethnic disparities in rates of infection, hospitalization, and deaths were quickly observed and reported.

COVID-19 U.S. Deaths in 2020 by Age Group

Source: CDC.gov




By mid-April, the CDC reported that 33 percent of hospitalizations due to COVID-19 infections were non-Hispanic Black people.⁵¹ Significant disparities were reported in regions as diverse as Illinois, Louisiana, Michigan, and New Jersey.⁵² For example, by early April, Chicago reported that 72 percent of the deaths from COVID-19 were among Black people, who constituted just 30 percent of the region's population.

Epidemiologists and public health experts quickly pointed out that African Americans were particularly vulnerable to the virus: they had less access to health care, had higher incidence of underlying risk factors like hypertension and diabetes, and were more likely to work in public-facing jobs with greater exposure to the virus.⁵³ Additionally, the virus swept through larger metropolitan areas first and fastest, where African Americans disproportionately resided.

By early May, reports had shown that Latinos were also disproportionately impacted by the pandemic, especially in states like California. In San Jose, for example, death rates were far higher in Latino neighborhoods than more affluent white neighborhoods.⁵⁴ The California Department of Public Health reported that Latinos accounted for more than 60 percent of deaths attributed to COVID-19, but less than 45 percent of the state-wide population. In Los Angeles as well as San Jose, crowding and multigenerational households appeared to contribute to the lethality of the virus, especially among Latino and Black households.⁵⁵

RENTERS BY RACE

Source: ACS 1-yr Estimates 2019



As the virus raged on throughout the year, many of these disparities lessened, although still remained, especially because the most vulnerable populations, the aged, are disproportionately whiter.⁵⁶ But in addition to the underlying risk factors and vulnerabilities of communities of color, the pandemic had other harmful effects on

these communities. Black and Latino children, for example, disproportionately relied upon free and reduced lunch for meals and nutrition, a problem exacerbated by the abrupt shift to remote learning. In addition, these families were less able to access fully the possibilities of remote education, both due to less access to household broadband internet and to other digital divides. In many cases, school districts scrambled to provide students with laptops.⁵⁷

In addition, service workers and lower-wage workers were most impacted by the economic shutdown that was a by-product of shelter-in-place mandates and business closures. White-collar workers shifted to remote work, while workers whose jobs could not be performed remotely filled unemployment rolls. The economic impact of the pandemic created tremendous stress and housing instability, especially for workers who could no longer afford rent and were at risk of being evicted.

All of these problems produced several notable policy responses in the United States. Federal and state governments enacted temporary eviction moratoriums. Not the first, but one of the earliest and most important, was the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, better known as the CARES Act. Signed into law on March 27, this \$2.2 trillion package included direct cash relief to most Americans, expanded unemployment insurance, and created a fund to support businesses through the Paycheck Protection Program.⁵⁸ This was the largest stimulus act in American history. There were several additional federal efforts, including the Federal Reserve's landmark Main Street Lending Program, which allowed the Federal Reserve to backstop bank lending to businesses.⁵⁹

Shelter-in-place and social distancing rules were implemented to slow the spread of the virus, which largely succeeded. But as winter neared, infection rates appeared to rise sharply in the United States, and the final days of 2020 were the grimmest of the year, with an average of nearly 4,000 deaths per day. The final major federal legislative effort of the year responding to the continuing pandemic was the Bipartisan-Bicameral Omnibus COVID Relief Deal, passed on December 21.⁶⁰ This \$900 billion relief package extended unemployment compensation programs and provided new direct cash payments to most Americans, relief for businesses, and additional funding for health, education, and transit sectors.⁶¹

The good news toward the end of 2020 was that vaccine development had proceeded at record speed. Operation Warp Speed, the federal effort to support and facilitate faster vaccine development, appeared to have helped, and by December 2020, the Food and Drug Administration granted Emergency Use Authorization for both the Pfizer and Moderna COVID-19 vaccines, which were shown to be safe and effective based on the data from the manufacturers and the findings from large clinical trials.⁶² The first deliveries of the vaccine were made in mid-December, although state health departments had their own distribution plans.

Many of the state and local distribution plans were informed by months of planning and incorporated equity frameworks that attempted to prioritize the most vulnerable social groups.⁶³ The rollout in many states, however, was marred by administrative challenges and the complexity of the endeavor.⁶⁴ The full impact of these efforts won't be known for many months.

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
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Appendix A: Methodology and Data Matrix

The Inclusiveness Index is a comparative analysis, thus the index values are relative to other countries in the global context and to other states in the US context. The data described in the report is collected, cleaned, and prepared for analysis. Each data value for any indicator is analyzed relative to other data values for the indicator based on how far each value is from the mean value.

The outcome of this standardization of data is known as “z-score.” A z-score is a statistical measure that quantifies the distance (measured in standard deviations) a data point is from the mean of a data set. The use of z-scores allows data to be measured based on the relative distance of the data value from the data average for the entire data set for one indicator. Z-scores are calculated for all indicators in each dimension and adjusted where higher values of indicators meant lack of inclusion (e.g., higher index values for government restrictions on religion). The dimension z-score is the average of z-scores of each indicator within the dimension (e.g., z-score [by race] = average [political representation by race z-score, income ratio of non-whites over non-Hispanic whites z-score, and overrepresentation of African Americans and Hispanics in criminal justice system z-score]).

The Inclusiveness Index value is the average of all dimension z-scores. The level of inclusiveness (high to low) is determined by sorting the data in descending order and breaking it down into quintiles. Thus, the countries or US states identified with high inclusiveness represent the top 20 percent of scores among respective geographies. Conversely, countries or US states identified with low inclusiveness represent the lowest scoring 20 percent of respective geographies. This average allows the scores of states and nation-states to improve from year to year even if they are lagging or worsening in one area but are excelling in another area.



Race	Gender	Sexual Orientation	Religion	Disability
			Social Hostilities Index (SHI)	
		Crime rate per 100,000 by bias motivation		
Ethnic minorities political representation	Women in parliament	LGBT representatives in Lower House		
Percentage of 116th Congress representatives who are non-white	Proportion of female State legislators	Proportion of State legislators who belong to LGBT community	Percentage of 116th Congress representatives who are non-Christian	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Female to male GNI per capita (PPP) Female labor force participation 			
Non-whites to non-Hispanic whites per capita income ratio	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Female to male income ratio Female labor force participation 			Median earning ratio of disabled people to able-bodied people
	Laws on gender rights	LGBT rights index	Government Restrictions Index (GRI)	Index based on existing disability laws and international treaties
		LGBT rights index	Number of anti-Sharia bills enacted	
	Female incarceration per 100,000 people			
Ratio of over-representation	Female incarceration per 100,000 people			

Appendix B: Indicators, Measures and Descriptions

General Population

● Global indicator(s) ● U.S. indicator(s)

Exposure to out-group violence	Indicator	None available	Hate Crimes
	Measure	—	Hate crimes per 100,000 people.
	Data source	—	FBI Hate Crime Statistics - Table 13
	Year of data	—	2019
	Data available	—	50 states
	Data link	—	https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/2019/topic-pages/jurisdiction
	Description	—	FBI's Uniform Crime Report provides aggregate state totals of bias-motivated incidents (hate crime) that law enforcement agencies submitted to the UCR program.
	Notes	—	This new indicator uses data on hate crimes replacing "Violent crimes" data used in 2019 index.

Political Representation	Indicator	Political Rights	None available
	Measure	Index of political rights.	—
	Data source	Social Progress Index	—
	Year of data	2020	—
	Data available	190 countries	—
	Data link	https://www.socialprogress.org/	—
	Description	An evaluation of three subcategories of political rights: electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and functioning of government on a scale from 0 (no political rights) to 40 (full political rights).	—

Income Inequality	Indicator	Gini Index	Gini Index
	Measure	Gini index for income inequality	Gini index for income inequality
	Data source	World Bank Database; Knoema	American Community Survey 1-yr estimates
	Year of data	2009-2018	2019
	Data available	157 countries	50 states
	Data link	http://databank.worldbank.org/data/source/world-development-indicators# ; https://knoema.com/WEFTIDI-2018Jan/inclusive-development-index	https://www.census.gov/
	Description	Income inequality is measured by Gini Index which compares the distribution of individual or household income to an equal distribution. A value of “0” signifies absolute equality whereas a value of “100” signifies absolute inequality. The most recent year, but within the last ten years, of data is used.	
	Notes	2018 Gini Index for Albania, Cambodia, New Zealand and Singapore was provided by Knoema database	

Incarceration	Indicator	Incarceration Rate	Incarceration Rate
	Measure	Incarceration per 100,000 people	Incarceration per 100,000 people
	Data source	Prison Policy Initiative	Prison Policy Initiative
	Year of data	2017	2017
	Data available	164 countries	50 states
	Data link	https://www.prisonpolicy.org/global/2018.html	https://www.prisonpolicy.org/global/2018.html
	Description	Prison Policy Initiative publishes prison related data for each year based on reported and survey data for nation-states and for each state in the U.S. Data for the most recent year has been used.	

Immigration	Indicator	Refugee Resettlement	Refugee Resettlement
	Measure	Refugees as a percentage of host country population	Refugees as a percentage of total population
	Data source	United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR); World Bank Database	Bureau of population, Refugees and Migrants, Department of State; American Community Survey 1-yr estimates
	Year of data	2019	Oct 1, 2010 - Sep 30, 2020
	Data available	174 countries	50 states
	Data link	https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/?url=E1ZxP4 ; http://databank.worldbank.org/data/source/world-development-indicators#	https://www.wrapsnet.org/admissions-and-arrivals/ ; https://www.census.gov/
	Description	United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) collects data on number of refugees, asylum-seekers (people who have applied for refugee status which has not yet been determined) and stateless persons from the country of origin and the receiving country.	Bureau of population, Refugees and Migrants at the Department of State provides data on monthly and annual number of refugees received by the nation and by each state.
	Notes	Anguilla and Eritrea 2019 population from Worldometer	Data based on Trump administration's reporting policy

Race

Political Representation	Indicator	Political Representation by Ethnic Minorities	Elected Representatives who are non-white
	Measure	Population proportions of groups which are categorized as “Powerless”, “Discriminated” or “Self-excluded.”	Percentage of 116th Congress representatives who are non-white
	Data source	International Conflict Research (ICR) Group at Swiss Federal Institute of Technology at Zürich	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> U.S. House of Representatives Press Gallery United States Senate
	Year of data	2017	2020
	Data available	177 countries	50 states
	Data link	https://icr.ethz.ch/data/epr/core/	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> https://pressgallery.house.gov/member-data/demographics https://www.senate.gov/senators/Ethnic-DiversityintheSenate.htm
	Description	Ethnic Power Relations Core Dataset 2019 “identifies all politically relevant ethnic groups and their access to state power in every country of the world from 1946 to 2017. It includes annual data on over 800 groups and codes the degree to which their representatives held executive-level state power—from total control of the government to overt political discrimination.” The countries with population of 250,000 or above are included in this dataset.	U.S. House of Representatives and United States Senate shares race data on all members of congress. Percentage of non-white representatives for each State is used as a measure for this indicator.
	Notes	Data for Rwanda was changed to ‘0’ in the dataset by O&BI to reflect this country’s policy to outlaw ethnicity .	

Income Inequality	Indicator	None available	Income Inequality by Race
	Measure	—	Non-whites to non-Hispanic whites per capita income ratio
	Data source	—	American Community Survey 1-yr estimates
	Year of data	—	2019
	Data available	—	50 states
	Data link	—	https://www.census.gov/
	Description	—	Using ACS 1-yr estimates, per capita income is calculated for non-whites and non-Hispanic whites.

Incarceration	Indicator	None available	Incarceration by Race
	Measure	—	Ratio of over-representation in criminal justice system
	Data source	—	Prison Policy Initiative
	Year of data	—	2015
	Data available	—	50 states
	Data link	—	https://www.prisonpolicy.org/racialgeography/counties.html
	Description	—	Over-representation of racial/ethnic minorities in criminal justice system suggests that the structure is more biased towards penalizing these minorities, and is thus less inclusive for these groups. Prison Policy Initiative provides number and ratio on incarcerated and non-incarcerated population by race for all counties within the US. For this indicator, data is aggregated up to the state, and over-representation is calculated for African Americans and Hispanics.

Gender

Political Representation	Indicator	Women in Parliament	State Legislators who are Women
	Measure	Percentage of seats held by women in lower house of parliament.	Proportion of state legislators who are women.
	Data source	World Bank Database	Center for American Women and Politics
	Year of data	2020	2020
	Data available	190 countries	50 states
	Data link	https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=2&series=SG.GEN.PARL.ZS&country=	https://cawp.rutgers.edu/women-state-legislature-2020
	Description	Data on proportion of seats held by women in lower house of parliament as a percentage of total available seats is being used as the measure for this indicator. The focus of this indicator is on elected representatives rather than nominated.	Percentage of women state legislators for each state is available at Center for American Women and Politics at Rutgers University, and is used as a measure for this indicator.

Income Inequality	Indicator	Income Inequality by Gender	Income Inequality by Gender
	Measure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Female to male Gross National Income (GNI) per capita (PPP) ratio Female labor force participation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Female to male income ratio Female labor force participation
	Data source	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> United Nations Development Program (UNDP) World Bank Database 	American Community Survey 1-yr estimates
	Year of data	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2018 2020 	2019
	Data available	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 178 countries 185 countries 	50 states
	Data link	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> http://hdr.undp.org/en/indicators/123506 http://hdr.undp.org/en/indicators/123606 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.TOTL.FE.ZS?view=chart 	https://www.census.gov/
	Description	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Derived from the ratio of female to male wages, ratio of female to male shares of economically active population and gross national income (in 2011 purchasing power parity terms) is used as a measure for this indicator. Percentage of females in labor force is used as a measure for this indicator. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ratio of female to male median income is used as a measure for this indicator. Percentage of females in labor force is used as a measure for this indicator.

Anti-Discrimination Laws	Indicator	Laws on Gender Rights	None available
	Measure	Average index value for the the indices on a number of laws on gender rights.	—
	Data source	OECD Gender, Institutions and Development Database (GID-DB) 2019	—
	Year of data	2019	—
	Data available	180 countries	—
	Data link	https://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=71149	—
	Description	OECD provides index values for laws on violence, land and non land rights, political rights, access to justice, access to financial services, freedom of movement and workplace rights.	

Incarceration	Indicator	Female Incarceration	Female Incarceration
	Measure	Female incarceration per 100,000 people	Female incarceration per 100,000 people
	Data source	Prison Policy Initiative	Prison Policy Initiative
	Year of data	2017	2017
	Data available	162 countries	50 states
	Data link	https://www.prisonpolicy.org/global/women/2018.html	https://www.prisonpolicy.org/global/women/2018.html
	Description	Prison Policy Initiative publishes prison related data for each year based on reported and survey data for nation-states and for each state in the U.S. Data for the most recent year on rates of female incarceration has been included in the calculations for Inclusiveness Index.	

Sexual Orientation

Exposure to out-group violence	Indicator	None available	Hate Crime by Bias Motivation
	Measure	—	Hate crime rate per 100,000 people by bias motivation.
	Data source	—	FBI Hate Crime Statistics - Table 13
	Year of data	—	2019
	Data available	—	50 states
	Data link	—	https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/2019/topic-pages/jurisdiction
	Description	—	FBI's Hate Crime Statistics provides data on crimes by bias motivation. Crimes motivated by bias towards sexual orientation and gender identity for each state in the U.S. per 100,000 people is used as the measure for this indicator.

Political Representation	Indicator	LGBTQ+ Representatives in Parliament	LGBTQ+ Elected Representatives
	Measure	Proportion of elected representatives who belong to the LGBT community in lower house of parliament.	Proportion of state legislators who belong to LGBTQ+ community.
	Data source	UNC LGBTQ Representative and Rights Research Institute	Victory Institute, Out for America
	Year of data	2016	2020
	Data available	203 countries	50 states
	Data link	https://lgbtqrepresentationandrights.org/data/	https://outforamerica.org/?office-level=State%20Legislature
	Description	Data on proportion of elected representatives who belong to the LGBT community in lower house of parliament as a percentage of total available seats is being used as the measure for this indicator. Using IPU data for number of available seats in lower house of parliament, proportion of LGBT MPs is calculated for 203 countries to include it in the index.	Percentage of state legislators who belong to the LGBT community is used as a measure for this indicator.

Anti-Discrimination Laws	Indicator	LGBT Rights Index	LGBT Rights Index
	Measure	Index of LGBT rights.	Index of LGBT rights.
	Data source	Equaldex	Equaldex
	Year of data	Downloaded on Oct 25, 2020	Downloaded on Oct 25, 2020
	Data available	237 countries	50 states
	Data link	http://www.equaldex.com/	http://www.equaldex.com/
	Description		

Religion

Exposure to out-group violence	Indicator	Social Hostilities Index (SHI)	None available
	Measure	Index of religious hostilities.	—
	Data source	Pew-Templeton's Global Religious Futures project	—
	Year of data	2016	—
	Data available	198 countries	—
	Data link	http://www.globalreligiousfutures.org/explorer#/?-subtopic=76&countries=Worldwide&index=SHI&chart-Type=map&year=2016&pdfMode=false	—
	Description	Social Hostilities Index (SHI) measures – on a 10-point scale – acts of religious hostility by private individuals, organizations and social groups. This includes mob or sectarian violence, harassment over attire for religious reasons and other religion-related intimidation or abuse. The SHI includes 13 measures of social hostilities.	—

Political Representation	Indicator	None available	Non-Christian Elected Representatives
	Measure	—	Percentage of 116th Congress representatives who are non-Christian.
	Data source	—	Pew Research Center
	Year of data	—	2019
	Data available	—	50 states
	Data link	—	https://www.pewforum.org/2019/01/03/faith-on-the-hill-116/
	Description	—	Percentage of each state's delegation in 116th Congress who are non-Christian.

Anti-Discrimination Laws	Indicator	Government Restrictions Index (GRI)	Number of Anti-Sharia Bills Enacted
	Measure	Index of government laws, policies and actions that restrict religious beliefs or practices.	Number of anti-Sharia bills enacted into law as a proxy for discrimination against all religious minorities.
	Data source	Pew-Templeton's Global Religious Futures project	Othering and Belonging Institute
	Year of data	2016	2010-2019
	Data available	198 countries	50 states
	Data link	http://www.globalreligiousfutures.org/explorer#/?-subtopic=76&countries=Worldwide&index=SHI&chart-Type=map&year=2016&pdfMode=false	https://belonging.berkeley.edu/global-justice/islamophobia#islamophobia-database
	Description	Government Restrictions Index (GRI) measures – on a 10-point scale – government laws, policies and actions that restrict religious beliefs or practices. The GRI is comprised of 20 measures of restrictions, including efforts by governments to ban particular faiths, prohibit conversions, limit preaching or give preferential treatment to one or more religious groups.	Othering and Belonging Institute researchers have created a database of all anti-Sharia laws introduced and enacted by the lawmakers in each state.

Disability

Income Inequality	Indicator	None available	Income Inequality by Disability
	Measure	—	Median earnings ratio of people with disability to non-disabled people
	Data source	—	American Community Survey 1-yr estimates
	Year of data	—	2019
	Data available	—	50 states
	Data link	—	https://www.census.gov/
	Description	—	Median earnings by people with disability as a ratio of median earnings by people with no disability is used as the measure for this indicator.

Anti-Discrimination Laws	Indicator	Anti-Discrimination Laws for People with Disabilities	None available
	Measure	Laws against discrimination of people with disabilities	—
	Data source	Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund	—
	Year of data	—	—
	Data available	190 countries	—
	Data link	https://dredf.org/legal-advocacy/international-disability-rights/international-laws/	—
	Description	<p>UN Convention on Rights of Persons with Disability (CRPD) proposed a treaty for all member countries to sign “to promote, protect and ensure the full and equal enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms by all persons with disabilities, and to promote respect for their inherent dignity.” Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund, a non-profit organization, provides a list of countries which have signed CRPD and/or have existing laws protecting the rights of disable people, was used. The data was coded as following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Countries which have signed CRPD and have more than two laws protecting the rights of people with disability: 3 • Countries which have signed CRPD and have two or fewer laws protecting the rights of people with disability: 2 • Countries which have signed CRPD but have no reported laws on disability: 1 • Countries that have not signed CRPD and have no reported laws on disability: -1 	—

COVID-19 Indicators

COVID-19 Infections	Indicator	COVID-19 Infections	COVID-19 Infections
	Measure	Number of COVID infections per million.	Number of COVID infections per 100,000.
	Data source	John Hopkins University	JHU CSSE COVID-19 Data
	Year of data	Upto Dec 31, 2020	Upto Dec 31, 2020
	Data available	189 countries	50 states
	Data link	https://github.com/owid/covid-19-data/tree/master/public/data	https://github.com/CSSEGISandData/COVID-19
	Description	Any country's policies and measures to control the spread of COVID is reflected in the number of infections normalized by its population.	Any state's policies and measures to control the spread of COVID is reflected in the number of infections normalized by its population.

Deaths from COVID-19	Indicator	Deaths from COVID-19	Deaths from COVID-19
	Measure	Number of deaths from COVID-19 per million.	Number of deaths from COVID-19 per 100,000.
	Data source	John Hopkins University	JHU CSSE COVID-19 Data
	Year of data	Upto Dec 31, 2020	Upto Dec 31, 2020
	Data available	189 countries	50 states
	Data link	https://github.com/owid/covid-19-data/tree/master/public/data	https://github.com/CSSEGISandData/COVID-19
	Description	Any country's health infrastructure during this pandemic is reflected in the number of deaths due to COVID -19 normalized by its population.	Any state's health infrastructure during this pandemic is reflected in the number of deaths due to COVID -19 normalized by its population.

COVID-19 Testing	Indicator	COVID-19 Testing	COVID-19 Testing
	Measure	Number of tests conducted per million.	Number of tests conducted per 100,000.
	Data available	199 countries	50 states
	Year of data	Upto Dec 31, 2020	Upto Dec 31, 2020
	Data source	Worldometer	JHU CSSE COVID-19 Data
	Data link	https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/	https://github.com/CSSEGISandData/COVID-19
	Description	A testing regimen can identify, isolate/quarantine COVID-19 cases to restrict the spread of the infection. A higher number of people tested is a measure of how robustly a country is trying to protect its people.	A testing regimen can identify, isolate/quarantine COVID-19 cases to restrict the spread of the infection. A higher number of people tested is a measure of how robustly a state is trying to protect its people.

The Othering and Belonging Institute at UC Berkeley brings together researchers, community stakeholders, and policymakers to identify and challenge the barriers to an inclusive, just, and sustainable society in order to create transformative change.



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