Part II: Criminal Justice 

Criminal Justice System and Police Reform

Police misconduct, disrespect, and violence were among the most serious complaints surfaced by the Kerner Commission’s field investigations. The Commission listed “police practices” as the issue, above
all, that elicited the most intense grievance among communities affected by disorder. Not surprisingly, the Commission made reforming police behavior and conduct a priority, and dedicated an entire chapter to recommendations under the header “police and the community.”

Critically, however, the Kerner Commission found that the issue of police misconduct was recognized to be a “trigger” or “inciting incident” but was not the truer, deeper cause of unrest. Rather, instances of police abuse were the most salient and visible aspect of a larger system of inequity. At the same time that police violence has become an important part of today’s national conversation on race, equally important is the role of the criminal justice system and the rise of mass incarceration in seeding and perpetuating racial inequality. Therefore, this section will examine the Kerner Commission’s police reform recommendations in light of a larger set of issues pertaining to criminal justice reform and the broader criminal justice system in 2019.

Kerner Commission Recommendations: 

The Kerner Commission advanced more than two dozen specific recommendations relating to policing reform, but organized its recommendations under five
“basic problem areas”: ­ The need for change in police operations in ghettos, to ensure proper conduct by individual officers and to eliminate abrasive practices.*

  • The need for more adequate police protections of ghetto residents, to eliminate the high sense of insecurity to person and property.
  • The need for effective mechanisms for resolving citizen grievances against the police.
  • The need for policy guidelines to assist police in areas where police conduct can create tension.
  • The need to develop community support for law enforcement.

Although progress has been made in each area, all five areas continue to have significant and enduring problems. Below we examine each Kerner Commission recommendation both individually and in the context of today’s larger questions about criminal justice reform.

Police Conduct and Patrol Practices

Abuse of community members in neighborhoods of racially-concentrated poverty was the most serious grievance recounted by the Kerner Commission, but it is one that has seen the least progress in the intervening years. In addressing this problem, the Kerner Commission recommended the curtailment of police misconduct, including “indiscriminate stops and searches,” physical abuse, harassment, and “contemptuous and degrading verbal abuse.”

Unfortunately, “broken windows” policing, a philosophy that urged police to target minor crimes with the goal of creating a more orderly community atmosphere that would discourage more serious crimes was ascendant since the 1970s.49 This policing philosophy led to more aggressive misconduct and more pervasive “indiscriminate stops and searches,” known in some places as “stop and frisk.” This tactic was embraced by cities with large Black populations nationwide, including Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Newark, Chicago, Baltimore, and New York City.50


Although many of these cities are not required to collect data from “stop and frisk” incidents, a lawsuit revealed that from 2004–2012 approximately 85 percent of those stopped in New York City were Black or Latino, even though those two groups made up only 52 percent of the city’s population.51 New York City’s “stop and frisk” policy was halted and reformed in 2013 when a federal judge held that the New York City Police Department (NYPD) had engaged in a pattern and practice of racial profiling in violation of the Constitution.52 But because the City of New York settled the case, it is uncertain whether such practices would have been held unconstitutional upon appeal.53 Further, numerous cities continue to engage in “stop and frisk” and as recently as October 2018, the Trump administration praised the tactic, and suggested that Chicago and other cities return to aggressive policing to combat crime.54

The Kerner Commission recognized that “motorized” patrol practices changed the police-civilian dynamic from earlier generations, and noted that the motorized police patrolman “comes to see the city through the windshield and hear about it over a police radio. To him the area increasingly comes to consist only of lawbreakers. To the ghetto resident, the policeman comes increasingly to be only an enforcer.”55

Motorized patrol practices have hardly abated in the years since the Kerner Report. Although efforts to promote “community policing” have emphasized “foot patrol” over motorized patrol, these efforts have not been broadly adopted. In fact, the opposite has occurred.56 By the late 1980s, the DOJ recognized that motorized patrol was the centerpiece of contemporary policing practices.57

Further, foot patrol has been unpopular with local police who viewed it as too informal and ineffective in responding quickly to crises.58 However, more recent studies have affirmed the value of foot patrol, including a major study by the Police Foundation in 2016 finding that this type of policing facilitates relationship building in communities and enhances the problem-solving capability of law enforcement.59  Although it is manpower intensive, foot patrol may be a key to community policing models.

The Kerner Commission also recommended that police departments develop rules prohibiting police misconduct and “vigorously enforce” those rules and standards. While most police departments have now developed rules governing conduct, police officers are accorded broad discretion in determining the scope of appropriate behavior. Much of the lack of police accountability stems from qualified immunity, a legal doctrine that protects police from suit under federal statute 42 US Code § 1983.60 When a police officer uses excessive force, or conducts an unlawful arrest or search, that officer can escape liability if she proves she reasonably believed her conduct was lawful, even if it was not.61 Further, even if the jury finds the officer liable for unlawful conduct, federal law does not require the police department to pay a reward to the victim.62  The reasonableness standard provides a wider scope of discretion than a higher standard might, and undermines comprehensive police department rules governing police conduct.63

In addition to stricter standards governing police conduct on the use of force, training police to de-escalate conflict also provides an important check on police misconduct. De-escalation training teaches police to identify and communicate with individuals who are experiencing mental and emotional crises in order to defuse dangerous situations.64 Only eight states require all officers to undergo this type of training, while the 34 states that have left police training decisions to local agencies have adopted no or very little de-escalation requirements.65 For example, as of February 2017, Georgia requires only one hour of de-escalation training per year.66 Local police departments cite lack of staff and resources and a prevailing belief that training is unnecessary as reasons for not adopting such programs. Statewide mandates should be adopted to ensure all police are equally and fully equipped to use the least amount of force against communities as possible.67

Police Protection

The Kerner Commission identified a lack of community protection and police resources in racially concentrated areas of poverty as contributing to a feeling of insecurity among residents. The Commission warned that “enforcement emphasis should be given to crimes that threaten life and property. Stress on social gambling or loitering when more serious crimes are neglected, not only diverts manpower but fosters distrust and tension in the ghetto community.” Although increased state and federal funds have been directed to local police departments in these communities, these resources have been used to criminalize rather than protect communities through “broken windows” policing as was discussed earlier.

The focus of police resources on targeting low-level crimes has had grave implications for victims of color. A study conducted from 2008 to 2018 found that in major cities “an arrest was made in 63 percent of the killings of white victims, compared with 48 percent of the killings of Latino victims and 46 percent of the killings of black victims. Almost all of the low-arrest zones are home primarily to low-income black residents.”68 In Stockton, California, 40 percent of Black killings result in an arrest, while more than 60 percent of white killings result in an arrest.69 In Miami, police only solve less than a third of killings of Black victims, whereas cases where a white person has been killed result in arrests at least 50 percent of the time.70 Some critics speculate that the lack of accountability or ability of police to solve these crimes contributes to, rather than ameliorates, violence in these neighborhoods.

Grievance Mechanisms

One of the main concerns expressed by the Kerner Commission was the “almost total lack of effective channels for redress of complaints against police conduct.”71 Police officers, it was felt, behaved with impunity or some measure of indifference because of a well-founded belief that they had little risk of punishment, even for violation of procedure or protocol. In fact, it noted that a 1967 Civil Rights Commission found that complainants of police misconduct were frequently victims of retaliation. The Commission presented five recommendations to improve grievance mechanisms: 

  1. Make filing complaints easier and do not require that individuals file these complaints at a central office. 
  2. Have a specialized, separate agency with adequate funds and staff handle complaints.
  3. Ensure that the complaint procedure has a builtin conciliation process.
  4. Allow the complaining party to participate in the investigation and process.
  5. To change policy, require that information regarding the resolution of complaints is forwarded to the departmental units which develop department policies and procedures and to training units responsible for instructing officers on these policies and procedures.

Although the particulars vary from city to city, most large, metropolitan police departments now permit complaints to be filed in the manner recommended by the Kerner Commission. The advent of communications technology has greatly aided the process and possibilities for citizens to file grievances without needing to travel to a central office location during work hours. For example, the BPD, which was subject to a DOJ investigation following the death of Freddie Gray, allows citizens to file complaints by email, phone, or mail, in addition to in-person filing.72

There are very few instances, however, of a police complaint procedure being handled by a separate, specialized agency, per the Kerner Commission’s recommendation. Instead, most complaints are handled by “internal affairs” offices, whose processes are as opaque as they are vague. There are no national or state standards governing the internal affairs process.73 Nor is there good research on the operations or standards of internal affairs units, according to experts.74 According to one research scientist who studied police policies, as of 2015 “[there is] really no general practice, other than the fact that agencies tend to have an internal affairs unit and they tend to investigate officers for misconduct.”75

In some cases, however, internal affairs review boards work alongside civilian review boards, which seeks to further police accountability by allowing non police community members to provide input and
police oversight.76 In most cases, the civilian review board does not have investigatory authority, but supports or acts in concert with investigators. In some cases, however, review boards are more independent. The NYPD, for example, has a civilian review board that is an independent, separate agency, which also allows complainants to connect with officers involved in their complaint.77 Baltimore also has an independent civilian review board made up of citizens from each of the districts in the city and are appointed by the mayor.78 In 2015 Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel recommended the establishment of a civilian-led review board to assist in the oversight of the city’s police department, but the Chicago City Council is still negotiating the structure and role of this board.79

Still, many cities lack effective police complaint procedures. Following the killing of Michael Brown in Ferguson, a DOJ investigation revealed a system in which officers dissuaded citizens from lodging complaints, retaliated against those who did, and repeatedly failed to investigate allegations of misconduct. The DOJ found that all of these actions served to condone officer misconduct and fuel community distrust.80

Further, a study of rates of punishment following complaints in large state and local law enforcement agencies found that only roughly 5–8 percent of such complaints were found to be eligible for disciplinary action.81 In New Orleans, that rate was 5.5 percent. In Newark, it was under 5 percent.82 While it is unclear what percentage of complaints actually resulted in discipline, these rates may understate the problem, considering that many police misconduct incidents do not result in complaints being filed in the first place.83

Policy Guidelines

Another area of recommendations advanced by the Kerner Commission was the creation of systematic policy guidelines for police, which regulate and govern police action and interventions in a range of scenarios. Although the Commission recognized the need for discretion and good judgment, it nonetheless felt that contacts between the police and citizens should be based upon carefully designed and written departmental policies. This responsibility, the Commission felt, was not simply the province of police departments, but local civilian authorities.

In intervening years most police departments have created policy guidelines that specify the range of appropriate or recommended conduct for officers. For example, departments now have detailed guidelines for the use of force, including each weapon.84 Police department manuals not only cover use of force, but also arrests, care and transport of arrestees, and vehicle and patrol operations.85  The level of detail and specificity provided in these manuals varies widely, as does the degree of prescriptiveness.86 Some guidelines are merely laudatory while others are framed as requirements.

Moreover, the main problem is not that there is a lack of clear guidance, but that the standards or guidelines themselves are too lax or discretionary. Exponents of greater police accountability have pushed for stricter guidelines on the use of force. The prevailing national standard permits the use of force where there is a “reasonable cause,” as set out by the United States Supreme Court. State and local efforts to raise standards on the use of force by police above this standard generally face intense opposition from departments and police unions.

Following the shooting death of Stephon Clark in Sacramento, a bill was introduced in the California state legislature that would prohibit the use of deadly force except “where it is necessary to prevent imminent and serious bodily injury or death to the officer or another person.”87 Seattle implemented a similar standard, restricting the use of deadly force to situations in which an “officer fears an imminent threat of injury or death.” Since implementing this standard, the Seattle Police Department has had fewer incidents of civilians killed by police officers.88

Community Support 

The Kerner Commission also felt that police departments must take affirmative steps to gain the support of the communities they serve. It found that the breakdown of communication and trust undermined the effectiveness of the police as an institution. Therefore, it developed a number of recommendations designed to improve community relations.

First, it recommended that police departments make a concerted effort to hire more Black officers. Without supposing that this would be a cure-all, the Commission noted that in the 28 departments it surveyed, Black officers ranged from less than 1 percent to 21 percent of all officers, and that the median was 6 


percent.89 Moreover, in no case was the proportion equal to the representation in the community. This disparity, it found, was more acute among supervisory personnel.

Although most major police departments today are far more diverse than those surveyed by the Kerner Commission, they still do not fully reflect the communities they serve, especially in senior leadership. According to a 2013 study of police departments serving communities with more than 100,000 residents, racial minorities are underrepresented on average by 25 percent.90 Most infamously, the Ferguson Police Department at the time of Michael Brown’s death and the subsequent uprisings consisted of 50 white officers and three Black officers in a city that was 67 percent Black in 2014.91

While the under representation of Black officers remains acute, neither we nor the Kerner Commission believe diversifying rank-and-file or police leadership would solve the problems that undermine trust and community support, including the frequency or brutality of violence. However, greater community representation brings local knowledge into these departments while opening the doors of opportunity for officers that have been traditionally excluded.

Second, the Commission recommended the use of community policing practices to improve communications with civilians and better allow police to perform their community service functions. The Commission specifically recommended that the federal government launch programs to establish community service officers or aides in communities with more than 50,000 people. The Commission also recommended that departments strengthen community relations programs, which have little in-house support and were often little more than “public relations programs,” designed to bolster the departments’ images.

In 2015 the Obama administration established a task force on “21st Century Policing” that advanced recommendations along these lines and highlighted community policing as one of the “pillars” of reform.92 Following this announcement, cities such as Richmond, California, made substantial progress in both reducing crime and improving community relations by implementing a number of community policing efforts, including long-term patrol assignments to build trust, improved department transparency, more frequent use of foot patrol, and greater accountability for bad police behavior.93

Cincinnati, the site of another uprising in 2001 following a police encounter, was lauded by the Obama task force for its efforts. The city’s community policing effort was focused on “problem solving” rather than control, and saw a dramatic (69 percent) reduction in police use of force.94 Whether such programs can be sustained in the absence of strong and committed leadership remains an open question. Only 15 of the 18,000 police departments in the US have signed on to Obama’s task force, and while the task force issued a report in 2016, the Trump administration has said nothing about continuing to advance the program.95

Further, in November 2018 the Trump administration’s former attorney general Jeff Sessions enacted consent decree restrictions, drastically limiting federal oversight over local police departments. Consent decrees are court-enforced agreements between the DOJ and local police departments found to have engaged in civil rights violations and abusive conduct. The Obama administration’s effort to fight police abuses resulted in consent decrees, out of court agreements, and investigations in dozens of cities across the US, including Ferguson, Baltimore, and Cleveland.96 Under the Trump administration’s new rule, all future and existing consent decrees will be reviewed under a heightened standard that requires a showing of evidence of violations beyond unconstitutional police behavior, a sunset end date rather than a showing of improvement of police behavior, and a condition that political appointees sign off on all proposed consent decrees.97

Criminal Justice Reform Today 

The Kerner Commission could not have fully anticipated or entirely foreseen the enormous growth in the carceral state that arose in subsequent decades. After decades of incarceration at a rate of about 100 per 100,000 people, the rate of incarceration rose sharply in the early 1970s. From the mid-1970s to mid-1980s, the rate of incarceration doubled from 150 per 100,000 Americans to 300 per 100,000 Americans.98 Then, remarkably, that figure doubled again by the mid-1990s, and reached a peak of 767 people per 100,000 by 2007. This resulted in an unprecedented rise in the prison and jail population of roughly 300,000 people to 2.2 million in absolute terms. This is far greater than any other nation on earth. A frequently cited statistic notes that although the US accounts for 5 percent of the world’s population, we have 25 percent of the world’s prison population.99

Further, the rising incarceration rate has disproportionately affected African Americans, who only make up 12 percent of the US population, but represent 33 percent of the sentenced prison population.100 In other words, African Americans experience five times the imprisonment rate of whites.101  While some of this disparity in incarceration rates can be attributed to greater social and economic dis advantages suffered by African Americans relative to whites, we do not believe that this can explain much of it, except in this respect: because young African American men are residentially concentrated in neighborhoods where disadvantage is commonplace, they are policed much more heavily and aggressively than demographically similar young white men who tend to be more broadly dispersed throughout integrated or white communities. Thus, racial segregation itself makes disparate incarceration of Black people more likely.

It should not be surprising that the rise of mass incarceration has a major racial dimension. Black men, in particular, have borne the brunt of this system, while Black families and communities in particular have been targeted and suffered by extension. This has prompted calls for a more thorough going set of reforms that extend far beyond those the Kerner Commission was in a position to imagine.

There remain many competing theories about what explains this rise in the rate of incarceration, but there appears to be broad consensus that the federal “War on Drugs” and the creation of more punitive sentencing


ing laws and more aggressive prosecutorial efforts at the state and local level played major roles.102 The rise in incarceration, however, has occurred even as crime rates fell dramatically since the early 1990s.103

First, rolling back misguided state and federal sentencing laws is a key step toward addressing the rise of mass incarceration. Most of these laws can trace their beginnings to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA), which was adopted amid the War on Drugs and abolished parole for federal offenders, lengthened prison terms, and led to the passing of mandatory minimum sentence laws for habitual offenders, thereby limiting the discretion of judges and parole boards. Following the SRA a majority of states enacted similar laws.104 But while violent crime peaked in the 1990s and has subsequently gone down, most mandatory sentences have remained and contribute significantly to increased prison populations nationwide.105

In 2009 New York removed harsh mandatory minimum sentences for low-level drug offenses. In 2014 California voters passed a measure that reclassified some low-level property and drug crimes from felonies to misdemeanors. In December 2018 President Donald Trump signed a federal prison reform bill with wide bipartisan support known as the Formerly Incarcerated Reenter Society Transformed Safely Transitioning Every Person Act (FIRST STEP Act). The new legislation includes provisions that relax mandatory-minimum sentences for nonviolent drug offenders with no prior criminal background, expands early release programs for good behavior, offers more training and work opportunities to prisoners, bans the shackling of pregnant women, and prohibits the use of solitary confinement for juveniles.106 In 2019 at least 9,000 inmates are expected to experience sentence reduction.107 While the FIRST STEP Act encompasses the most significant changes to the federal criminal justice system in decades, it applies only to federal prisoners, who make up approximately 181,000 of the 2.1 million persons imprisoned in the US.108 Supporters of the bill, including the American Civil Liberties Union and Koch Industries, are preparing for further reform efforts in line with the FIRST STEP Act, while other criminal justice reform groups like the Sentencing Project continue to advocate for the elimination of all mandatory minimum sentences and have suggested imposing a 20-year limit on prison terms.109

Additionally, bail reform is needed to address the fact that thousands of low-income individuals are held in jail before trial because they are unable to pay. The original intent behind the bail system was to ensure that people would return to court after arraignment, but jurisdictions that eliminate their use of money bail often have as high or higher percentages of people returning for court dates.110 Further, this practice disproportionately impacts African Americans who are 2.5 times more likely to be arrested than whites, two times more likely to be detained than whites, all while African American men face bail that is on average 35 percent higher than white men for similar offenses.111 A number of states have taken steps to eliminate cash bail for most criminal defendants, including New Jersey, New Mexico, and Kentucky. In 2018, California was the first state to entirely dismantle cash bail, although some criminal justice advocates are concerned with the extensive discretion the new system provides judges. Policing low-level offenses in areas perceived to be in “disorder” under the “broken windows” theory should also be revisited and reformed.112 Although the approach was initially envisioned as a community policing tactic, it has resulted in the over policing of minority communities due to varying ideas of what “social disorder” looks like. A study in Chicago found that if two neighborhoods had identical amounts of graffiti, litter, and loitering, people perceived the neighborhood with more African Americans as one with more disorder in need of policing.113  Some cities have led the charge in walking back this approach. New York allows officers to issue civil summonses for “quality of life” offenses. Milwaukee, Philadelphia, New Haven, Portland, and Seattle have introduced police foot patrols in order to repair police relationships with the community. While African Americans in some of these cities remain concerned about excessive force and discrimination from the police, approval ratings for the police have risen in some of these cities.114

These policy prescriptions would form the core of any contemporary Kerner Commission. 

  • *The Kerner Commission frequently used the word “ghetto” to refer to neighborhoods of racially concentrated poverty. In fact, it dedicated an entire chapter to the “Conditions of Life in the Racial Ghetto.” We continue to use the word “ghetto” for semantic consistency with the Kerner Report and for precision, despite possible negative associations and connotations the word has since acquired in the view of some people.
  • 49George L. Kelling and James Q. Wilson, “Broken Windows,” The Atlantic, accessed December 27, 2018, archive/1982/03/broken-windows/304465/.
  • 50Daniel Bergner, “Is Stop-and-Frisk Worth It?,” The Atlantic, accessed December 27, 2018, archive/2014/04/is-stop-and-frisk-worthit/358644/.
  • 51David Rudovsky and David A. Harris, “Terry Stops-and-Frisks: The Troubling Use of Common Sense in a World of Empirical Data,” Legal Studies Research Paper Series (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Law School, 2018), https://
  • 52“Floyd, et Al. v. City of New York, et Al.,” Center for Constitutional Rights, July 20, 2018, https://
  • 53“Floyd, et Al. v. City of New York, et Al.”
  • 54Philip Bump, “The Facts about Stop-and-Frisk in New York City,” Washington Post, September 26, 2016, news/the-fix/wp/2016/09/21/it-looks-like-rudygiuliani-convinced-donald-trump-that-stop-andfrisk-actually-works/.
  • 55“Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (The Kerner Report),” 305.
  • 56Gary Gordner, “Community Policing: Principles and Elements,” in Critical Issues in Policing: Contemporary Readings, ed. Roger G. Dunham and Geoffrey P. Alpert, 7th Edition (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 2015).
  • 57Mark H. Moore, Robert C. Trojanowicz, and George L. Kelling, “Crime and Policing” (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice; National Institute of Justice; Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, June 1988).
  • 58Moore.
  • 59Brett M. Cowell and Anne L. Kringen, “Engaging Communities One Step at a Time: Policing’s Tradition of Foot Patrol as an Innovative Community Engagement Strategy” (Washington, D.C.: Police Foundation, 2016), PF_Engaging-Comminities-One-Step-at-a-Time_ Final.pdf.
  • 60“Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights,” 42 U.S. Code § 1983 §, accessed December 27, 2018, text/42/1983.
  • 61John O. Newman, “Here’s a Better Way to Punish the Police: Sue Them for Money,” Washington Post, June 23, 2016, https://www.”
  • 62Newman.
  • 63Police Executive Research Forum, “Guiding Principles on Use of Force,” Critical Issues in Policing (Washington, D.C.: Police Executive Research Forum, March 2016), https://www. pdf; Radley Balko, “The Case Against Qualified Immunity,” Washington Post, January 12, 2017,….
  • 64Curtis Gilbert, “Not Trained to Not Kill,” APM Reports, May 5, 2017, https://www.apmreports. org/story/2017/05/05/police-de-escalation-training.
  • 65Gilbert.
  • 66Gilbert.
  • 67Gilbert.
  • 68Wesley Lowery et al., “Where Killings Go Unsolved,” Washington Post, June 6, 2018, https://….
  • 69Steven Rich et al., “Homicide Database: Mapping Unsolved Murders in Major U.S. Cities,” Washington Post, June 14, 2018, https://www.
  • 70Tim Elfrink, “Miami Police Solve Fewer Than a Third of Murders in Many Black Neighborhoods,” Miami New Times, June 6, 2018, https://www.
  • 71“Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (The Kerner Report),” 311.
  • 72“Citizen Complaints,” Baltimore Police Department, 2018, citizen-complaints.
  • 73Ryan J. Reilly, “Here’s What Happens When You Complain to Cops About Cops,” Huffington Post, October 9, 2015,….
  • 74Reilly.
  • 75Reilly.
  • 76Olugbenga Ajilore, “How Civilian Review Boards Can Further Police Accountability and Improve Community Relations” (Cambridge, MA: Scholars Strategy Network, June 25, 2018),…; Tim Lynch, “How Mayors, Police Unions and Cops Rig Civilian Review Boards,” Cato Institute, October 24, 2016, commentary/how-mayors-police-unions-cops-rigcivilian-review-boards.
  • 77“Complaints,” New York City, Civilian Complaint Review Board, accessed December 27, 2018,; Allyson Collins, “Shielded from Justice: Police Brutality and Accountability in the United States” (Washington, D.C.: Human Rights Watch, 1998),
  • 78“The Civilian Review Board of Baltimore City,” Baltimore City Office of Civil Rights, July 9, 2015,
  • 79Annie Sweeney, “First Public Hearing on Civilian Oversight of CPD Abruptly Breaks Up Amid Protest,” Chicago Tribune, May 16, 2018, https:// ct-met-community-oversight-commission-hearing-20180516-story.html.
  • 80“Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department.
  • 81Matthew J. Hickman, “Citizen Complaints about Police Use of Force,” Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (U.S. Department of Justice. Bureau of Justice Statistics, December 15, 1989), ICPSR09222.v2.
  • 82“Investigation of the Newark Police Department” (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division; U.S. Attorney’s Office District of New Jersey, July 22, 2014), https://….
  • 83An estimated 83.9% of individuals who experienced force or the threat of force felt that the police acted improperly. Of those who experienced the use or threat of force in 2008 and felt the police acted improperly, 13.7% filed a complaint against the police. Christine Eith and Matthew R. Durose, “Contacts Between Police and the Public, 2008” (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, October 2011), 14, pdf/cpp08.pdf.
  • 84“Use of Force Policy,” Chicago Police Department, 2018, use-of-force-policy/.
  • 85See: Carmen Best, Chief of Police, “Seattle Police Department Manual” (Seattle Police Department, December 3, 2018), https://www.
  • 86See: Brian Manley (Chief of Police), “Policy Manual” (Austin Police Depart - ment, July 20, 2017), https://www. Current_APD_Policy_Manual_2017-1.5_ issued_7-20-2017.pdf.
  • 87Rebecca Worby, “California Could Become the First State to Dramatically Restrict Police Use of Deadly Force,” Pacific Standard, June 22, 2018, https://
  • 88The Sacramento Bee Editorial Board, “Don’t Be So Fast to Dismiss That California Use-of-Force Bill,” The Sac - ramento Bee, June 24, 2018, https:// article213634014.html.
  • 89“Report of the National Advisory Com - mission on Civil Disorders (The Kerner Report),” 317.
  • 90Mike Maciag, “Where Police Don’t Mirror Communities and Why It Matters,” Gov - erning, August 28, 2015, http://www. - ty/gov-police-department-diversity.html.
  • 91Katie Sanders, “Ferguson, Mo., Has 50 White Police Officers, Three Black Offi - cers, NBC’s Mitchell Claims,” PolitiFact, August 17, 2014, https://www.politifact . com/punditfact/statements/2014/ aug/17/andrea-mitchell/ferguson-po - lice-department-has-50-white-officers-t/.
  • 92President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, “Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing” (Washington, D.C.: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, May 2015).
  • 93John Geluardi, “The Firing of Captain Mark Gagan,” East Bay Express, June 27, 2018, oakland/the-firing-of-captain-mark-gagan/ Content?oid=17479569.
  • 94Alana Semuels, “How to Fix a Broken Po - lice Department,” The Atlantic, accessed December 27, 2018, https://www. cincinnati-police-reform/393797/.
  • 95Rhodan Maya, “Why Obama’s Police Reform Is a Work in Progress,” Time, July 8, 2016, obama-police-reform-report-task-forceon-21st-century-policing/.
  • 96Jeff Roberson, “Here’s Why Jeff Ses - sions’ Parting Shot Is Worse Than You Thought,” The Marshall Project, November 20, 2018, https://www.
  • 97Katie Benner, “Sessions, in Last-Minute Act, Sharply Limits Use of Consent Decrees to Curb Police Abuses,” The New York Times, November 15, 2018, sec. U.S., https://www.nytimes. com/2018/11/08/us/politics/ses - sions-limits-consent-decrees.html.
  • 98Ta-Nehisi Coates, “The Black Family in the Age of Mass Incarceration,” The Atlantic, accessed December 27, 2018, archive/2015/10/the-black-family-in-theage-of-mass-incarceration/403246/.
  • 99white house council of econ. Advisors, eco - nomic perspectives on incarceration and the criminal justice system 23 (2016), https:// files/20160423_cea_incarceration_criminal_ justice.pdf. [].
  • 100John Gramlich, “The Gap Between the Number of Blacks and Whites in Prison Is Shrinking,” Pew Research Center, January 12, 2018, sec. Fact Tank: News in the Numbers, http://www. - ing-gap-between-number-of-blacks-and-whitesin-prison/.
  • 101Gramlich.
  • 102Eli Hager and Bill Keller, “Everything You Think You Know about Mass Incarceration Is Wrong,” Marshall Project, February 9, 2017, https:// everything-you-think-you-know-about-mass-in - carceration-is-wrong.
  • 103“Reported Violent Crime Rate in the United States from 1990 to 2018,” Statista, February 20, 2019, - tics/191219/reported-violent-crime-rate-in-theusa-since-1990/.
  • 104Bloomberg Editorial Board, “Congress Has a Chance to Reform Criminal Sentencing,” Bloomberg, June 20, 2018, sec. Bloomberg Opinion, articles/2018-06-20/congress-has-a-chanceto-reform-criminal-sentencing.
  • 105Bloomberg Editorial Board
  • 106Nicholas Fandos, “Senate Passes Bipartisan Criminal Justice Bill,” The New York Times, December 20, 2018, sec. U.S., https://www. - ate-criminal-justice-bill.html.
  • 107Justin George, “Okay, What’s the Second Step?,” The Marshall Project, December 19, 2018, https://www.themarshallproject. org/2018/12/19/okay-what-s-the-second-step.
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