Moving Targets: An Analysis of Global Forced Migration

Part 1: A History of Refugee Protections: Race, Colonialism, and the Unevenness of Forced Migration

Part 1: A History of Refugee Protections: Race, Colonialism, and the Unevenness of Forced Migration

In this section we begin our look at forced migration by unpacking the twentieth-century origins and evolution of the global refugee regime: the set of norms that define who is a refugee, the rights to which that person is entitled, and the norms that define who is expected to support that person. We examine the support designated refugees receive, addressing the significance of the person's country of origin, intended host country, the causes of that person's displacement, and the broader social and political context within which their journey has taken place.

Those forced to migrate today are largely from the Global South. Further, the disproportionate burden of accommodating such refugees has also been placed upon the Global South, while many Global North countries have ignored established refugee conventions. These realities illustrate what we call the unevenness of forced migration, which is related to the idea of Europe itself as a "sanctuary"—the relative well-being its populations enjoys, not simply in contrast to regions under former European colonial control, but made possible by way of extractive colonial relations. Our analysis illustrates how these dynamics have been shaped by particular social and political contexts, most notably the Cold War. 

World War II and the Origins and Limits of Refugee Protections

With roughly 60 million Europeans fleeing persecution, violence, and poverty during WWII, the extreme vulnerability that characterized the wartime and post-war environment was largely new for Europeans in the modern era.8 As the scale of violence increased, migration continued throughout the war. By 1951, more than five years after the fighting stopped, a million people had yet to find a place to settle.

The Second World War highlighted for many people the ways in which national governments were themselves the cause of the refugee problem. From their origin during the Enlightenment, so-called “human rights” were understood as the rights of national citizens. Yet by the late 1930s, the fact that one’s rights were only as good as the politics of the country they lived in had become apparent9 —for those not under the protection of the racist, homophobic, and ableist ideologies of Germany, for example, this point was quite clear.10

In the wake of WWII, such judicial and political vulnerability motivated the creation of a new universal human rights regime. This included the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 and the Refugee Conventions that followed (in 1951, 1954 and 1961).11 It also included the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.12

A significant major stipulation of the 1951 Refugee Convention was that it was limited to protecting European WWII refugees from only before January 1, 1951.14 Although the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees removed both the temporal and geographic restrictions of the 1951 Refugee Convention, the Protocol gave those states that had previously ratified the 1951 Convention the option to uphold such restrictions. 

Given these early Eurocentric limits of international refugee law, for many Europeans WWII was a divergence from the histories of violence that were typically reserved for those areas outside Europe. The war reflected the inward movement of US and European-driven colonial violence and dispossession, racialized expropriations of many kinds, and policies that had virtually ensured that colonized countries across the world would be unable to provide social and economic security for the vast majority of their populations. '

What separates the conditions of World War I from those of World War II are the exclusionary nationalistic and discriminatory ideologies that drove not only mass violence but also the enactment of such violence along new lines of human difference previously experienced primarily by colonized populations. The genocides carried out during World War I, for example, were largely carried out by the Ottoman Empire against Armenians, Assyrians, Lebanese, Kurds, and others, whereas those carried out in World War II were against those people who were part of their respective national populations. 

According to the author Hannah Arendt, what the world witnessed during WWII was the experience of violence, death, and displacement by the “civilized” people of Europe that had been previously reserved for the “savages” of the colonial world.15 In the particular tactics used, and within the social and political formations that arose, such links are apparent. According to the African philosopher and political theorist Achille Mbembe, there is a link between national-socialism and traditional imperialism, and as the prominent Martiniquan poet Aimé Césaire stated, fascism is not an aberration in the history of the West, for its brutal tactics and ideas have long been the work of Western empire outside its borders.16 The surprise to Europeans that Europe itself could experience dispossession and violence generally reserved for the colonial world— and, for Europe’s working classes and newly “stateless people” who were themselves compared to the “savages” of the colonial world—speaks to the histories that have created Europe as a place of relative material comfort and supposed “sanctuary” in the world.17 Specifically, territorial acquisition, enslavement and indentured labor, and extractive trade in the colonial world founded the formative wealth of Europe, the US, and elsewhere.18

Violent and extractive colonial relations were sustained so that life within the US and Europe could remain more secure and prosperous. This certain comfort was thrown into question with the rise of authoritarian and far rightwing regimes in Europe—as well as the experience of US blacks in and outside of the Jim Crow-era US South—with violence and displacement taking place on a scale not seen before.

CATEGORIES OF FORCED MIGRATION

International legal mechanisms, some of which are codified in domestic law and others that are generally accepted principles, define various types of people who have been forced from their homes, lands of origin or current place of residence. Here are the most commonly accepted categories of forced migration. 

Asylum Seeker is the general term used for people seeking protection in a country different from their country of origin. 

Refugee falls within a subset of “asylum seeker”. The basic definition of refugee found in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees is as follows:

"Owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it."

This definition expanded in the 1950 Statute of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees by including persecution on the basis of social group. The 1967 Protocol amended the refugee definition by eliminating geographical and temporal limitations. The EU and Canada have ratified the Convention and Protocol, the US has only ratified the Protocol. In the US, the 1980 Refugee Act defines a refugee as the following: 

"(A) any person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, or (B) in such special circumstances as the President after appropriate consultation...may specify, any person who is within the country of such person’s nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, within the country in which such person is habitually residing, and who is persecuted or who has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion."

International conventions and domestic legislation require a person to be outside their country of origin to be considered a refugee. In contrast, an internally displaced person (IDP) is an individual who remains within their country’s territorial boundaries. The UNCHR Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement define IDPs as:

"persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized border."

Even if IDPs have fled their homes for reasons identical to refugees, they remain under the legal protection of their own government, even if that government is the root cause of their fleeing. IDPs and refugees are subject to the privileges and responsibilities associated with their countries of origin or where they have taken refuge. 

There is also a special designated status for those considered stateless. The 1954 Convention on the Status of Stateless Persons defines such a person as someone 

“who is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law.” Some people are born stateless while others become so later in their lives. 

Climate refugee is a term we use for people who are not considered refugees or IDPs, but have been forced to migrate for reasons related to climate change-induced environmental disasters and degradation. The Cancun Adaptation Framework agreed to at the 2010 UN Climate Change Conference called on parties to enhance their understanding and cooperation of “climate-induced displacement, migration and planned relocation.” The UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction estimates that more than 19.3 million were displaced by disasters in 2014. 

There is also development-induced displacement, another type of forced migration related to the forcing of people out of their homes for economic development such as the building of dams for hydroelectric power and irrigation purposes, mining, creating military installation, airports, industrial plants, weapon testing grounds, railways, road developments, urbanization, conservation projects and forestry, among others. The World Bank estimates that approximately 10 million people are displaced yearly worldwide due to infrastructure programs.13

This chart showcases Refugee Admissions to the United States by Region, from 1975 to present

The Cold War and the Political Utility of Refugee Protections

uropean countries and the US have not always turned their back on migrants and refugees from the Global South (nor do they do so entirely now). Yet during the Cold War, Europe and the United States’ selective acceptance of refugees—dependent upon the country of origin, the receiving country, the cause for displacement, and the social and political context at the time—spoke to how acceptance of refugees has been at times more a matter of political utility than a fundamental belief that such protections should be afforded to all peoples. 

After the fall of the Soviet Union, the limits of signatories to fully abide by refugee conventions—limits inherent to the origins of such conventions—became especially apparent.

During the Cold War years, the granting of refugee status and protections to asylum seekers became a moral and political tactic. Doing so helped differentiate between the supposed “civilized West” and “uncivilized East”—namely, the Soviet Union.21 As such, the paradigmatic refugee during the Cold War was the Eastern European and Soviet escapee, and the term “refugee” became interchangeable with “defector.” In this way, providing asylum to refugees fleeing communism, who were themselves symbols of communism’s failure, became a foreign policy tool for the US, providing an alleged advantage over the Soviet Union.22 For example, in 1948, following the admission of more than 250,000 displaced Europeans, Congress passed the Displaced Persons Act, which enabled the admission of an additional 400,000 refugees, the vast majority of whom were escaping from Communist governments—namely, Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia, Korea, Vietnam, China, and Cuba. Despite conflict not being limited to these selected countries, until the mid-1980s, more than 90 percent of the refugees that the US admitted came primarily from countries in the communist Eastern bloc.23

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the political utility of accepting refugees was severely diminished. It was at this time that the racial and colonial limits of refugee conventions became particularly apparent. During the 1990s there were several prominent refugee emergencies that highlighted not only the shifting geographies of mass displacement but also the negative rhetoric toward about refugees from outside Europe, and the extreme social and political hesitation to accept them. The Kurdish refugee crisis in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War, the displacement resulting from the Balkan wars, the mass exodus resulting from the Rwandan genocide, the waves of refugees from the Horn of Africa and West Africa—all were emergencies that received far less attention than explicitly Cold War crises.24

This infographic includes a map detailing The Rise of Populism and Exclusionary Nationalism in Europe

There was no shortage of stated reasons for refusing to accept non-European refugees. Sadako Ogata, the former UN High Commissioner for Refugees in the 1990s noted that the nature of the refugee crisis was seemingly beyond what the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) could handle.25 Many of the challenges confronted by the agency during the 1990s had political origins and therefore required more than simply humanitarian responses. As such, Ogata has rightly portrayed the nineties as a decade of refugee emergencies. During Ogata’s tenure the average duration of a refugee's situation almost doubled, rising from an average of nine years in 1991 to 17 years by 2003. The decade gave rise to protracted refugee situations, what might be considered the greatest challenge faced in regard to the global refugee protection regime, and forcing the UNHCR to address situations that were seemingly beyond their capacity or mandate to resolve.26 Under such circumstances, Ogata argued that the UNHCR was forced to compromise on a number of its core principles, such as the return of rejected asylum seekers to their place of origin.27

Yet the UNHCR was largely left alone to confront such difficulties during the decade in part because state actors were increasingly unwilling to take action. For example, in Hungary the rise of Victor Orban and his rightwing populist party swept to victory (in 2010 and again in 2014) on the back of xenophobia, Islamophobia, anti-refugee sentiment, and a “keep Europe Christian” platform.28 Hungary’s role in dealing with refugees attempting to get in Europe has been uniquely egregious in its lack of humanitarian response, with in-country asylum-seekers detained, and their applications rejected based largely on their national origin and religion. Amnesty International has documented that “Hungary continued to severely restrict access to the country for refugees and asylum-seekers, criminalizing thousands of people for irregular entry across the border fences put up at its southern border.”29 When Hungary suspended its obligation and refused to accept asylum-seekers other European governments publicly accused the Hungarian government of treating refugees “worse than wild animals.”30

Such anti-refugee sentiment and policy has been at the center of many rightwing European political parties’ push for the formation of more restrictive asylum and refugee policies, and have led many European governments either to inaction or to openly bending under pressure in order to avoid the fulfillment of their international obligations toward refugees.31 These trends pose a fundamental challenge to the rights and support guaranteed within the global refugee regime.

THE EU-TURKEY DEAL: A DECEITFUL AGREEMENT

Changes in international refugee governance are already being made. For example, the EU-Turkey refugee deal, which went into effect March 20, 2016, has been claimed a major victory for the Turkish and German government given its potential to reduce the flow of asylum-seekers into the EU and calm the ongoing refugee crisis. The deal stipulates that: Turkey will work to prevent departures of migrants from Turkey to the EU; in coordination with EU member states, Turkey will return those migrants considered to not be in need of international protection to their country of origin; Turkey will send one Syrian refugee to the EU for every Syrian refugee deported to Turkey; and that Turkey will receive 3–6 billion Euros to aid its own resettlement programs and a promise of easing visa restrictions for Turkish citizens to the EU. In return for Turkey’s agreement, the deal stipulates that the EU would grant visa-free travel to Turkish citizens, accelerate Ankara’s EU membership application, and increase financial aid to help Turkey manage the refugee crisis.

Yet such developments in international refugee governance need be assessed for their larger impacts and precedents they set. The EU-Turkey deal, for example, has introduced a host of new crises: it is arguably illegal under EU law and international law, and it ultimately reflects an entirely wrong framework for new partnerships and measures designed to curb the influx of refugees and adequately process those that do arrive. Despite the stipulations above, for example, only 2,935 Syrian refugees have been resettled to EU member states as of January 17, 2017, while Turkey hosts some 2.8 million Syrian refugees. Additionally, Turkey has not proven to be a safe place for refugees, as many Syrians fleeing violent conflict have been deported from Turkey back to Syria. The borders to other European countries have been closed and are increasingly militarized and securitized, thus creating a bottleneck for all migration to Europe and putting great stress on Greece in particular. Furthermore, as these borders close, other, more precarious paths for human smuggling emerge, leaving refugees with little choice but to make even more perilous journeys across highly surveilled borders. A recent report from Amnesty International calls the EU-Turkey deal “A Blueprint for Despair.

The deal has also nearly frozen the legal process for asylum in Greece. As of March 16, 2017, only around 10,000 asylum seekers were relocated from Greece to another EU member state, out of an initial target of 63,000. Further, since the EU-Turkey deal went into effect, nearly 14,000 asylum seekers have been stuck indefinitely on the Greek islands in the Aegean Sea, in prison-like camps that offer little safety or protection, and no clear answers or certainty as to whether their cases will be considered or processed. People fear deportation, which would be a death sentence for the many Syrians who face great risk if sent back to Turkey. Many of the different groups fighting in Syria have extended networks into Turkey, where kidnappings by Syrian regime forces, Jabhat al Nusra, and Daesh have previously occurred. The endless uncertainty and fear of what is to come is the hardest to endure, especially when conditions within the camps continue to worsen.

The camps in Greece are being turned into detention centers, or “hotspots,” complete with fences and barbed wire. There are also plans to build new camps in remote locations that would be completely closed off. Essentially, these refugees are imprisoned with little access to or contact with the outside world. With little access to basic services for physical and mental health, as well as legal needs, the conditions in the camps themselves are abysmal and have continued to worsen.

Such conditions in the camps are essentially a symptom of a deal that is fundamentally flawed. While the world is witnessing the greatest displacement of peoples since WWII, the EU has failed in its responsibility to provide safety and protection for a fraction of the world’s displaced peoples. Instead, it has worked to build walls, borders, and legal regimes to keep people out, in effect, relapsing to a historical period it vowed never to repeat. 

Expansion and Contraction of Refugee Protections in the Twenty-first Century

In recent years, however, some progress has been made toward less restrictive asylum policies, and the definition for refugee status has been broadening in some ways under customary international law. According to international law scholar Donald Worster, this is taking place in a few key ways. First, the classification of social group membership appears to be broadening as a result of cultural changes.32 Additionally, some states have begun to recognize non-state actors as potential sources of persecution, rather than only states themselves.33 Finally, the infrequent use of certain exceptions to refugee conventions is also a sign of its broad applicability and dynamic nature.34

At the same time, however, persons and situations covered by customary international law have been contracting.35 For example, internal flight or relocation within the state of nationality has been used as an alternative to seeking official refugee status, as relocation within the state of nationality can seemingly allow for the individual not to face the danger needed for refugee qualification. Additionally, states have applied “safe third country” and “safe country of origin” guidelines—blanket definitions of country’s safety for the purpose of asylum. The recent addition of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia to Germany’s “safe country of origin” list seemingly enables Germany to refuse claims without further review.36

On the one hand, states appear to believe in a humanitarian imperative to protect individuals who are seeking refuge—a seeming shift from the restrictive politics of refugee protections in the wake of the Cold War—while, on the other hand, they are reluctant to permit entry to all those persons falling under their responsibility.37

Even for those who are resettled, the failure to grant citizenship has both contributed to displacement and made it more difficult to resolve. Many states limit the number of viable paths to citizenship. Restrictive framings of national citizenship limit and inhibit local integration. Further, policies that focus on extended detentions in isolated areas—currently highly visible in the practices of Australia, Greece, Turkey, and elsewhere—further undermine efforts of integration. Ultimately, such policies create “separate but equal” systems within the countries where they are seeking asylum. Many refugees can only live in a limited geographic space and are deprived of freedom of movement and protections of the state.38 The International Refugee Rights Initiative states that the proper realization of citizenship is a key factor that determines whether or not a particular person or group will be further displaced; whether they will be able to repatriate; whether they will be accepted by those in their home communities if they do return; how they are perceived in exile both by host communities and those “at home”; whether durable solutions are possible; or whether they will end their lives in exile.39

Taken together, the contracting of those who would be covered by international law and the limiting of pathways to citizenship, despite the seemingly expanding scope of refugee protections, together with the increase of political animosity toward displaced peoples from outside Europe, are trends that we attribute in part to the racialized limits of refugee protections, which have deep roots in the Global North’s history of colonialism. This is not to say that international refugee protections and actions by state actors have not been paramount in providing the possibility for another life for displaced peoples; rather, such protections by international actors have not been as sufficient as should be when the potential political gains were unclear.44

As such, the UNHCR has stated that “the rate at which solutions are being found for refugees and internally displaced people has been on a falling trend since the end of the Cold War.45 This trend is apparent in the treatment of asylum-seekers and other displaced peoples who are part of the current extremity that refugees face, treatment that stands apart from the refugee crises of the past. This treatment includes the mass deportation of Syrians back to Turkey, the call by British, German, and Italian governments for refugees to be sent back to Libya, the Danish government’s demands that asylum seekers hand over valuables to pay for their stay, as well as the stranding of more than 53,000 refugees and migrants in Greece as of April 2016.46

  • 8. Violence and displacement within Europe was not new, of course, as World War I, the Napoleonic Wars, the 30 Years War, and other such wars make clear. As the section outlines though, it was the particular ideologies held and practices enacted during World War II, and the protections to emerge thereafter, that set it apart from these earlier conflicts
  • 9. Lyndsey Stonebridge, “What History Tells Us About the Refugee Crisis,” New Humanist, December 14, 2015, https://newhumanist.org.uk/articles/4972/whathistory-tells-us-about-the-....
  • 10. World War II saw the figure of the “refugee” or “stateless person” entered European political thought. Hannah Arendt, a German-born political theorist who escaped Europe during the Holocaust was among the first to describe how incredibly vulnerable refugees had become during the era. Italian Political theorist Georgio Agamben elaborated upon those ideas put forth by Arendt and argued that refugees expose the key contradiction of the liberal democratic nation-state: the principle of national sovereignty to exclude anyone from citizenship or entry, and the support commitment of said state to universal individual rights. This contradiction, they argue, highlights the limits of liberal efforts to assimilate refugees. Ibid.
  • 11. The Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, also known as the 1951 Refugee Convention, is a United Nations multilateral treaty that defines who may qualify as a refugee and the responsibilities of nations that grant asylum. The Convention builds on Article 14 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which recognizes the right of persons to seek asylum from persecution in other countries.
  • 12. While consolidated into a comprehensive human rights regime after World War II, such refugee protections have their roots in the institutions that arose in wake of World War I (1914-1918), the Balkan Wars (1912-1913), as well as the wars in the Caucasus (1918-1921) and the Greco-Turkish War (1919-1922). These conflicts caused considerable displacements in the countries involved, particularly in the Russian Empire, where between 1 and 2 million fled Russian territories from 1918 and 1922, seeking asylum in Europe, Asia Minor, and Central and East Asia. These wars led to the creation of the League of Nations (1921-1946) and the mass displacement in particular fomented the creation of several institutions designed to perform some or all of the tasks of the High Commissioner for Refugees: the Nansen International Office for Refugees (1931-1938), the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees coming from Germany (1933-1938), the Office of the High Commissioner of the League of Nations for Refugees (1939-1946) and the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (1938-1947). Gilbert Jaeger, “On the History of the International Protection of Refugees” 83, no. 843 (September 2001).
  • 14. Specifically, prior to being expanded, the 1951 convention referred to “events occurring in Europe before 1 January 1951.”
  • 15. Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harvest, 1966), 444, https://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/arts/english/currentstudents/pg/masters/m....
  • 16. Achilles Mbembé and Libby Meintjes, “Necropolitics,” Public Culture 15, no. 1 (2003): 18.
  • 17. Aimé Césaire, Discourse on Colonialism (Paris: Présence Africaine, 1955), 20.
  • 18. Lisa Lowe, “The Intimacies of Four Continents,” in Haunted by Empire: Geographies of Intimacy in North American History, ed. Ann Laura Stoler (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 30.
  • 13. “Resettlement and Development: The Bankwide Review of Projects Involving Involuntary Resettlement, 1986-1993” (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, March 31, 1996), http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/1996/03/01....
  • 21. Randy Lippert, “Governing Refugees: The Relevance of Governmentality to Understanding the International Refugee Regime,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 24, no. 3 (1999): 295–328; Cited in: Yen Le Espiritu, Body Counts: The Vietnam War and Militarized Refugees (Oakland: University of California Press, 2014), 8.
  • 22. Espiritu, Body Counts, 8.
  • 23. Carl J. Tempo, Americans at the Gate: The United States and Refugees During the Cold War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14682740903398904; Cited in: Espiritu, Body Counts, 9.
  • 24. Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin, 2006), http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396330601062857.
  • 25. Sadako Ogata and Kofi A. Annan, The Turbulent Decade: Confronting the Refugee Crises of the 1990s (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2005).
  • 26. Ibid.
  • 27. Ibid.
  • 28. Robert Mackey, “Hungarian Leader Rebuked for Saying Muslim Migrants Must Be Blocked ‘to Keep Europe Christian,’” The New York Times, September 3, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/04/world/europe/hungarian-leader-rebuked....
  • 29. “Annual Report: Hungary, 2016/2017” (London: Amnesty International, 2017), https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/europe-and-central-asia/hungary/rep...
  • 30. Matthew Weaver and Patrick Kingsley, “Expel Hungary from EU for Hostility to Refugees, Says Luxembourg,” The Guardian, September 13, 2016, sec. World news, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/13/expel-hungary-from-eu-for-....
  • 31. Such sentiment is of course not recent nor is it limited to Hungary. For example, in Germany during the early 1990s, anti-migrant and anti-refugee populism from mainstream politicians grew alongside waves of street violence and arson attacks in towns such as Hoyerswerda, Rostock, Solingen and others. Grounded in generally hostile sentiment toward non-Europeans, many politicians, large sections of the media, and the general public all saw asylum seekers as legitimate targets for criticism because asylum seekers often required state aid, seemingly offered little by way of visible economic benefits to the host state, and arrived uninvited.
  • 32. William Thomas Worster, “The Evolving Definition of the Refugee in Contemporary International Law,” Berkeley J. Int’l L. 30 (2012): 96.
  • 33. Ibid., 97
  • 34. According to Worster, such exceptions include those who “pose a compelling threat to national security or public order, present a danger to the security of the country of refuge, or have been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime and constitute a danger to the community of the country of refuge.” Ibid., 103.
  • 35. Ibid., 140.
  • 36. Thus, despite the fact that no state is entirely safe, “safe third country tests” can be used as a means to refuse claims outright without analysis if the individual is coming from a country that has been deemed safe (a possibility often paired with expedited processing procedures). Courts have demanded, however, that such claims be assessed on their merits rather than procedurally refused based on the stated country of transit and other criteria. Therefore, Worster argues that “the definition of refugee as a person outside his country of nationality has evolved to cover only a person outside his country of nationality who has not arrived in any other safe country yet.” Significantly, under certain circumstances, states have also imposed certain regulations that entirely prohibit the filing of an application for refugee status . According to Worster, these provisions do not narrow the definition of “refugee,” rather they “assess the broader scope of refugee status.” Ibid., 149.
  • 37. Ibid., 94
  • 38. Lucy Hovil and Zachary Lomo, “The Role of Citizenship in Addressing Refugee Crises in Africa’s Great Lakes Region” (Kampala: International Refugee Rights Initiative, June 2014), http://www.refugee-rights.org/Publications/Papers/2014/Citizenship%20 policy%20paper%20FINAL1.pdf
  • 39. Ibid.
  • 44. The acceptance of refugees from Vietnam, Loas, and Cambodia from the mid-1970s onward clarified both the political utility (vis-à-vis the Cold War) of accepting refugees as well as the imperial origins of such refugees vis-à-vis the U.S. intervention in the affairs of the Global South. See: Mimi Thi Nguyen, The Gift of Freedom: War, Debt, and Other Refugee Passages (Durham: Duke University Press, 2012).
  • 45. “Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2015.
  • 46. Raziye Akkoc, “What the Refugee Crisis Looks Like Across Europe Over Four Weeks in Six Charts,” The Telegraph, April 14, 2016, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/04/14/what-the-refugee-crisislooks-....